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1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
The present dissertation that investigates Giorgio Agamben’s political thinking 
and Ernesto Laclau/Oliver Marchart’s post-foundational political ontology con-
sists of three interrelated articles: “Political Differentiability”, “Giorgio Agam-
ben’s ‘Messianic Fulfilment’ of Foundationalism in Politics”, and “Towards a 
Rethinking Laclau and Mouffe’s of Conception of ‘Social Antagonisms’: 
Agamben’s Critique of Relation”. These studies examine three major topics of 
contemporary political ontology: “the political difference” between “the politi-
cal” and politics, political post-foundationalism, and social antagonism. The 
following introduction serves as a summary that outlines the wider philosophi-
cal context, the central theses, and the interconnection between the aforemen-
tioned articles. 
In general terms, the subject matter of the present dissertation is political 
ontology or “the philosophy of the political” that, in my view, grows out of the 
collapse of fundamental ontology or, to use the traditional term, of metaphysics. 
Traditionally, metaphysics is seen as not investigating the being of this or that 
particular being (e.g., a table, a house), but rather as the study of “the being of 
beings” (das Sein des Seiende), of “being qua being” (Heidegger 1998). 
Throughout the history of the Occident, being has disclosed itself as a foun-
dation on the basis of which the beingness of all beings shines forth (Heidegger 
2006: 65–66; Heidegger 2007: 69–70). Metaphysics is in this sense the most 
fundamental form of foundationalism (i.e., theology) that envisions beings as a 
whole from the perspective of an ultimate or final being like god, Hegel’s abso-
lute, and Descartes’s subject. Metaphysics (also called a first philosophy) 
grounds all particular sciences or, better, regional ontologies, examining one 
specific region of beings. In face of the nihilism that Friedrich Nietzsche 
associated with the devaluation of Christian values, the metaphysical chain of 
“onto-theo-logical” fundamentals from arche to Edmund Husserl’s transcen-
dental subjectivity began to break down (Agamben 1991: xi–xiii; Agamben 
1999: 45–47; Derrida 2007: 352–355). Nihilism, as Martin Heidegger has 
argued, does not simply signify plain termination, but rather “completion” 
(Vollendung) of metaphysics (Heidegger 2007: 71–74; see also Agamben 1991: 
xiii). What is at stake in the age of nihilism is nothing less than the final and 
extreme unveiling of being as the nothing of all beings. Pure being, which meta-
physics has sought to isolate from “the many meanings of the term “Being””, 
appears as the nothing, as the most empty and meaningless word (Agamben 
1998: 182). The nothing that refers to the groundlessness of the self-grounding 
of being is the “ineffable” limit of the Western metaphysics. Following Agam-
ben and Laclau, I argue in the present dissertation that this unsayable limit is 
primarily the passage or “the zone of undecidability” between outside and in-
side, negativity and positivity, the political and politics, semiotics and seman-
tics, particularity and universality. To dwell in the age of nihilism means to 
experience the imprisonment within this very passage, in the Nothing. 
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In Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time that attempts to renew again “the 
question of being”, the fundamental categories of the Western politics do not 
play any significant role. But Agamben, one of the best known and original 
philosophers in contemporary Italy, draws attention to an ineffable negativity 
that has destined not only the metaphysical grounding of all beings, but also the 
political self-grounding of the juridico-political order (Agamben 1998: 7–8, 
182). Since the ancient Greek polis, as Agamben shows in his internationally 
acclaimed and controversial work Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, 
the metaphysical quest to isolate pure being from many ways of being has been 
inseparable from the political quest to isolate “bare life” (nuda vita) from many 
ways of life (Agamben 1998: 182). Bare life, insofar as it is subjected to the 
sovereign power, is homo sacer (a sacred man) who “may be killed and yet not 
sacrificed” (Agamben 1998: 8; original emphasis). Homo sacer, a killable life, 
is the “original political element” (i.e., negativity) in relation to which a 
juridico-political order has grounded itself. Simultaneously with the breakdown 
of the Occidental onto-theo-logy, the juridico-political tradition brings to light 
its ineffable limit in the figure of homo sacer (Agamben 1998: 11–12). 
Thinking and politics, having reached the extreme point of culmination and ex-
haustion, run up against their ineffable limits – i.e., against the nothing and 
homo sacer. For Agamben, this negative limit is the point of intersection where 
the metaphysical tradition and the juridico-political tradition pass over into each 
other (Agamben 1998: 182; see Agamben 2002: 75–80). The undecidable pas-
sage where we dwell is therefore a political passage. That is why a general 
ontology, or metaphysics, is constitutively a political ontology (e.g., Agamben 
1998: 7–8; Agamben 2004: 75–80). Thus, without taking politics into account, 
it is not possible to grasp the constitution of the Western metaphysics. 
Due to the influence of Heidegger on political ontology, I situate the main 
topics and themes of the current dissertation on a wider horizon called “the 
Heideggerian Left”. Yet, accepting Heidegger’s thinking as the main point of 
reference in no way entails that its reception would have been univocal or un-
questioning. Troubles emerge already within the so-called “left-Heideggeria-
nism” itself. Alain Badiou and Jacques Rancière, for instance, reject the philo-
sophical mode of thinking inaugurated by Heidegger; and others, like Ernesto 
Laclau and Agamben, elaborate some but reject other ideas and concepts. 
Disavowal and avowal go hand in hand. Yet, the philosophy of the political, 
whether negatively or positively, sees Heidegger nevertheless as a partner in the 
discussion. As long as the dissertation specifically studies the intersection of 
Agamben’s philosophy and post-foundational political ontology, I have 
refrained from exploring certain clusters of fundamental questions. In order to 
focus on the explication and defence of my theses, I have placed within brackets 
all questions of fidelity to Heidegger’s work, for example, problems such as: Is 
Agamben’s interpretation of Ereignis correct? Is Laclau’s understanding of the 
ontological difference feasible? Does Marchart present Heidegger’s under-
standing of “difference as difference” adequately? In the same way, I do not 
examine whether left-Heideggerian political thought succeeds or fails in its 
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critique of Heidegger. That is to say, I do not explore problems such as: Has 
Agamben a “wider” conception of nihilism that encompasses within itself even 
Heidegger’s thought? Does Agamben succeed in bringing to language the limits 
of Heidegger’s thinking? Does Marchart succeed in demonstrating the pre-
eminence of the political difference over the ontological difference? 
Agamben is a philosopher whose works encompass archaeological investi-
gations on diverse topics such as commandment, messianism, ethics, Ausch-
witz, the state of exception, language, sovereignty, civil war, “form-of-life”, and 
duty. Since the publication of the English translations of Coming Community 
and Homo Sacer, more and more secondary literature has been published on the 
diverse dimensions of Agamben’s philosophy.1 Some of the first collections of 
essays like Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben’s 
Homo Sacer and Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life concentrate on Homo 
Sacer, too often disregarding Agamben’s earlier writings on language, aesthe-
tics, and potentiality. Although Eva Geulen’s Giorgio Agamben zur Einführung 
seeks to take a wider perspective by studying the different influences of Agam-
ben’s work, it still tends to remain confined to the framework of Homo Sacer. 
In contrast to this, Leland de la Durantaye’s Giorgio A gamben: A Critical 
Introduction offers a rational reconstruction of Agamben’s intellectual bio-
graphy by reading and commenting on many of Agamben’s works and by 
dealing with a wide range of objections to the homo sacer project. In a similar 
way, Catherine Mills’s work Philosophy of Agamben gives a systematic over-
view of Agamben’s views on the main topics such as metaphysics, aesthetics, 
politics, ethics, and messianism. At the end of her book, Mills suggests that 
Agamben’s philosophical radicalism may slip into “a kind of anti-political 
quietism” (Mills 2008: 137).   
Over the years, Agamben’s philosophical ideas have gained currency across 
disciplines. Yet, for many commentators, Agamben’s historical reconstructions 
paint far too extreme and pessimistic a picture of the human condition. With 
provocative and abstract paradigms such as the concentration camp, the state of 
exception, homo sacer, and the Muselmann, it is hard, if not impossible, to 
throw light on socio-political issues that are both diverse and complex. Take, 
                                                     
1  So far, three works of Agamben have been translated into Estonian. Agamben, G. 2009. 
Homo Sacer: Suveräänne võim ja paljas elu. Trans. by M. Kangro. Tallinn: Eesti Keele 
Sihtasutus; Agamben, G. 2015. Tulevane Kogukond. Vahendid ilma Eesmärgita. Trans. by 
M. Kangro. Tallinn: Eesti Keele Sihtasutus. In addition, several doctoral dissertations have 
touched on Agamben’s ideas. See, for example, Monticelli, D. 2008. Wholeness and its 
Remainders: Theoretical Procedures of Totalization and Detotalization in Semiotics, 
Philosophy and Politics. Tartu: University of Tartu Press; Tomberg, J. 2011. Kirjanduse 
lepitav otstarve. Tartu: University of Tartu Press. In Finnish, for instance, see Agamben, G. 
2001. Keinot vailla päämäärää: reunamerkintöjä politiikasta. Trans. by J. Vähämäki. Hel-
sinki: Tutkijaliitto. On the interpretation of Agamben’s work, for instane, see Ojakangas, M. 
2005. Impossible Dialogue on Bio-Power: Agamben and Foucault. In Foucault Studies, nr. 
2, 5–28; Ojakangas, M. 2010. Conscience, the remnant and the witness: Genealogical re-
marks on Giorgio Agamben’s ethics. In Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 36, nr. 6, 697–
717. 
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for example, Jean-Philippe Deranty, according to whom Agamben “isolates 
ontological essences in which the common ground of apparently different, or 
even opposite, empirical and historical phenomena is revealed” (Deranty 2004). 
Or Paolo Virno’s reading, which goes along the same lines: “Agamben is a 
thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political 
vocation. Then, when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency 
to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the archaic 
Roman right” (Virno 2002; my emphasis). Here, as many other critics are in-
clined to emphasise, the ontologisation of politics is dangerous, if for no other 
reason than that seeking to grasp the substantial essence of the (political) world 
disregards historical and sociological specificity. And according to William 
Rasch, the homo sacer project echoes Agamben’s messianic distrust and aver-
sion towards the contingent and “dirty” world of politics (Rasch 2009: 11; see 
also Rasch 2004: 89–102; Rasch 2007). From Marchart and Laclau’s perspec-
tive, Agamben’s pessimistic picture of the human condition is untenable as long 
as modern politics does not necessarily have to culminate in “the unavoidable 
advance towards a totalitarian society” and in devastating violence on the part 
of the sovereign power (Laclau 2014: 213; see Marchart 2010: 221–241). Last-
ly, Eva Geulen thinks that if the ontological (re-)grounding of politics is 
justified “in reference to the camp inmates”, in reference to the limit figure of 
the Muselmann, then Agamben’s revival of political ontology discredits itself, 
and it should be resisted as an unnecessary supplement (Geulen 2009: 25, 28). 
In opposition to the above-mentioned sceptical responses, there are more 
sympathetic attempts to elucidate the troubled and misunderstood relationship 
between Agamben’s philosophy and politics. In recent years, the topic of poli-
tics in Agamben’s work has been explored in several monographs. To begin 
with, David Kishik’s work The Power of Life: Agamben and the Coming 
Politics interprets Agamben’s reflections on life and politics in light of the 
struggle between “the power over life” and “the power of life”: “Whereas in the 
first process, life cedes its power to external forces, in the second, these external 
forces become powerless in face of life” (Kishik 2012: 100–101). In 2013, 
Jessica Whyte published Catastrophe and Redemption: The Political Thought of 
Giorgio Agamben in which she argues that, in Agamben’s political thought, the 
saving power or redemption is already present in the signs of catastrophe. In her 
book, Whyte puts forward and defends a thesis that this identification of 
redemption and catastrophe suffers from serious flaws (Whyte 2013: 6). Sergei 
Prozorov’s Agamben and Politics: A Critical Introduction argues against the 
pessimistic interpretations of the homo sacer project that are intimidated and 
baffled by Agamben’s hyperbolic and apocalyptic statements such as “the 
concentration camp as biopolitical paradigm of the modern” and “an inner 
solidarity between democracy and totalitarianism” (Prozorov 2014: 172–182). 
By investigating topics ranging from language to history, Prozorov convin-
cingly demonstrates the optimistic and affirmative tonality of Agamben’s over-
all approach to politics that tends to get lost and missed in Agamben’s destruc-
tive critique of the Law and other power apparatuses. Elaborating the concept of 
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“inoperativity”, Prozorov offers a well-grounded interpretation of Agamben’s 
“inoperative politics” that is illustrated and substantiated by different examples. 
What, in my opinion, unites Prozorov’s book and the three articles of the disser-
tation is a specific emphasis on the central role of inoperativity in Agamben’s 
philosophy and politics.  
Finally, I want to mention Mathew Abbott’s book The Figure of This World: 
Agamben and the Question of Political Ontology that differentiates Agamben’s 
political thinking from political philosophy concerned with socio-political 
issues on the ground of human reason and from “political theology” (e.g., Carl 
Schmitt) concerned with the “sociological” study of the correspondence 
between the theological and juridico-political concepts (Abbott 2012: 23–25; 
see Schmitt 1996: 41–55). In between these options, there is a third field of re-
search – i.e., political ontology – that, according to Abbott, is better suited for 
the classification of Agamben’s philosophical and political vocation. Political 
ontology, simply put, studies the ontological underpinnings of “the ontic possi-
bilities for human collectives”; what is at issue in the question of “the political” 
is the experience of being as a “political exigency” (Abbott 2012: 23–24; see 
also Abbott 2014: 13–32). On Abbott’s account, there have emerged two oppo-
site approaches to the determination of political ontology. On the one hand, 
there is Marchart who interprets the political ontology as dealing with a ground-
less foundation or with a political foundation on the basis of which the social 
objectivity is constructed. In contrast, Abbott supports Agamben’s version of 
political ontology that calls “all attempts at ‘grounding’ politics into question” 
(Abbott 2012: 24). The opposition of these two approaches to political ontology 
stand at the centre of my three articles. 
While Kishik, White, Prozorov, and Abbott put forward compelling interpre-
tations, defences, and developments of Agamben’s account of politics, the cur-
rent dissertation juxtaposes Laclau/Marchart’s post-foundational political onto-
logy and Agamben’s account of the juridico-political tradition. To demonstrate 
the fruitfulness and contribution of Agamben’s approach, I show how the main 
issues of post-foundational political ontology – i.e., political difference, post-
foundationalism, and social antagonism – can be criticised and reconsidered 
using Agamben’s basic insights. In this sense, my three articles are concerned 
with the points of confrontation between these two alternative conceptions of 
political ontology, rather than with the immanent exegesis and defence of 
Agamben’s texts. 
As I mentioned, left-Heideggerian political thought encompasses a wide 
range of different philosophers such as Jean-Luc Nancy, Alain Badiou, Claude 
Lefort, and Jacques Rancière. A critical line of thought, with which I am occu-
pied in my articles, starts with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s rearti-
culation of Marxism in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy and extends to 
Marchart’s Post-Foundational Political Thought. But why to focus on Laclau 
and, in particular, Marchart’s elaboration of political post-foundationalism? 
Starting with Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau has persistently 
criticised and reworked the main categories of the Marxist tradition, such as 
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“hegemony” and “emancipation”. Laclau’s views on discourse, identity, demo-
cracy, antagonism, and populism have provoked an on-going academic debate.2 
What is a common thread of Laclau’s “circumstantial interventions, taking 
place around a concrete event”, is the attempt to demonstrate and substantiate 
the contingent structure of social objectivity that is constituted around the “poli-
tical articulation” of its antagonistic limits (Laclau 1996: viii). Instead of pro-
posing a regional ontology of politics, Laclau has implicitly moved towards a 
general ontology of all beings (e.g., Laclau 2014: 203–206; Marchart 2005; 
Marchart 2007: 146–149; Marchart 2010: 211–218). Drawing upon a number of 
key insights from the hegemonic approach, Marchart elaborates a political 
ontology at the level of a general ontology. What, in my opinion, distinguishes 
Marchart’s approach from other contemporary philosophies of the political is 
precisely the conscious objective to establish the impossible but necessary 
discipline of a first philosophy (Marchart 2007: 162–169). Many contemporary 
thinkers have shied away from making this radical step. Badiou’s militant 
politics, for example, privileges mathematics, specifically set theory. In Post-
Foundational Political Thought, Marchart studies critically the different candi-
dates on the basis of which to construct political ontology. By selecting Lac-
lau’s theory of hegemony, Marchart eliminates for different reasons others like 
Nancy, Badiou, Lefort, Rancière, and, last but not least, Agamben. A general 
claim I make in all of the three articles is that Marchart’s omission of Agamben 
is problematic. 
Laclau examines Agamben’s Homo Sacer in the short essay “Bare Life or 
Social Indeterminacy?”; and Marchart’s work Die Politische Differenze 
contains a chapter ”Politische Differenz ohne Politik: Giorgio Agamben” 
[Political Difference without Politics: Giorgio Agamben].  Marchart and Laclau 
challenge Homo Sacer on different but related grounds of which I have 
identified the three that appear the most major to me (Laclau 2014; Marchart 
2010). 1) Drawing upon Heidegger’s “ontological difference” between being 
and beings, Marchart’s Post-Foundational Political Thought constructs the 
political difference between the political (the ontological) and politics (the 
ontic). From Marchart’s point of view, Agamben delimits the political diffe-
rence to abstract reflections on the political. In this sense, Agamben collapses 
the political difference into the ontological side (Marchart 2010: 238–239). 2) 
                                                     
2  Since its publication, Laclau and Mouffe’s work has stood at the centre of academic 
debates. See, for instance, Smith, A. 1998. Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic 
Imaginary. London: Routledge; Torfing, J. 1999. New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, 
Mouffe, and Zizek. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell; and Critchley, S. & Marchart, O. (Eds.) 2004. 
Laclau: A Critical Reader. London: Routledge. On the reception of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
ideas in Estonia, see Ventsel, A. 2009. Towards Semiotic Theory of Hegemony. Tartu: 
University of Tartu Press; Selg, P. 2011. An Outline for a Theory of Political Semiotics. 
Tallinn: Tallinn University Press; and Lipping, J. 2009. Ernesto Laclau. In Annus, E. (Ed.) 
20. sajandi mõttevoolud. Tartu: University of Tartu Press, 623–643. In Finnish, see Palonen, 
E. 2008. Laclau ja Mouffe: Diskurssiteoriaa ja radikaalia demokratiaa. In Lindroos, K. & 
Soininen, S. (Eds.) Politiikan nykyteoreetikkoja. Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 209–232. 
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Facing the breakdown of metaphysics, politics has to take upon itself the task of 
grounding the social field as a totality. From Marchart and Laclau’s perspective, 
however, this political grounding, insofar as it produces contingent foundations, 
is never able to bring about a “communitarian fullness”, i.e., society as a self-
identical and self-grounding being.3 That is why a concrete totality of “the 
social” is in principle always a partial and failed totality, a political totality and 
why the political grounding of the social bond is an endless task (e.g., Laclau 
1996: 71–72; Marchart 2007: 167). In opposition to Marchart’s political post-
foundational approach, I believe, Agamben wants to deactivate the nullified 
foundationalism that is “part and parcel of an infinite task” without fulfilment 
(Agamben 2005b: 104). On Marchart’s account, I think, this strategy falls prey 
to an anti-foundationalism that is just a peculiar version of essentialist founda-
tionalism (Marchart 2010: 227–228, 232; see also Laclau 2014: 220). 3) In his 
article, Laclau argues that Agamben’s “sovereign ban” between the sovereign 
power and bare life is unsuitable for thinking “the antagonistic relation” (Laclau 
2014: 211–212). Agamben’s critique of sovereignty tends to eliminate social 
antagonism. For Laclau, the idea of an undivided and harmonious society leads 
Agamben’s political thinking astray. 
So far we have seen that the post-foundational conception of politics 
confronts Agamben’s philosophy with serious challenges. In light of this, a 
decision must be made: one either responds to Marchart and Laclau’s assess-
ment or abandons the homo sacer project altogether. By engaging with the poli-
tical difference, post-foundationalism, and social antagonism from Agamben’s 
perspective, the current dissertation has chosen the first option. In my articles, I 
seek to find an answer to the following problems: Does Agamben delimit the 
political difference between the political and politics on the ontological side? Is 
it possible to reflect on the political difference as political difference from 
Agamben’s perspective? Is Agamben’s thinking a part of the foundationalist 
paradigm? How is Marchart’s post-foundationalism related to Agamben’s 
messianism? Does Agamben seek to establish a Messianic Kingdom, a harmo-
nious society beyond socio-political divisions? Are social antagonisms con-
ceivable only through the category of the limit relation?  
The present dissertation collects reflections on the topics of political onto-
logy that are examined in three articles. The first article, “Political Diffe-
rentiability”, defends the thesis that, contrary to Marchart’s belief, the political 
difference as political difference does not appear in a never-ending play 
between the political and politics. To resolve this Heideggerian problem, the 
political differencing should rather be rendered inoperative. In order to seize 
hold of the political difference as such, I think it is not enough to emphasise the 
consubstantiality of the political and politics. The second article, entitled “Gior-
gio Agamben’s ‘Messianic Fulfilment’ of Foundationalism in Politics”, argues 
that Marchart’s post-foundationalism has got stuck in the empty form of 
                                                     
3  On the post-foundational theories of society, see Marchart, O. 2014. Das unmögliche 
Objekt. Eine post-fundamentalistische Theorie der Gesellschaft. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. 
16 
foundationalism or, in other words, in an “imperfect nihilism” (Agamben 1998: 
53). Through “the messianic fulfilment” of grounding acts, however, Agamben 
is able to render inoperative the metaphysical paradigm of foundationalism. In 
general, I believe, Agamben’s ideas fit neither within foundationalism nor post-
foundationalism. In “Towards a Rethinking of Laclau and Mouffe’s Conception 
of ‘Social Antagonisms’: Agamben’s Critique of Relation”, I point to the simi-
larities between Agamben’s sovereign decision and Laclau and Mouffe’s poli-
tical articulation. This comparison reveals the structural analogy due to which 
the hegemonic relation does not escape Agamben’s critique of the sovereign 
relation, that is, the “non-relational relation” or “the limit form of relation” (see 
Agamben 1998: 29; Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 139; Laclau 2014: 165). Although 
Agamben calls into question the limit relation, I argue that he nevertheless does 
not do away with social antagonism.  
In what way are the three articles connected? Is there one central idea or 
concept that forms all the above-mentioned theses of the present dissertation 
into one coherent whole? How is the political difference linked with post-foun-
dationalism and social antagonisms? In all three articles, although they are 
written on different topics, I reflect on one and the same configuration – that is 
to say, on the passage or “the zone of undecidability” between life and law, zoe 
and bios, phone and logos, langue and parole, exclusion and inclusion, outside 
and inside, means and ends, exception and rule, negativity and positivity, the 
political and the social, a constituting power and a constituted power, a signifier 
and a signified, semiotics and semantics, particularity and universality, potenti-
ality and actuality, being and beings. I argue that the problem of the passage is 
the common subject matter of Laclau/Marchart’s political post-foundationalism 
and Agamben’s homo sacer project. In my opinion, the fundamental passage 
which Agamben uses to deactivate the (political) articulation between these 
dichotomies is the passage from potentiality to actuality. For this reason, 
Agamben attributes a fundamental importance to the being of potentiality that is 
the most difficult but also the most central topic to which he returns again and 
again in different books and essays (e.g, Agamben 1998: 44–48; Agamben 
1999: 177–219; Agamben 2013a: 92–99). Without tackling the structure of 
potentiality, I think it is hard, if not impossible, to grasp how the political dif-
ference, post-foundationalism, and social antagonism are connected. The prob-
lem of how to conceive the potentiality-actuality passage runs through the cur-
rent dissertation as a thin red line. Thus, in my opinion, the major contemporary 
issues of political ontology cannot be resolved properly without resorting to 
Agamben’s reconceptualisation of the “modal” categories. The homo sacer 
project, if nothing else, proves the relevance of potentiality to the different is-
sues of contemporary political ontology.   
The present introduction of the dissertation is divided into four subchapters. 
The second subchapter gives a short overview of the Heideggerian Left (in par-
ticular, Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxist theory of hegemony and Marchart’s 
post-foundational thought on politics). The third subchapter describes Agamben 
as a protagonist of the Heideggerian Left, and here I also summarise the main 
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influences on Agamben’s philosophy and post-foundational political ontology. 
Furthermore, I sum up Marchart and Laclau’s main critical points regarding 
Agamben’s work. The fourth subchapter outlines the main theses of all three 
articles. In the final subchapter, I explicate how my three articles are linked. 
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2. POST-FOUNDATIONAL  
POLITICAL ONTOLOGY  
To explain the fatal shortcomings of Marxism in the 20th century, Laclau and 
Mouffe pinpoint the essentialist, foundationalist, and reductionist underpinnings 
of the Marxist categories that subsume the totality of history and society under 
the necessary laws of economics (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 7–88; Laclau 1990a: 
41–60; Laclau 1991: 56). The historical development of society, for instance, 
goes always through the same stages that reflect the objective contradiction 
between the labour and the capital. Without doing away with the figures of 
foundation (e.g., totality, universality), Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics criticises foundatio-
nalism and essentialism due to which Marxism has failed to cope with the 
political necessities in hard times. In contemporary academic research, Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse analysis is used to investigate different types of socio-
political phenomena such as populism, identity, and democracy.4 
All my articles are inspired by Oliver Marchart’s elaboration of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discursive theory of hegemony in Post-Foundational Political 
Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. Marchart 
has rewritten and revised his thesis in the later writings such as Die Politische 
Differenz: Zum Denken des Politischen bei Nancy, Lefort, Badiou, Laclau und 
Agamben and Das unmögliche Objekt: Eine postfundamentalistische Theorie 
der Gesellschaft. The present dissertation departs mainly from Marchart’s first 
book whose relevance may be summarised succinctly in three points. Firstly, 
the work engages with the contemporary philosophies of the political, 
demonstrating how the political difference between the political and politics 
defines implicitly or explicitly our current predicament. Secondly, political 
ontology is not just a regional ontology – an ontology of politics – , but rather a 
general ontology of all beings. And last but not least, Marchart stresses the ontic 
relevance of a concrete politics for all philosophical theories of the political. 
The current subchapter is divided into three sections. The first section explo-
res the central tenets of “the Heideggerian Left”. The second section sum-
marises Laclau and Mouffe’s “post-Marxist” approach. In the final section, I 
describe how Marchart radicalises the main views of Laclau and Mouffe. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4  On the post-structuralist theory of discourse, for instance, see Howarth, D. & Norval, J. 
A. & Stavrakakis, J. (Eds.) 2000. Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, 
Hegemonies, and Social Change. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
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2.1. Heidegger and Marxism:  
“The Heideggerian Left” 
While posing and laying out “the question of the meaning of being” (die Frage 
nach dem Sinn von Sein), Heidegger’s Being and Time remains silent on ethics. 
Nor can one find there a systematic and comprehensive exposition of political 
philosophy. In spite of some scattered remarks, it seems as if ethics – as well as 
politics – is fundamentally incompatible with the thinking of being. This philo-
sophical “gap” has perhaps laid a fruitful ground for the plurality of interpreta-
tions from various political perspectives. Due to Heidegger’s rectorship and the 
membership of the Nazi party (NSDAP), this issue has become even more 
acute. To some extent, these facts explain the ambivalent reception that ex-
presses itself in thinking with and against Heidegger. The current dissertation 
concentrates mainly on “the Heideggerian Left” (la gauche heideggérienne) 
that, as a concept, was first coined by Dominique Janicaud in his investigation 
of the reception of Heidegger in France (Marchart 2007: 10).  
The lines dedicated to Marx come nowhere close to matching the pages that 
Heidegger has written on Nietzsche and Hölderlin.5 Still, it is undeniable that 
“fundamental ontology” and “the history of being” have left a noticeable trace 
in Marxism. Consider, for instance, the work of Herbert Marcuse and of Karel 
Kosík.6 Here, my aim is not to rationally reconstruct any of Heidegger’s basic 
ideas or concepts; nor do I investigate Heidegger’s intellectual biography (e.g., 
the Kehre). In the same way as it is possible to study the historical transfor-
mations of Marxism, I think it is possible to examine how Heidegger’s thinking 
has been appropriated and expropriated by his successors. The current disser-
tation studies in particular the Leftist interpretations labelled as the “Heideg-
gerian Left”, “Heideggerian Marxism”, “Heidegger of the Left”, or “Left-
Heideggerianism”.  
To begin with, left-Heideggerian political thought names neither a philo-
sophical doctrine nor some unified school of thought. Nor does the Heideg-
                                                     
5  Even though Heidegger did not deal extensively with the thought of Marx, “The Letter 
on “Humanism”” offers some enlightening observations. After having situated Marx in the 
humanist line of thought, Heidegger makes an interesting remark in the middle of the article: 
“Because Marx by experiencing estrangement attains an essential dimension of history, the 
Marxist view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts” (Heidegger 1998: 
259). Marx, in other words, experiences the estrangement or, better, the “alienation” 
(Entfremdung) that structures history. With the socio-economic analysis and critique of 
alienation in capitalist societies, Marx builds the eschatological picture of history that ends 
in the termination of the class contradiction. Yet, the Marxist concept of alienation, insofar 
as it stays blind to the “unconcealment” of being, belongs in the metaphysical tradition of the 
Occident rooted in the “homelessness” (Heimatlosigkeit) of the human being (Heidegger 
1998: 259). 
6  Kosík, K. 1976. Dialectics of the Concrete: A Study on Problems of Man and World. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; and Marcuse, H. 2005. Heideggerian Marxism. 
Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. 
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gerian Left signify some kind of a political party. Instead, we are confronted 
with different, not to say conflicting, leftist interventions in Heidegger’s 
terminology. What unifies this heterogeneous group of thinkers is not so much a 
well-defined essence, but rather a “family resemblance” that, in Wittgenstein’s 
terms, reigns between some overlapping issues, themes, and problems of which 
none is predominant. In the history of metaphysics, Heidegger’s “destruction” 
of metaphysics signifies the event that has affected different strands of thought, 
such as existentialism, philosophical archaeology, post-structuralism, and 
psychoanalysis. The following remark of Foucault is illuminating:  
“Heidegger has always been for me the essential philosopher. […] But I’ve never 
written anything on Heidegger and only a very short article on Nietzsche. […] 
Perhaps someday I’ll write about them, but at that point they will no longer be 
instruments of thought for me” (Foucault 1998: 250).  
Broadly speaking, there is some truth in the claim that Foucault’s genealogical 
analysis of institutions (e.g., prisons, clinics) and practices (e.g., truth-telling) 
rework and revise Heidegger’s historical epochs of being.7 In this type of recep-
tion, Foucault is certainly not an exception. The ambivalent legacy of Heidegger 
constitutes the horizon within which contemporary thinking moves. And this is 
the case even when the Heideggerian way of thinking is vehemently, disputed, 
rejected, or declared irrelevant.  
In order to understand what is at stake in the Heideggerian Left, I turn to an 
observation of a contemporary Italian philosopher, Gianni Vattimo, who expli-
citly identifies himself with the Leftist approach to the culmination and ex-
haustion of metaphysics in nihilism. Vattimo distinguishes the Heidegger of the 
Left from that of the Right in the following way: 
“Right, in the case of Heidegger, denotes an interpretation of his overcoming of 
metaphysics as an effort, in spite of everything, somehow to prepare a ‘return of 
Being’, perhaps in the form of an apophasic, negative, mystical ontology; left 
denotes the reading […] of the history of Being as the story of a ‘long goodbye’, 
of an interminable weakening of Being […]” (Vattimo 1997: 13).  
While Heidegger seeks to reawaken the question of being and to go back to the 
unthought “origin” (Ursprung) of metaphysical thinking, Vattimo wants to 
weaken the metaphysical “sending” of being as an ultimate and solid foundation 
for the beingness of all beings (see Vattimo 2013). One should abandon relying 
on an Archimedean point that anchors the plurality of discourses and the highly 
fragmented world. On Vattimo’s account, philosophy should thus resist the 
temptation to make absolutist claims that defy context, history, geography, and 
contingency. The Heideggerian Left rejects “the foundationalist paradigm (rep-
                                                     
7  On the relationship between Heidegger and Foucault, see Dreyfus, H. L. 2008. Being and 
Power: Heidegger and Foucault. In International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 4, 
no. 1, 1–16. 
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resented scientifically by such diverse schools of thought as economic deter-
minism, behaviourism, positivism, sociologism, and so on)” (Marchart 2007: 5).  
Yet, as Marchart has pointed out, the critique of foundationalism does not 
mean that the metaphysical concept of foundation is completely terminated 
(Marchart 2007: 14). What the end of metaphysics brings to light is the 
impossibility of an ultimate foundation that is universally and necessarily true 
regardless of time and place. The claims of foundation, insofar as they are 
immersed in a concrete context and in a particular discourse, fall always short 
of being self-evident and unquestionable. The consequence is that the 
undeniable premises are more and more exposed as depending on historical, 
geographical, and contextual circumstances. Judith Butler, for instance, talks 
about the need to expose the contingency of unquestionable premises that are in 
fact constituted through some hegemonic process of exclusion (Butler 1992: 7). 
From Marchart’s perspective, the Heideggerian Left experiences contingency as 
“the moment of the political” that interrupts the enclosed system of meta-
physical categories or the being of all beings as pure presence (Marchart 2007: 
5).8 The event of the political deconstructs the self-understanding of philosophy 
as an impartial, neutral exercise of reason in search of nothing more than the 
Truth. The philosophical terrain is politicised. 
Marchart reserves the label of the Heideggerian Left mainly for those 
thinkers that, in the École normale supérieure, were associated with the Centre 
for Philosophical Research on the Political (Centre de recherches philo-
sophiques sur le politique) founded by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy (Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy 1997). The idea to establish the centre came 
in a conference dedicated to the article “The Ends of Man” in which Jacques 
Derrida states right at the beginning that “[e]very philosophical colloquium 
necessarily has a political significance” (Derrida 1982: 109). During the time of 
its operation from 1980 till 1984, the Centre offered a platform and settings for 
debates and the exchange of ideas. For instance, among the participants were, 
for instance, Étienne Balibar, Luc Ferry, Jean-François Lyotard, Alain Badiou, 
Claude Lefort, Jacques Rancière, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Jean-Luc 
Nancy. Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy formulate the objective of inves-
tigation in the form of question: “How to question (indeed, can one), today, 
what must provisionally be called the essence of the political?” (Lacoue-
Labarthe & Nancy 1997: 101; original emphasis). For most of the participants, 
the “essence” of the political is like Heidegger’s being that “withdraws” itself 
after letting beings come into being.9 
                                                     
8  On the relevance of contingency to political theory, see Pocock, J. G. A. 1975. The 
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Rosanvallon, P. 1985. Le Moment Guizot. Paris: 
Gallimard; Palonen, K. 1998. Das 'Webersche Moment': Zur Kontingenz des Politischen. 
Wiesbaden: Springer; and Abensour, M. 2011. Democracy against the State: Marx and the 
Machiavellian Moment. Cambridge: Polity.   
9  On the political, for instance, see Lacoue-Labarthe, P. & Nancy, J.-L. 1997. Retreating 
the Political. Ed. by S. Sparks. London: Routledge; Badiou, A. 2010. Ist Politik denkbar?. 
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Taking its cue from Heidegger’s work, the Centre wanted to achieve two 
things:  
“[F]irst, to go beyond scientism and its remnants in what was the most advanced 
theoretical paradigm of their time, structuralism; and second, based on an aware-
ness of the dubious if not despicable political inclinations of Heidegger himself, 
to re-work and direct his thought into a more progressive direction” (Marchart 
2007: 2).   
Thus, in Marchart’s opinion, the Heideggerian Left is opposed to scientism for 
which all beings are adequately graspable only with the help of the methods of 
science. Let us think, for instance, of Claude Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism that, 
through linguistic analysis and formalisation, makes the structurality of the 
structure into an intelligible object (see Marchart 2013: 93–120; Laclau 1996: 
36–40). Modern science objectifies the object of its research. History, for in-
stance, is turned into the object that is perfectly graspable with historical meth-
ods. In opposition to scientism, “the political”, “the social”, “the historical”, and 
“the literal” denote to the structural impossibility of full objectivity, of a sutured 
totality. According to Laclau and Mouffe, the symbolic structure is the overde-
termined space whose essence cannot be literally fixed (see Laclau & Mouffe 
1985: 97–105). All the aforementioned terms are substantiated adjectives that 
occur quite often in the writings of Heidegger. In my opinion, all these terms, 
lacking an objective referent, do not denote a particular being, or a region of 
beings. Take, for example, “the political” (das Politische) that is something 
more than the sum of existing state institutions, bureaucratic apparatuses, or 
political parties.10 The political is that which political science ontologically pre-
supposes. Linguistics, for instance, presupposes the existence of language that 
scientific study cannot explain (Agamben 1999: 62–76). The substantialised 
adjectives refer to the structural incompleteness that haunts scientific attempts 
at objectivisation. This ontological incompleteness is named, among other 
things, negativity, undecidability, and contingency. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Trans. by F. Ruda & J. Völker. Berlin: Merve Verlag; Lefort, C. 1988. Democracy and 
Political Theory. Trans. by D. Macey. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Lefort, 
C. & Gauchet, M. 1990. Über die Demokratie: Das Politische und die Instituierung des 
Gesellschaftlichen. In Rödel, U. (Ed.) Autonome Gesellschaft und die libertäre Demokratie. 
Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp; Gauchet, M. 1990. Die totalitäre Erfahrung und das Denken des 
Politischen. In Rödel, U. (Ed.) Autonome Gesellschaft und die libertäre Demokratie. 
Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp; Valentine, J. 2006. The Political. In Theory Culture Society, vol. 
23, no. 2–3, 505–511; Hebekus, U. & Völker, J. 2012. Neue Philosophien des Politischen: 
Zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius Verlag; Bedorf, T. & Röttgers, K. (Eds.) 2010. Das 
Politische und die Politik. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. 
10  Consider, for instance, Carl Schmitt’s infamous assertion: “The state presupposes the 
concept of the political” (Schmitt 2009: 19). The state and the political are thus not one and 
the same thing. The modern state is a historical manifestation of the political. On Schmitt’s 
account of the political, see also the first section of the third subchapter. 
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For Marchart and Laclau, the best example of objectivist discourse is 
orthodox Marxism. The 20th century, however, proved Marx to be wrong in 
many predictions (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 159–171; see Devenney 2004: 8–
29). The working class, for example, did not degenerate into a homogenous 
mass; the workers, like the rest of society, proved to be more heterogeneous 
than was initially anticipated. New social movements (encompassing diverse 
struggles such as feminism, ecology, and anti-racism) called into question the 
leading role of the proletariat in the struggle for universal emancipation (Laclau 
& Mouffe 1985: 159). To this course of events, Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy responds by neither abandoning nor blindly defending, but rather by 
critically rethinking the orthodox categories of the Marxist tradition. Laclau and 
Mouffe formulate their post-Marxist position thus: “[I]f our intellectual project 
in this book is post-Marxist, it is evidently also post-Marxist” (Laclau & Mouffe 
1985: 4; original emphasis). Through the emphasis, the concept post-Marxism 
stresses two aspects: post-Marxism, if the prefix “post” is stressed, criticises and 
rejects the Marxist orthodoxy that is trapped in economic determinism, class 
reductionism, teleologism; post-Marxism, on the other hand, remains embedded 
in the Marxist tradition insofar as it develops “certain intuitions and discursive 
forms constituted within Marxism” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 4). Post-Marxism, 
in other words, critically examines the foundationalist and essentialist claims, 
without eliminating completely the figures of foundation (e.g., totality). Post-
Marxism exemplifies post-foundational political thought. In the Heideggerian 
Left, Marchart attributes to Laclau and Mouffe’s “theory” of hegemony a 
paradigmatic place. 
In the remaining two sections, I outline Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of hege-
mony and then show how it is elaborated by Marchart into political ontology as 
a first philosophy.  
 
 
2.2. Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemonic  
Conception of Politics 
The concept of hegemony emerged as a response to the crisis of Marxist ideol-
ogy. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, differ-
ent strands of Marxism from Rosa Luxemburg to George Sorel sought to ac-
count for the growing gap between the opacity of social reality and the theoreti-
cal uniformity of Marxist categories, between the actual heterogeneity of the 
workers and the theoretical homogeneity of the proletariat (Laclau & Mouffe 
1985: 18). Diverse political forces, as Leninism in Russia proved, can hege-
monise the revolutionary task of the proletariat. A theoretical breakthrough, 
however, was made by Antonio Gramsci according to whom the working class, 
as a leading intellectual and cultural force, needs to create a collective will from 
a series of different social demands (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 65–71). Later, the 
discursive conception of “hegemony” seeks to leave behind the remaining 
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remnants of essentialism and foundationalism. To achieve this objective, as we 
will see, Laclau uses Heidegger’s ontological difference. 
Orthodox Marxists claim to have identified the objective laws of economics 
operative underneath the surface of social processes, institutions and practices. 
The economic base determines the superstructure of social phenomena such as 
culture and politics (Laclau 1990a: 7–42). A legal system, for instance, reflects 
the historical stage in which economic production finds itself at that particular 
moment. No matter what type of society we are dealing with, social relations 
and identities are determined by the laws of economics. The structure of society 
and history is made transparent by the impersonal and immutable laws of 
dialectical materialism.  
If, as Laclau and Mouffe believe, the differential chain of social signifiers 
lacks an unquestionable centre, then society, as a signifying system, does not 
appear as a self-grounding objectivity, as a fully transparent and immediate 
reality: 
“Against the essentialist vision we tend nowadays to accept the infinitude of the 
social, that is, the fact that any structural system is limited, that it is always sur-
rounded by an ‘excess of meaning’ which it is unable to master and that, conse-
quently, ‘society’ as a unitary and intelligible object which grounds its own par-
tial processes is an impossibility” (Laclau 1990a: 90).  
Contrary to metaphysical representations, society does not precede the infinite 
field of interlinked identities and practices as a pre-given essence or substance. 
What we are left with and what we have to start with in the age of dissolution of 
all certainties is the endless proliferation of social difference. Yet, according to 
Laclau and Mouffe, this does not mean that we end up with a bundle of pure 
particularistic identities. In the same way as society, particularities are not en-
closed objectivities with a literal meaning (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 103–104). 
How is then social formation possible when the meaning of neither particular 
nor society is finally fixed?   
“Communitarian fullness”, conceived as a determined and immediate being, 
is structurally impossible (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 93–96). Yet, for Laclau and 
Mouffe, this impossible object is structurally necessary insofar as social 
relations and particularities do not exist in a perpetual state of chaos. The social 
necessity for an order manifests itself intensely in the state of disorder where 
“’order’ is present as that which is absent” (Laclau 1996: 44). An order, if it is 
present in the state of privation, lacks a particular content. Having suspended its 
normal functioning, an order reveals itself as an empty form or as “the empty 
signifier” without a particular signified. Laclau and Mouffe think that the 
experience of this lack sets in motion the political attempts at instituting a 
normal state of affairs. In the concrete circumstances, there are multiple 
possibilities as to how the social field can be organised. An exact form that an 
order takes cannot be deduced form some positive rules or premises (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985: 105–114). The construction of “people” occurs on a contingent 
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terrain where competing political forces seek to articulate a social bond. The 
political act of institution (or “political articulation”) gives a particular content 
to an order as such and, by doing so, constitutes the objectivity of the social. In 
this sense, Laclau and Mouffe attribute to politics “the status of an ontology of 
the social” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xiv; original emphasis).  
 In order to grasp the character of an instituted order, Laclau and Mouffe 
elaborate Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. A realised order, resulting from an 
articulatory practice, is hegemonic in the sense that “a certain particularity 
assumes the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it 
[…]” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xiii). A missing order can be embodied by 
different particularities none of which are by nature suitable for the task (Laclau 
1996: 42–43). For Marchart and Mouffe, universality is thus a hegemonic 
universality; analogously, a concrete order is always a hegemonic order. In the 
state of crisis, political projects compete for the hegemonisation of an absent 
communitarian fullness. In order to hegemonise the empty signifier and fill in 
the lack, a particularity needs to detach itself from a particular signified. A 
socialist party, for instance, does not just advance its own narrow interests. In 
order to articulate other identities and political forces, socialism needs to 
address a much wider spectrum of unsatisfied socio-political concerns and 
issues (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 183–183). The problems of ecology, racism, or 
chauvinism need to be articulated within the paradigm of Marxism. What, in the 
end, is at stake in the workers’ struggle is not only the emancipation of the 
proletariat, but rather universal emancipation.  
What Laclau does not get tired of emphasising is the fact that a hegemonic 
incarnation of communitarian fullness never sutures the gap between the 
universal and the particular: “[O]n the one hand, the ruler imposes a particular 
order; on the other, and as the alternative to this particular order is chaos 
(nothingness), it has also to incarnate order as such, whose indifference to the 
particularity of its contents likens it to pure Being” (Laclau & Zac 1994: 30; my 
emphasis). Here, Heidegger’s ontological difference between being and beings 
is reformulated as the difference between an order as such and a particular 
order. As such, an order does not have a fixed content. That is why the onto-
logical and the ontic never coincide for Laclau: “[T]here is no ontic content that, 
by itself, has a precise ontological signification. But, conversely, there is no 
ontological signification constructed other than through an investment of an 
ontic content” (Laclau 2014: 115). Thus, putting it in Heidegger’s terms, being 
never gives itself immediately as a transparent being with an objective referent; 
being is not one being among beings. In Laclau’s terms, being discloses itself 
always and only through the “ontic investment” (e.g., Laclau 2000: 79; Laclau 
2005: 83–93). This means that communitarian fullness appears only through the 
investment in an ontic content, in one particularity. By untying itself from its 
differential signified, the Green party, for example, can totalise itself and 
represent absent communitarian fullness (i.e., pure being).   
To recapitulate Laclau’s main point, hegemonic incarnations never reconcile 
society with itself. A particularity, embodying an absent society, is unable to 
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erase its partial nature completely. A hegemonic body, although it has acquired 
the status of the universal, cannot abolish its own particularity (Laclau & 
Mouffe 1985: xiii). In the end, universalisation always fails. The political 
ordering of the social is only an ontic “substitute” that necessarily fails to realise 
communitarian fullness. A hegemonic order “lives in [the] unresolvable tension 
between universality and particularity” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xiii). This 
inherent tension comes forth in the state of disorder where the universality of a 
hegemonic order is challenged and called into question. What exactly is per-
ceivable in these extreme situations is “the contingent nature of so-called 
‘objectivity’” (Laclau 1990a: 35; my emphasis).  That, how the line between the 
universal and the particular, the identical and the different is fixed in a particular 
order, is always contingent. From Laclau and Mouffe’s point of view, social 
relations and identities can be rearticulated through the displacement of 
dichotomous categories. A hegemonic order never coincides with itself as long 
as it is cut across by the dichotomous tensions. 
On Laclau and Mouffe’s account, it is possible to experience the un-
resolvable tensions at the antagonistic frontiers of social objectivity. The 
tensional relations between binary opposites manifest themselves through the 
antagonistic opposition that is neither the objective relation like “the real 
opposition” (Realrepugnanz) between real objects nor “the logical contra-
diction” between conceptual objects (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 122–124). The 
antagonistic frontier rather prevents social identities from being fully deter-
mined objectivities:  
“Insofar as there is antagonism, I cannot be a full presence for myself. But nor is 
the force that antagonizes me such a presence: its objective being is a symbol of 
my non-being and, in this way, it is overflowed by a plurality of meanings which 
prevent its being fixed as full positivity” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 125). 
The antagonising force, due to which “I” cannot be “I”, blocks identity as pure 
presence. Social antagonism signals thus the necessary failure or lack in the 
constitution of identity. An identity as an enclosed and immediate reality is 
impossible. Yet, on the other side, the antagonistic limits function as the condi-
tion of possibility for any type of identity (including social formation as a 
whole). A partially fixed positivity of the social rests on the relation with the 
negative or with the non-relational element that is heterogeneous with respect to 
a symbolic order (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 127–129). Neither positivity nor 
negativity is a fully constituted reality, that is, pure positivity or pure negativity. 
The boundary between dichotomous opposites, as Laclau says, emerges through 
the “interplay of mutual subversions between the contingent and the necessary”, 
between the positive and the negative (Laclau 1990a: 27). This mutual subver-
sion takes place in the zone of undecidability where political articulation, or the 
political act of institution, decides on the limit relation between dichotomous 
concepts and, by doing so, brings into existence the social as a political totality. 
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Political articulation, as a performative act, produces the constellation of di-
chotomies by determining for example the relation between inside and outside.  
The chain of social differences, with which Laclau and Mouffe’s hegemonic 
politics begins, is a discursive field without a fixed centre. This social field, 
divided into a series of struggles, lacks a natural representation. If there is not 
any self-grounding and immediate totality, then the only way how political arti-
culation can construct the social bond is through the act of subversion (Laclau 
& Mouffe 1985: 128). To achieve this, political articulation must produce a 
“subversive outside” (or a radical negativity) in opposition to which differential 
signifiers, or social fragments, are subverted and linked together into “the chain 
of equivalences” (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 127–134). The social bond is not 
based on a positive identity. From Laclau and Mouffe’s perspective, the social 
field constructs itself as a signifying totality only by maintaining the equi-
valential relation with that what it is not, with that what negates or antagonises 
all its being. In this way, the equivalential chain manages to signify commu-
nitarian fullness in its absence. This lack or deprived presence, however, cannot 
be represented directly: “A simple absence does not require any type of 
representation, but if the absence as such is present within the structure, it 
requires access to the field of representation. This representation, however, 
cannot be a direct one, because what is represented is an absence” (Laclau 2014: 
118). A signifier that incarnates an absent society creates a discursive-
hegemonic order whose positivity is subversively mediated or reflexively 
determined by negativity. So, for Laclau and Mouffe, the positivity of the social 
depends on its relation with an antagonistic outside. Political articulation 
constructs discursively the boundary, or the antagonistic frontier, between 
binary opposites such as the universal and the particular. 
 All in all, for Laclau and Mouffe, social formation remains a precarious 
space that cannot be literally fixed once and for all as long as the antagonistic 
relation can be contested and displaced. That what is inside of an order and that 
what is outside of an order is precariously determined by political struggle.  
 
 
2.3. Marchart’s Political Ontology  
as a First Philosophy 
Taking his cue from Laclau and Mouffe’s position, Marchart illuminates the 
alternative approaches to the political put forward and defended by such think-
ers such as Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, and Claude Lefort 
(Marchart 2007; Marchart 2010). Marchart’s Post-Foundational Political 
Thought, furthermore, elucidates the implicit presuppositions of the post-Marx-
ist idea of hegemony and, with the help of Heidegger’s “ontological difference”, 
rethinks “the political difference”, foundationalism, and a first philosophy. In 
what follows, I summarise Marchart’s main ideas.  
Philosophy, in the traditional sense of metaphysics, does not study any 
particular ontic region of beings. In traditional terms, metaphysics transcends all 
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regional sciences (Marchart 2007: 162–163). Metaphysics, as the discipline of all 
disciplines, investigates all beings with respect to being. What is at stake in 
metaphysics is the being of beings. First philosophy serves as a founding 
discipline for regional disciplines like politics, sociology, and physics; to put it in 
other terms, ontology is a first philosophy (prima philosophia). According to 
Heidegger’s analysis of metaphysics, being has shown itself as a foundation on 
the basis of which the beingness of all being comes to light (Heidegger 2007: 69–
70; Heidegger 2006: 65–66). A case in point is the father of modern philosophy – 
René Descartes – who, in his Meditations on First Philosophy, founded the 
objectivity of sciences on the certainty of the “I”. For Descartes, the subject is the 
clear and distinct premise on the basis of which it is possible to derive deductively 
further conclusions. Reactivating some central intentions behind Descartes’s 
project, Edmund Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations reformulates first philosophy 
under the name of a “transcendental phenomenology” that aims at grasping the 
original activity of a transcendental subjectivity in the constitution of the “world”. 
Through the phenomenological return to the pure transcendental ego, Husserlian 
phenomenology aims at resolving the crisis of scientific disciplines. 
When, however, the “onto-theo-logical” tradition of the West breaks down, 
then the philosophical discourse experiences the conditions of its own im-
possibility, the groundlessness of being (Derrida 2007: 354–355). In the article 
“Community and its Paradoxes: Richard Rorty’s ‘Liberal Utopia”, Laclau 
concludes: “Once undecidability has reached the ground itself, once the 
organization of a certain camp is governed by a hegemonic decision […] the 
realm of philosophy comes to an end and the realm of politics begins” (Laclau 
1996: 123). A hegemonic politics grows on the ashes of metaphysics, on the im-
possibility of an ultimate foundation. Yet, the end of philosophy and the 
beginning of politics do not have to be seen as two successive and mutually 
exclusive events. Marchart interprets Laclau’s words in another way: “[I]n post-
foundational political thought, the political, as the ‘outside’ of the philosophical, 
is folded back into the philosophical in the form of political ontology as prima 
philosophia” (Marchart 2007: 165–166; see Marchart 2010: 253–268; Marchart 
2004; Marchart 1998). So, for Marchart, politics signals the impossibility of 
traditional metaphysics; and, at the same time, it reinstates a first philosophy. 
Metaphysics survives its own end as political ontology; or, as I would say, 
political ontology is one of the extreme possibilities of metaphysics.  
To substantiate his claim, Marchart turns to Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of 
discourse according to which the being of all beings is discursive: “[I] will never 
encounter the object in its naked existence – such a notion is a mere abstraction; 
rather, that existence will always be given as articulated within discursive 
totalities” (Laclau & Mouffe 1990b: 104; my emphasis). Thus, we never come 
across with a mere “entity” existing outside of a discursive totality. For example, 
a piece of forest acquiers a fixed meaning in a definite discursive totality (e.g., an 
ecological discourse). Because of the absence of an ultimate foundation, the chain 
of differences can be signified only through radical exclusion – or, in other words, 
through the antagonistic limits. For that reason, Marchart thinks that Laclau and 
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Mouffe’s discursive conception of signification is “not only a theory of political 
signification but a ‘political theory’ of signification” (Marchart 2007: 146). All 
objects, if they are necessarily articulated in a discourse as moments, have at least 
potentially a political meaning. Discourse analysis that describes the formation of 
political identities and totalities is political ontology. In Marchart’s opinion, 
furthermore, this political ontology is not just a regional ontology – namely, a 
regional ontology of politics. The being of all being, insofar as it is given 
discursively through political articulation, is political. A hegemonic approach, 
thought to its radical conclusions, leads to a first philosophy (Marchart 2007: 
146–149).   
Does political ontology return to a traditional first philosophy? Does 
Marchart’s political ontology fall back into a kind of metaphysical foundatio-
nalism?  
Politics, by bringing to light the absence of a final foundation, destroys the 
possibility of transcendent grounding of all beings. On the other hand, the 
philosophy of the political takes over the impossible position of a prima 
philosophia by stepping “in as a supplement for the absent ground” and serving as 
a quasi-transcendental condition of all being (Marchart 2007: 162–176). Political 
ontology is not limited to a ontology of politics: “What is at stake in political 
ontology is the political nature of being-qua-being, the political nature – in quasi-
transcendental terms – of all possible beings, and not simply the nature of the 
‘good regime’ or ‘well-ordered society’” (Marchart 2007: 166). Political ontology 
that recognises the indispensability of a first philosophy serves as a “supplement” 
that fills in the empty place left behind by metaphysics. Marchart, however, does 
not restore the idea of pure being or a final ground. Political ontology is not a pure 
ontology of the political. “[O]ntology must aspire to be an ontology of all beings 
and yet, in doing so, it can proceed from a particular, ‘ontic’ region” (Marchart 
2007: 83). This ontic region, a subsystem of society, is politics that contaminates 
the philosophy of the political. 
So, Marchart’s political ontology, if it is conceived as a first philosophy, does 
not deal with pure being; the philosophy of the political is contaminated by the 
ontic – by politics; we have thus a differential ontology (Marchart 2007: 159–
162).11 Politics, as one particular sphere of society, is understood in its difference 
from the political as the quasi-transcendental foundation of all beings. In 
conceptualising the political difference between the political and politics or, in 
German, between das Politische and die Politik or, in French, between le 
                                                     
11  There is a tendency to focus on the philosophical “essence” of the political and to forget 
real politics. In “Politics or the Political? An Historical Perspective on a Contemporary Non-
Debate”, Kari Palonen asserts: “The search for the political, whether as a philosophical 
foundation or an ‘ontological’ instance of stability, may be understood as an attempt to 
create a legitimate place for the political in the order of things. From this point of view, the 
contingent – temporal, passing and rhetorical – aspect of the activity of politics necessarily 
remains unintelligible. The reverse side of this attitude lies in the lack of interest in the dirty 
world of ‘mere’ politics” (Palonen 2007: 76). In order to avoid this philosophical debase-
ment of politics, Marchart deems it necessary to emphasize the importance of real politics. 
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politique and la politique or, in Estonian, between poliitilisus and poliitika, 
Marchart follows Heidegger’s ontological difference between being and beings. 
In “Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik”, Heidegger claims that 
the metaphysical tradition from its beginning has “forgotten” to reflect on the 
very difference between being and beings (Heidegger 2006: 56; Heidegger 1969: 
50–51). What is at stake in being and beings is “difference as difference” or, to 
use Heidegger’s neologism, “dif-ference” (Unter-Scheid). In the same way, 
Marchart constructs the political difference “in terms of, and by analogy to, the 
ontological difference in philosophical thought” (Marchart 2007: 171). The 
political signifies the ontological dimension of society; and politics, on the other 
side, is reserved for one ontic sphere of the social that can be thought as the public 
sphere, state apparatus, and so on. What, similarly to Heidegger, is at stake in the 
political difference is the very difference itself between the political and politics. 
Thus, the task is to think “the political difference as political difference” 
(Marchart 2007: 169–176). From Marchart’s point of view, the political 
difference shows itself as the political differencing, as the never-ending play 
between the political and politics. There is “an unbridgeable chasm, an abyss, 
which, by dividing the ontopolitical from the ontic side of politics, at the very 
same time unites them in never-ending play” (Marchart 2007: 172; my emphasis). 
The play unites and, at the same time, separates the political and politics. As far as 
the political and politics never overlap, the process of differencing, or mutual 
grounding, can go on infinitely without the political being reduced to politics or 
politics being hypostatised into the political.  
The political, as long as it is distinguished from politics, points to the fact 
that any type of transcendent grounding remains constitutively incomplete 
(Marchart 2007: 5). The neutral ground, rendering all beings (including society) 
transparent, is the impossible. In light of this, first philosophy appears as an 
impossible discipline. And yet, as we already know, Marchart does not throw 
“the science of all sciences” completely aside. Contrary to the complete elimi-
nation of metaphysics, the philosophy of the political does not lead beyond the 
metaphysical tradition, but rather subverts first philosophy and, in doing so, 
reinstates it again in the figure of political ontology. On Marchart’s account, all 
beings come into presence and are present via the never-ending play between 
the political and politics: 
“What the gap between the ontic and the ontological, between politics and the 
political indicates is precisely that no particular ontic politics can ever be 
grounded within the ontological realm of the political, but will always have to be 
articulated within the space opened by the play of political difference” (Marchart 
2007: 159) 
Thus, politics subverts the metaphysical reflection on pure being. In this way, I 
would claim that a first philosophy achieves the presence in its absence, i.e., in 
the state of privation as political ontology. Moreover, that is why Marchart does 
not simply negate being-as-foundation; in opposition to the anti-foundational 
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approach, foundationalism is subverted from within by contingency (Marchart 
2007: 25–31).  
The mutual conditioning of the political and politics indicates, for Marchart, 
one and the same thing: the impossibility of a final suture or, put differently, the 
impossibility of an ultimate foundation (Marchart 2007: 5). “Contingency”, 
“freedom”, “antagonism”, and “event” refer to the same impossibility as the 
political differencing. Yet, contrary to common perception, the disavowal of an 
ultimate foundation does not result in anti-foundationalism that, despite its 
aspirations, remains nevertheless trapped within the foundational framework 
(Marchart 2007: 11–13). Instead of negation, the metaphysical concept of 
foundation is affirmed in the dimension of nullity. At the end, Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy makes a passing note: hegemony affirms “a ‘ground’ which 
lives only by negating its fundamental character” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 
193; my emphasis). In my opinion, it is pertinent to say that the post-
foundational concept of politics holds on to non-foundational foundations or, to 
use Bulters concept, “contingent foundations” (Butler 1992). In this sense, 
political post-foundationalism is the empty form of foundationalism.  
In explicating his post-foundationalism, Marchart draws again upon 
Heidegger’s thinking. The seeds of post-foundationalism are already present in 
Heidegger’s thinking: post-foundationalism “owes so much to Martin Heidegger 
that it would not be exaggerated to regard Heidegger as one of the main 
‘founders’ of post-foundationalism” (Marchart 2007: 18; my emphasis). To 
substantiate this statement, Marchart draws attention to a seemingly tautological 
sentence from Beiträge zur Philosophie: “Der Ab-grund ist Ab-grund” 
(Heidegger 1989: 379; original emphasis). The emphases point to the chiasm in 
the foundation: the Grund (i.e., the foundation) is abyss; and inversely, Abrgund 
(i.e., the abyss) is the foundation. The ground, if it is examined in detail, veils the 
abyss; and yet, the same abyss still functions as ground. Marchart offers the 
following interpretation of the abyssal foundation or of the groundless foundation: 
“[T]he ground grounds only on the very basis of its abyssal character: that is to 
say, only via its very own absence, via what we might call its absencing or ‘de-
grounding’. The a-byss is the never-ending deferral and withdrawal of ground, a 
withdrawal which belongs to the very nature of the latter and cannot be separated 
from it” (Marchart 2007: 19). 
By pointing to the abyss underneath the ground, the concept of foundation is not 
negated as some kind of relict. The abyss rather constitutively defines the being 
of ground. In interpreting Heidegger, I think, Marchart’s political post-founda-
tionalism nullifies and, at the same time, affirms the concept of foundation. 
With this double gesture, political grounding and “de-grounding” become two 
intertwined moments in the event of foundation. In other words, Marchart does 
not negate, but rather leaves the concept of foundation operative in its absence: 
“[T]he ground remains, to some extent, ‘operative’ as ground only on the basis 
of its very absence, which is why the absence of the ground must not be envis-
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aged as ‘total’ cancellation, as ‘mere’ absence” (Marchart 2007: 18; my empha-
sis). In political post-foundationalism, the ground is present and operative in its 
absence. In this way, Marchart thinks that he succeeds in avoiding the para-
doxes of anti-foundationalism. 
The previous analysis reached a paradoxical conclusion: the foundation is 
abyss and the abyss is foundation. The same idea can be expressed with 
Derrida’s concept of undecidability (Laclau 1996: 123; Marchart 2007: 15–17, 
28–29; see also the second section of the third chapter). When undecidability 
penetrates the metaphysical concept of foundation, then foundation deconstructs 
itself. And yet, this deconstruction does not annihilate foundation, but rather 
shows the (im)possible condition of foundation. Here, as many other Derrida’s 
texts, the condition of possibility overlaps with the condition of impossibility. 
But how does Marchart explicate this paradoxical statement? Post-founda-
tionalism does not deny or declare impossible just any type of foundation, that 
is, foundation per se. What, rather, is called into question is the existence of an 
ultimate ground or of fully present and self-evident foundation (Marchart 2007: 
13–18). All solid foundations, if studied with care, betray their contingent 
origin. Although post-foundationalism rejects an ultimate foundation, it still 
argues for contingent foundations. Contingency, attributed to foundation, is 
necessary; that is to say, all foundations are necessarily contingent. Contingent 
foundations, moreover, emerge in a specific historical constellation – “which is 
to say that the realization of contingency as necessary is the non-necessary 
outcome of empirical conditions” (Marchart 2007: 31; original emphasis). The 
impossibility of an ultimate foundation is, for Marchart, a quasi-transcendental 
presupposition of contingent foundations.  
In other words, Marchart rejects an ultimate ground but defends the need for 
contingent foundations. Post-foundational political thought points to the im-
possibility of a fully realised foundation–or rather, the impossibility of a fully 
present society–but, on the other side, the political points to the infinite process 
of grounding. In the absence of an ultimate foundation, foundationalism ope-
rates as the excess of contingent grounds. Marchart writes: “[T]he pluralisation 
of grounds and of identities within the field of the social is the result of a radical 
impossibility, a radical gap between the ontic and the ontological, which has to 
be posited in order to account for the plurality in the ontic realm” (Marchart 
2007: 15). So, the ontic plurality to which contingent foundations belong hinges 
on the ontological impossibility. From Marchart’s point of view, this exigency 
makes the political grounding into an endless task that, in principle, excludes 
the possibility of a fully present foundation. As far as a fulfilment is infinitely 
suspended, the incompletion is a constitutive part of every ground. To recapi-
tulate the main idea, the ontic plurality of contingent grounds sustains founda-
tionalism in an idle state, that is, in the state of a “deferred” fulfilment.  
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3. GIORGIO AGAMBEN AND  
“THE HEIDEGGERIAN LEFT” 
Heidegger is one of those authors whose work has exercised a substantial, and 
yet ambivalent, influence on philosophical thought in Italy.12 The main con-
temporary thinkers that, on Marchart’s account, may be named “the Heideg-
gerian Left of Italy” are Gianni Vattimo, Antonio Negri, Massimo Cacciari, and 
Roberto Esposito (Marchart 2010: 19). This heterogeneous group uses Heideg-
ger’s ideas (e.g., nihilism and “the history of being”) as the “theoretical” basis 
for the emancipatory objectives of the Left. This use, however, is by no means 
univocal. Negri, for instance, categorically rejects Heideggerianism, while 
Vattimo, conforming to the thinking of Ereignis as the interruptive event in the 
foundationalist thought of metaphysics, seeks to free the project of the Left 
from its metaphysical assumptions (Vattimo 2009: 31–36). In doing so, Vattimo 
joyfully affirms nihilism as a positive possibility, as a chance. In this nihilistic 
condition, it becomes harder to justify inequality and domination in the name of 
some self-evident premises (Vattimo 2009). The socio-political emancipation is 
identified with the emancipation from the metaphysical conception of foun-
dation, from the violence of foundation. To bring in another example, Cacciari 
argues for negativity that is not dialectically sublimated into a synthetic unity 
or, formulated in Marxist terms, that is not incorporated into the dialectical 
accumulation of capital as a negative moment (Mandarini 2009: 58). For Cac-
ciari, nihilism, as the last manifestation of being, reveals the inherent negativity 
or the groundlessness of being. Being, as Agamben summarises, is das 
Grundlose “as much as being takes place in the nonplace of foundation (that is, 
in nothingness)” (Agamben 1991: xiii). Cacciari’s Grundlose is “the mystical” 
limit of all beings that cannot be brought into language. Negativity, as the 
mystical, is the ineffable foundation of metaphysics. 
In what follows, I concentrate mainly on Agamben whose influence is 
noticeable across diverse disciplines such as jurisprudence, linguistics, political 
science, history, theology, political theory, and literary theory. The current sub-
chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I show how Agamben, 
employing Heidegger’s ideas, approaches Marx’s concept of “commodity 
fetishism”. The second section outlines the main influences on the development 
of post-foundational political ontology and Agamben’s thought; in particular, I 
concentrate on Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, Walter Benjamin, and Jacques 
                                                     
12  On Italian philsophy, see Borradori, G. (Ed.) 1988. Recoding Metaphysics: The New 
Italian Philosophy. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press; Hardt, M. & Virno, P. 
(Eds.) Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics. Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press; Chiesa, L. & Toscano, A. (Eds.) 2009. The Italian Difference: Between 
Nihilism and Biopolitics. Melbourne: re-press; and Esposito, R. 2012. Living Thought: The 
Origins and Actuality of Italian Philosophy. Trans. by Z. Hanafi. California, CA: Stanford 
University Press.    
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Derrida. And the third section of the present subchapter summarises the main 
critical points that Marchart and Laclau raise regarding the work of Agamben. 
 
 
3.1. Agamben as the Philosopher of the Heideggerian Left 
The central themes of the Marxist tradition with which Agamben is occupied 
are the “classless society” (Agamben 2005a: 63–64; Agamben 2005b: 30–33), 
“the end of history” (Agamben 2000: 109–118), and “commodity fetishism” 
(Agamben 1993c: 36–40). Also the Marxist authors such as Walter Benjamin 
and Guy Debord are present in Agamben’s writings. In the same way, through-
out his writings, Agamben returns again and again to the work of Heidegger. 
Consider, as an illustration, the topics such as the metaphysical difference be-
tween the animal and the human in The Open: Man and Animal, the problem of 
language examined in Language and Death: The Place of Negativity and Stan-
zas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture, and the archaeology of the poten-
tiality-actuality relation in Opus Dei: An Archaeology of Duty, the critique of 
“being-towards-death” (Sein-zum-Tode) in The Remnants of Auschwitz: The 
Witness and the Archive, the perverse nature of aesthetics in The Man without 
Content, and the issue of “abandonment” (Verlassenheit) in Homo Sacer: Sov-
ereign Power and Bare Life. In order to demonstrate Agamben’s reception of 
Marx and Heidegger, I show how Agamben gives a Heideggerian twist to 
Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism. 
In Reading Capital, Louis Althusser, a renowned structural Marxist, 
suggests abandoning Karl Marx’s reflections on the “commodity fetishism” due 
to the embeddedness of the concept in the idealist philosophy of Hegel 
(Agamben 2000: 76). Against this approach, Guy Debord elaborates Marx’s 
analysis of commodity fetishism in his work Commentaries on the Society of 
the Spectacle. The development of the capitalist mode of production reaches to 
the extreme point in “the spectacle” where it  
“is nothing more than the commodity’s last metamorphosis, in which exchange 
value has completely eclipsed use value and can now achieve the status of abso-
lute and irresponsible sovereignty over life in its entirety, after having falsified 
the entire social production” (Agamben 2000: 76). 
For Debord, as it appears from the previous quotation, the society of the specta-
cle is the extreme accumulation of the capital as a result of which the use-value 
is surpassed by the exchange-value of the produced object. In order to grasp the 
complete meaning of this claim, I take a short detour on Marx’s conception of 
commodity fetishism as presented in the first volume of Capital: A Critique of 
Political Economy. 
What, according to Marx, is at stake in the capitalist phenomenon of 
fetishism is the transformation of our ordinary relation to things. There is 
nothing mysterious or fantastic about things that are produced to satisfy 
everyday human needs (Marx 1990: 163). Everything, however, is changed 
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when workers produce commodities for the commercial purpose of exchange. If 
the capitalist mode of production expands enough, then the value of the 
productive activity is determined by the exchange-value. The simple thing 
whose use-value is obliterated in favour of the exchange-value appears now as a 
supernatural and mysterious being. A commodity that, at first sight, appears as 
“an ordinary, sensuous thing” is in reality changed into “a thing which 
transcends sensuousness” (Marx 1990: 163). To illustrate commodity fetishism, 
Marx draws an analogy with religion: “There the products of the human brain 
appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter 
into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world 
of commodities with the products of men’s hands” (Marx 1990: 165). A belief 
in the objective existence of the supernatural disguises the fact that a mono-
theistic religion such as Christianity is actually a product of the human brain. 
Similarly, for Marx, the productive activity of the workers finds itself 
transformed into the objective characteristics of commodities. Thus, human 
labour is seen as an “objective characteristic of the products of labour 
themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things” (Marx 1990: 164–
165). In the age of commodity fetishism, the human being does not recognise 
itself in its own work, in its productive activity. According to Marx, capitalism 
separates and alienates the human being from its productive praxis.  
Moreover, it needs to be emphasised that, for Marx, commodity fetishism 
arises in the social realm as long as the activity of production is always social in 
nature. Commodity fetishism is, through and through, a social phenomenon of a 
capitalist state. In light of this, the previous analysis has to be made more 
specific. What exactly acquires a supernatural or fantastic being in the capitalist 
mode of production is men’s social being, i.e., the social activity of production:   
“It is however precisely this finished form of the world of commodities – the 
money form – which conceals the social character of private labour and the so-
cial relations between the individual workers, by making those relations appear 
as relations between material objects, instead of revealing them plainly” (Marx 
1990: 168–169; my emphasis). 
The complex of social relations increasingly resembles the objective relations 
between things. And, for the capitalist, men’s labour force becomes just another 
commodity among many others. Direct social relations, and also the relations of 
domination, are made opaque. In the age of capital accumulation, the human 
being no longer recognises its “natural species-connection with other men” 
(Marx 1990: 173). Commodity fetishism expresses therefore the extreme alien-
ation of the human being from its social being. 
Marx’s model of fetishism plays a relevant role in Agamben’s line of 
reasoning (e.g., Agamben 1993c: 36–40). What, for Agamben, is at stake in the 
transformation of use-value into exchange-value is a symbolic investment into a 
thing. The spread of commodification brings into view the symbolic consti-
tution of social reality; that is to say, the capitalist society does not appear as a 
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transparent and immediate reality. Social relations (including the relations of 
domination and the relation with things in general) are mediated by a symbolic 
investment, by the abstract exchange-value of produced objects (e.g., Marx 
1990: 172–173). The experience of an unattainable thing accompanies com-
modity fetishism: “Just as the fetishist never succeeds in possessing the fetish 
wholly, because it is the sign of two contradictory realities, so the owner of a 
commodity will never be able to enjoy it simultaneously as both useful object 
and as value” (Agamben 1993c: 37). Because of the split between use-value and 
exchange value, it is impossible to assume the products of human labour. 
According to Agamben, the commodity appears as an unattainable thing whose 
presence is marked by absence. The fetishist enjoys the unattainable object in its 
negative presence. This symbolic character of commodity is used by Agamben 
as a point of reference for understanding the metaphysical conception of 
language. The Western conception of signification, like Marx’s notion of 
commodity fetishism, is cut across by the gap or the barrier between a signifier 
and a signified that signals “the impossibility of the sign to produce itself in the 
fullness of presence” (Agamben 1993c: 155). The sign, insofar as it is 
constitutively split and ruled by the difference, cannot manifest itself as a 
positive fullness. The movement of signification is established on the im-
possibility of grasping the positivity of the sign. The sign, as a divided reality, is 
present in its absence (see Agamben 1993c: 152–157).  
On the basis of the previous analysis, it should be possible to understand 
what, for Agamben, is at issue in commodity fetishism or in Debord’s society of 
the spectacle. The fetishist character of commodity is not simply analogical to 
the conception of signification dominant in the Western tradition of meta-
physics. The fact that we are dealing here with something more substantial is 
apparent in Agamben’s words:  
“[T]he spectacle is language, the very communicativity and linguistic being of 
humans. This means that an integrated Marxian analysis should take into consid-
eration the fact that capitalism (or whatever other name we might want to give to 
the process dominating world history today) not only aimed at the expropriation 
of productive activity, but also, and above all, at the alienation of language itself, 
of the linguistic and communicative nature of human beings, of that logos in 
which Heraclitus identifies the Common” (Agamben 2000: 82; my emphasis). 
Therefore, the extreme stage of capitalism corresponds not only to the domina-
tion of commodity form over use-value, but also to the alienation of the human 
being from language. From Agamben’s point of view, the generic social being 
of humans (or, as Marx would put it, Gattungswesen, “species-being”) ex-
presses itself above all in language, in the communicative being of language 
(Agamben 2000: 84). What the common thing is that human beings share is the 
communicative being. In its inherent nature, the human is a linguistic being. But 
the spectacle expropriates exactly this common “essence”, the communicativity 
into “an autonomous sphere” (Agamben 2000: 115). In this way, human beings 
are blocked from having the access to language itself. For Agamben, this type 
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of alienation reaches its extreme when language is experienced as revealing “the 
nothingness of all things”; that is, the age of commodity fetishism is the age of 
nihilism where human beings are unable to grasp their social essence, that is, 
language. Language is experienced as an ungraspable, unattainable thing 
(Agamben 1999: 45–46). 
Thus, the rise of commodity fetishism is co-original with the “essence” of 
nihilism which, as Heidegger argues in his readings of Nietzsche, marks the 
culmination of metaphysics. Nihilism unveils the groundlessness, or the 
nothingness, accompanied by the metaphysical quest to ground the beingness of 
beings. As Agamben argues in Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, 
the original place where being takes place lacks foundation (Agamben 1991: 
xiii). The metaphysical chain of “onto-theo-logical” fundamentals rests on “the 
negative foundation”. “The end of metaphysics” signifies the culmination and 
exhaustion of the metaphysical tradition through “the unveiling and the 
devastating arrival of its final negative ground at the very heart of ethos, 
humanity’s proper dwelling place. This arrival is nihilism” (Agamben 1991: 
xiii). For Agamben, this negative ground of metaphysics is rooted in the 
experience of the ineffable that takes place in “the event of language”. 
 What has determined the “essence” of metaphysics throughout its history is 
the particular experience of language: “[M]etaphysics is that experience of 
language that, in every speech act, grasps the disclosure of that dimension, and 
in all speech acts, experiences above all the “marvel” that language exists” 
(Agamben 1991: 25; my emphasis). The structural theory of the sign, for 
instance, expresses this dimension through the barrier that conveys the passage 
between a signified and a signifier, between semiotics and semantics, between 
langue and parole. There is a linguistic unit, an empty sign that binds together 
two opposing poles. This empty sign is called a pronoun or, in Jakobson’s 
terms, a “shifter” that, according to Agamben, indicates the pure event of dis-
course, the taking place of language. Before something is said, pronouns 
demonstrate the being of language (Agamben 1991: 19–26). As Descartes’s “I”, 
Hegel’s “diese”, and Heidegger “da” demonstrate, shifters occupy an eminent 
place in the terminology of metaphysics. Summarising his position, Agamben 
gives a linguistic twist to Heidegger’s ontological difference: “The opening of 
the ontological dimension (being, the world) corresponds to the pure taking 
place of language as an originary event, while the ontic dimension (entities, 
things) corresponds to that which, in this opening, is said and signified” 
(Agamben 1991: 26). If attention is turned only to that what is said in speech 
acts, one fails to notice the event of language itself. Ousia, being, indicates the 
event of language that, as the short exposition of commodity fetishism 
demonstrated, is defined by negativity. The fact that language takes place falls 
into oblivion in the said. Thus, for Agamben, the event of language is the pre-
supposition of all presuppositions that cannot be named by the name. The 
advent of nihilism discloses the negativity at the heart of metaphysics – i.e., the 
impossibility of bringing language into language (see, for instance, Agamben 
1999: 205–220; Agamben 1993c: 141–149). 
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In contrast to Heidegger, however, Agamben does not want to leave the 
ontological presupposition of language unsaid. The problem arises in 
Heidegger’s seminars at Thor-en-Provence which Agamben attended in 1966 
and in 1968. This encounter is recollected in several writings (e.g., Agamben 
2000: 139). The Idea of Prose recalls the seminar with the following words: 
 “At Le Thor, Heidegger held his seminar in a garden shaded by tall trees. At 
times, however, we left the village, walking in the direction of Thouzon or Re-
banquet, and the seminar then took place in front of a small hut, hidden away in 
the midst of an olive grove. One day, when the seminar neared to its end and the 
students crowded around him, pressing him with questions, Heidegger merely 
remarked: “You can see my limits; I can’t”” (Agamben 1985: 59). 
The limits, which the students are supposed to see, are the limits within which 
Heidegger’s thinking unfolds itself (Agamben 1985: 59). This truth, whose 
latent presence destines and inspires thinking, is the non-said in the said. Hei-
degger cannot say the limits of his own thinking. Later, Agamben will un-
derstand the non-said as the event of language that, as an ineffable thing, with-
draws and conceals itself in every speech act (Agamben 1991). Language pre-
supposes itself as something that cannot be brought into language as an objec-
tive being. The task, facing Heidegger’s students, is to expose the internal limit 
of thinking (Agamben 1985: 60). Agamben deems it necessary to say the inef-
fable thing, to “overcome” the linguistic alienation of human beings. The ex-
treme alienation conceals thus a positive possibility – the possibility to appro-
priate the productive activity of men or, as Agamben would say, the linguistic 
essence of human beings: 
“[T]he age in which we live is also that in which for the first time it becomes 
possible for human beings to experience their own linguistic essence – to experi-
ence, that is, not some language content or some true proposition, but language 
itself, as well as the very fact of speaking” (Agamben 2000: 85; original emphasis). 
Thus, from Agamben’s point of view, language can be brought into language. In 
order to comprehend the linguistic essence of human beings, it is necessary to 
conceive what it means to have a potentiality to speak. The meaning of this 
claim becomes clearer in the fifth chapter of this dissertation where I explicate 
in detail Agamben’s understanding of potentiality.    
Agamben’s earlier works on language laid the groundwork for the homo 
sacer project. The unsayable foundation of metaphysics is inseparably linked 
with politics insofar as the Greek polis is the proper dwelling place – that is, the 
ethos – where the connection between phone and logos, between a living being 
and language, or between bare life and political life is at stake (see, for instance, 
Agamben 1985: 7–8). In order to cope with the consumption of metaphysics, it 
is not therefore enough to pose anew the question of being; it has to be 
accompanied by an effort to interrogate the concealed link between metaphysics 
and politics. As Agamben says in Homo Sacer: “Brought to the limit of pure 
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Being, metaphysics (thought) passes over into politics (into reality), just as on 
the threshold of bare life, politics steps beyond itself into theory” (Agamben 
1998: 182). The advent of nihilism reveals not only the non-said, but also the 
original element of a juridico-political tradition – that is to say, homo sacer who 
dwells at the threshold of a secular and of a sacred order and who ”may be 
killed and not yet sacrificed“(Agamben 1998: 8; original emphasis). This 
structural interrelation of politics and metaphysics comes to light at the end of 
metaphysics: “The coming thought will have thus to try and take seriously the 
Hegelo-Kojèvian (and Marxian) theme of the end of history as well as the 
Heideggerian theme of the entrance into Ereignis as the end of the history of 
being” (Agamben 2000: 110). If one component – either the end of state or the 
end of history – is disregarded, then one does not understand the nihilistic 
completion of metaphysics. The end of history in Ereignis coincides with “the 
withering away of the state” (see the first section of the fifth chapter).  
 
 
3.2. Other Influences on Agamben and  
Post-Foundational Political Ontology 
Along with Heidegger, Agamben and political post-foundationalists engage 
with authors such as Walter Benjamin, Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, and 
Jacques Derrida. This abundance of literary references creates a fruitful ground 
for all kinds of interpretations. Agamben’s project, for instance, can be seen as a 
development of Benjamin’s messianic conception of history, as an extension 
and deepening of Foucault’s biopolitics, as a critical study of Derrida’s decon-
struction, and as a critical response to Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty. In what 
follows, the current section briefly summarises these influences on Agamben’s 
philosophy and on Laclau and Marchart’s post-Marxist approach. 
Carl Schmitt is a controversial figure who was associated with the inner 
circles of Nazi Germany. Leaving his opportunistic adventures aside, Schmitt’s 
political and juridical thought has exercised a substantial influence on a wide 
spectrum of political and legal theory including the tradition of Marxism. 
Mouffe and Laclau and Marchart have engaged directly with Schmitt’s views.13 
What, in my opinion, has fascinated the Left and, in particular, political post-
                                                     
13  See, for instance, Mouffe, C. 1999. (Ed.) The Challenge of Carl Schmitt. London: Verso; 
Laclau. E. 2005. On “Real” and “Absolute” Enemies. In The New Centennial Review, vol. 5, 
no 1, 1–12; Marchart, O. 2007. Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in 
Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 41–48; Lipping, J. 
2016. Laclau and Schmitt on Political Form. In Devenney, M. (Ed.) Thinking the Political: 
Ernesto Laclau and the Politics of Post-Marxism. London: Routledge; and Dyrberg, T. B. 
2009. The leftist fascination with Schmitt and the esoteric quality of “the political”. In 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 36, no. 6, 649–669. On Schmitt see, for example, 
Ojakangas, M. 2004. A Philosophy of Concrete Life: Carl Schmitt and the Political Thought of 
Late Modernity. Sophie: Jyväskylä; Rasch, W. 2004. Sovereignty and its Discontents: On the 
Primacy of Conflict and the Structure of the Political. London: Birkbeck Law Press; Marder, 
M. 2010. Groundless Existence: The Political Ontology of Carl Schmitt. London: Continuum. 
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foundationalism is the idea of “the political” (das Politische) in Schmitt’s Der 
Begriff des Politischen. The infamous work starts with an enigmatic statement: 
“Der Begriff des Staates setzt den Begriff des Politischen voraus [The concept 
of the state presupposes the concept of the political]” (Schmitt 2009: 19). With 
the appearance of non-state entities (e.g., revolutionary parties, partisans), the 
modern state loses the monopoly over the political, over deciding who the 
existential enemy is. The late modernity has reached to a junction where the 
political is not by definition necessarily concerned with all things associated 
with the aggregate of state apparatuses and practices. In contrast to a liberal way 
of dividing the social into separate fields, the political does not signify a 
particular subsphere of society or, in more general terms, an ontic subfield of all 
beings (Schmitt 2009: 36). From my perspective, this substantiated adjective 
rather names that what distinguishes a political institution from other types of 
social organisations, that is to say, that what constitutes one specific institution 
as political institution (e.g., the state as state). Using non-objectivist terms, the 
political signifies being or, better, the political nature of being that has 
constituted the political beingness of the state. Schmitt, to be more precise, 
formulates the political as a “criterion” (Kriterium) that marks a decision upon 
the friend-enemy relation (Schmitt 2009: 25). The criterion does not single out 
any specific sphere as long as the groupings along the enemy-friend line can 
achieve a degree of “intensity” in the diverse realms such as economy, religion, 
and technology (Schmitt 2009: 35–42). What has captured attention of the 
contemporary Left is precisely the ontological primacy of conflict or “the 
autonomy of the political” in respect to the economical, the religious, and the 
moral. With regard to this similarity, however, there is one important 
difference: whereas Schmitt covers over the political in the domestic context in 
favour of an international politics, the post-foundational Left argues for the 
conflictual being of social formations (Schmitt 2009: 50–54). 
This non-objectivist approach is present in Schmitt’s critique of legal theory 
with which Agamben occupies himself in many works (Schmitt 1996: 23–40; see, 
for example, Agamben 1998: 15–29; Agamben 1999: 160–174; Agamben 2003: 
52–64). In Politische Theologie, Schmitt proposes an infamous definition of 
sovereignty: “Souverän ist, wer über den Ausnahmezustand entscheidet [Sove-
reign is that who decides upon the state of exception]” (Schmitt 1996: 13). To 
guarantee the validity of a juridico-political order, the constitution includes 
articles regulating when and on what conditions the Law can be suspended. The 
sovereign is, for Schmitt, precisely that who judges if “the state of necessity” 
(Notstand) is imminent or not. When an existing order is perceived to be under 
threat, then the sovereign can declare the state of exception (Ausnahmezustand) 
and, by doing so, interrupts the normal application of the Law. Yet, on Schmitt’s 
account, the state of exception is not the same thing as a chaos, as anarchy 
(Schmitt 1996: 18). The state of exception rather marks the limit zone where a 
juridical order maintains itself in a condition of privation. The Law, as Agamben 
emphasises, is in force but not applied. Moreover, the state of exception reveals 
an independent juridical element – i.e., the “decision” – that is independent from 
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the legal norm and that cannot be derived deductively from the legal norm 
(Schmitt 1996: 18–19). The juridical system is thus not a closed corpus of 
juridical norms purified from everything non-legal or extra-legal. The validity of 
the juridical order rests on the sovereign who, topologically speaking, is situated 
neither inside nor outside, but rather at the undecidable limit of a juridical order 
(Agamben 1998: 15–17). Thus, in Schmitt’s point of view, a juridical system, 
insofar as it is founded on the sovereign decision on the undecidable, is not a 
closed normative objectivity as legal positivism mistakenly thinks. What, for 
Agamben, is at stake in the zone of undecidability is the very limit form of 
relation between outside and inside, zoe and bios, life and law (Agamben 1998: 
26–29). The sovereign power decides on the undecidable and determines the 
constitutive nexus between the biopolitical model and the juridico-political model 
of power. By elaborating Schmitt’s state of exception, Agamben connects two 
seemingly opposite conceptions of power: the juridical concept of sovereignty 
and Michel Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics.  
In political post-foundationalism, Laclau and Mouffe investigate and criti-
cise Foucault’s notions of discourse and subjectivity (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 
105–122); and, subsequently, Marchart examines and criticises Foucault’s 
extreme nominalism and agonistic understanding of social conflicts (Marchart 
2013: 238–262). Arguably, the opposite is also true: Foucault would be critical 
of the post-structural project of hegemony.14 In contrast to this, however, 
Foucault is a scholar from whom Agamben has “learned a great deal” (Agam-
ben 2009: 7). Besides the methodological principles such as archaeology, 
Agamben is influenced by Foucault’s investigation of biopolitics. In the first 
volume of The History of Sexuality and, subsequently, in the lecture course 
published under the title Society Must Be Defended, Foucault distinguishes the 
biopolitical model of power from the dominant juridical model of power 
founded on the concepts of the state and sovereignty (Foucault 1990; Foucault 
2003: 239–265). In contrast to the sovereign’s negative power to decide over 
the life and death of his and her subjects, biopolitics presents itself as a 
positive – i.e., productive – force that aims at developing, optimising, maxi-
mising, and maintaining natural life processes (Foucault 1990: 135–137). 
Agamben distinguishes two directions of research in Foucault:  
“[O]n the one hand, the study of the political techniques (such as the science of 
police) with which the State assumes and integrates the care of the natural life of 
                                                     
14  In the article “Beyond the State, Beyond the Desert”, Sandro Mezzadra argues that 
Foucault was suspicious of the concept of the political (Mezzadra 2011). It is no wonder that 
Foucault’s ideas have functioned as the starting point for the critique of hegemony (e.g., 
Antonio Negri). Taking a cue from Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics, Cultural Studies talks 
about “post-hegemony”. On post-hegemony, see Beasley-Murray, J. 2010. Post-Hegemony: 
Political Theory and Latin America. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota; and Lash, 
S. 2007. Power after Hegemony: Cultural Studies in Mutation? In Theory, Culture, and 
Society, vol.  24, no. 3, 55–78; Arditi, B. 2007. Post-Hegemony: Politics Outside the Usual 
Post-Marxist Paradigm. In Contemporary Politics, vol. 13, no. 3, 205–226. 
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individuals into its very centre; on the other hand, the examination of the tech-
nologies of the self by which processes of subjectivization bring the individual to 
bind himself to his own identity and consciousness and, at the same time, to an 
external power (Agamben 1998: 5; original emphasis). 
While the political techniques are occupied with the large scale trends (e.g., 
birth rate, mortality rate) in the population, the practices of subjectivisation 
examine how individuals bind their identity and bodies to power (e.g., “confes-
sion”). Whereas, for Foucault, biopolitics is fundamentally at odds with the juri-
dical approach to power, Homo Sacer seeks to reveal “the hidden point of 
intersection between the juridico-political and bio-political conceptions of 
power” (Agamben 1998: 6). This original link comes to light at the limits of a 
juridico-political order – i.e., in “the state of exception” – where the normal 
functioning of law is suspended and where law refers to life (Agamben 1998: 
25–29). Moreover, as Agamben argues, the ontological structure of the excep-
tion manifests itself first in the Greek polis where zoe and bios, a simple natural 
life and a political existence, exclusion and inclusion, are decided for the first 
time (Agamben 1998: 1). Contrary to how it may look like, biopolitics is 
therefore not a purely modern phenomenon par excellence. From Agamben’s 
point of view, the hidden link between life and law has defined the juridico-
political tradition from the beginning. 
Derrida is another important thinker that now and then pops up in the works 
of the Heideggerian Left. I start with Laclau and Mouffe who draw from many 
principal ideas of deconstruction such as the critique of the sign, “undecidabi-
lity”, “hauntology”, and a “constitutive outside”; in addition, Laclau has written 
an essay “’The Time is Out of Joint’” on Derrida’s Spectres of Marx (Laclau 
1996: 66–83). To explicate Derrida’s reception, I concentrate on the main ideas 
of Derrida’s influential article “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences”. From Derrida’s perspective, metaphysics has conceived “the 
structurality of the structure” or, differently put, the beingness of all beings on 
the basis of a “transcendental signified” (or pure being) that renders the struc-
ture present as a full objectivity (Derrida 2001: 351–353). By seeking to erase 
the signifier-signified split within the sign, metaphysics sutures the discursive 
field of difference as a coherent and self-identical totality. If, however, there is 
no structuring centre or no “transcendental signified” or, simply, no transparent 
sign, then the objective essence of the structure is not fixable once and for all. 
This open-ended structure, as Derrida claims, does not spring from the empiri-
cal infiniteness of a discursive field, but rather from the finite constitution of 
language: “If totalization no longer has any meaning, it is not because the 
infiniteness of a field cannot be covered by a finite glance or a finite discourse, 
but because the nature of the field – that is, language and a finite language – 
excludes totalization” (Derrida 2001: 365; my emphasis). Language, due to its 
finite character, is structurally unable to constitute itself as a full positivity. 
Within language, there is no direct and immediate access to a discursive outside 
or to pure being on the basis of which to grasp the structure as a reconciled 
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being in full presence. The finiteness of linguistic beings (i.e., human beings) is 
primarily embedded in the finiteness of language. For that reason, a meta-
physical totalisation, as long as we inevitably dwell in the particular context, or 
medium, of language, is impossible; and yet, for Derrida, the same totalisation 
is absolutely necessary if signification is to exist at all (Derrida 2001: 365). 
Thus, paradoxically, a transcendental signified – or, in other words, pure being 
and transcendental grounding of all beings – is necessary and impossible, at the 
same time. The finiteness of language makes signification as a fully present 
being impossible; on the other hand, the same finiteness also makes it possible. 
Being, as long as it is mediated by the linguistic play of differences, appears 
less than pure being; an ultimate foundation appears less than a self-grounding 
and self-evident foundation. In more general terms: if one glimpses at the 
linguistic being of humans, one experiences the impossibility and, at the same 
time, necessity of metaphysical discourse (Derrida 2001: 354). To sum up: Der-
rida’s deconstruction delineates and exposes in my view the zone of undecidabi-
lity between necessity and impossibility, a signified and a signifier, a pure 
presence and a mere absence. 
 In developing the concept of hegemony, Laclau and Mouffe take their cue 
from Derrida’s ideas (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: xi; Laclau 1996: 36–40; Marchart 
2007: 146–149). Laclau & Mouffe, like Derrida, accept the fact that there is no 
transcendental signified. This conveys to them that the discursive field of social 
differences lacks a metaphysical grounding in some sort of objective principles 
(e.g., economics, religion, moral). This non-objective or non-sutured character 
of the social is visible in the antagonistic limits of society. For Laclau and 
Mouffe, social antagonisms, or at least the latent presence of conflicts, point to 
the impossibility of society as a full presence (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 122–127; 
Laclau 1990a: 17). Society, as communitarian fullness, is an impossible object. 
As with Derrida, this impossibility does not point to a bare absence of social 
reality. A social totality, although it is impossible as the full positivity of a 
signifying structure, is still necessary. According to Laclau and Mouffe, social 
formation springs from a hegemonic fixation of meaning, a hegemonic fixation 
of identities. The social objectivity, lacking a determined essence, is constructed 
politically out of non-fixed parts of the discursive terrain. Laclau and Mouffe 
think that a discursive-hegemonic order substitutes for the absent commu-
nitarian fullness or, in general, pure being. The social expansion of undecidabi-
lity therefore creates the realm of politics: “Once undecidability has reached the 
ground itself […] the realm of philosophy comes to an end and the realm of 
politics begins” (Laclau 1996: 123; my emphasis). 
In the same manner, Marchart’s explication of post-foundational political 
ontology draws upon Derrida’s ideas on the process of signification (Marchart 
2007: 15–17). In our abandonment to the infinite play of signs, pure being is, 
for Derrida, impossible but, at the same time, being (or a signifying structure) is 
also necessary. Laclau (and Mouffe) interpreted this statement as meaning the 
impossibility of society as a full presence and, at the same time, the necessity of 
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social totality. Marchart adopts the same strategy clearly evident from the 
following citation: Derrida’s quasi-transcendentalism 
“resides in a sort of double movement which indicates the necessity both to up-
hold transcendental questioning – a strengthening of the philosophical view vis-
à-vis the purely empirical approach – and to weaken it from within, by defining 
the condition of possibility of something as that thing’s simultaneous condition 
of impossibility” (Marchart 2007: 29; my emphasis). 
Undecidability, or the non-objectivity of a discursive reality, pertains to the 
metaphysical concept of foundation – that is to say, being-as-foundation. The 
absence of a transcendental signified is nothing less than the absence of an ulti-
mate foundation. What, for Marchart, is at stake in Derrida’s deconstruction and 
Laclau’s account of hegemony is the impossibility of a transcendental ground-
ing of all beings (Marchart 2007: 15–18). This claim, as the quotation above 
indicates, does not imply that there would not be any foundations or, better, that 
we live in a totally chaotic world lacking any suture. Like Derrida sticks to be-
ing in the weakened form and like Laclau sticks to the concept of society, Mar-
chart sticks to the metaphysical concept of foundation. Contrary to an anti-
foundational approach, the metaphysical grounding is both upheld and weak-
ened. Otherwise stated, Marchart makes the impossibility of an ultimate foun-
dation into a quasi-transcendental condition of possibility of contingent founda-
tions (see the third section of the second chapter). The objectivity of the ontic 
realm depends on a quasi-ontological presupposition: the ontological impossi-
bility of an ultimate foundation (Marchart 2007: 15). Additionally, leaving aside 
the political twist, Marchart follows Derrida’s “logic” to the end. Namely, post-
foundational political ontology signifies the impossibility of metaphysics, but 
on the other hand, political ontology materialises a general ontology in a weak-
ened form. To describe this, Marchart uses Derrida’s concept of “hauntology”: 
“It is only in the sense of hauntology, that is to say, as an ontology lacking its 
very object (being-as-foundation), that the term ontology may still be em-
ployed” (Marchart 2007: 63; original emphasis). Post-foundational political 
ontology that assumes the status of first philosophy is hauntology.  
In the same way as Laclau and Marchart, Agamben discusses and calls into 
question many of Derrida’s ideas such as the deconstruction of the sign, the 
conceptions of messianism, the nature of the Law, and the philosophical 
underpinnings of friendship (see Agamben 1991: 38–40; Agamben 1993c: 152–
157; Agamben 1999: 205–219; Agamben 2005b: 102–104).15 Yet, differently 
from Laclau and Marchart’s post-Marxist reinterpretation of deconstruction, 
Agamben seeks to distance himself from Derrida’s approach. To substantiate 
                                                     
15  On the debate between Agamben and Derrida, see Derrida, J. 2009. The Beast and the 
Sovereign (Volume 1). Trans. By G. Bennington. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; 
Derrida, J. 2005. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Trans. by P. Brault & M. Naas. Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press; and Kevin A. 2014. Giorgio Agamben: Beyond the 
Threshold of Deconstruction. New York: Fordham University Press.  
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the claim, I stop on one of the main points of their confrontation: the problem of 
undecidability. In Homo Sacer, Agamben makes the following remark:   
“The prestige of deconstruction in our time lies precisely in its having conceived 
of the entire text of tradition as being in force without significance, a being in 
force whose strength lies essentially in its undecidability […] But it is precisely 
concerning the sense of this being in force (and of the state of exception that it 
inaugurates) that our position distinguishes itself from that of deconstruction” 
(Agamben 1998: 54; my emphasis). 
To read deconstructively the fundamental text of the Western tradition means to 
conceive the tradition in a state of undecidability, as “being in force without 
significance”.16 Through the deconstructive exposure of undecidability at the 
heart of the text, the tradition, in which we dwell, is nullified and affirmed in 
one and the same gesture. Derrida’s early work Speech and Phenomena, for 
instance, exposes the impossibility of the sign insofar as it consists of two fun-
damentally different parts: a signifier and a signified or, in Husserl’s terminol-
ogy, “expression” (Ausdruck) and “indication” (Anzeigung). The structure of all 
structures – i.e., the sign – is fundamentally split into two (Agamben 1993c: 
135–139; Derrida 1973). Because of its non-coincidence with itself, the sign 
constitutively fails to be a fully present objectivity. According to Agamben, this 
split, moreover, is marked by a “barrier” between a signifier and a signified 
(S/s). The barrier, as Agamben explicates, is the zone of undecidability where 
the articulation or passage between a signifier and a signified takes place 
(Agamben 1993c: 155–157). In my opinion, this zone of undecidability is a 
place of decision. Like Husserl, one can decide to develop a concept of signifi-
cation that emphasises the signified and that, through “the phenomenological 
epoché”, seeks to bracket and downplay the signifier (or indicative notions). 
Alternatively, like Derrida, one can decide to emphasise the element of signifier 
and to attribute primacy to “writing” and “letter” (Agamben 1993c: 155–157). 
Either approach, however, stays within the metaphysical tradition insofar as the 
barrier – or the event of signification – is left unquestioned:  
“From the point of view of signification, metaphysics is nothing but the forget-
ting of the originary difference between signifier and signified. Every semiology 
that fails to ask why the barrier that establishes the possibility of signifying 
should itself be resistant to signification, falsifies, with that omission, its own 
most authentic intention” (Agamben 1993c: 137). 
So, on Agamben’s account, Derrida repeats the negative structure of metaphys-
ics by failing to reflect on the barrier or on the zone of undecidability that 
makes signification possible but is in itself unsignifiable. Deconstruction dis-
                                                     
16  Agamben borrows the phrase “being in force without signifigance” (Geltung ohne 
Bedeutung) from Gerschom Scholem who uses it in a letter to Benjamin investigating 
Kafkas parable “Before the Law” (Agamben 1998: 49–58). 
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closes the signifier-signified barrier as the internal limit of language where sig-
nification is broken down but still operative without significance. Language, 
like the juridico-political order, exposes itself at its extreme limits where signi-
fication affirms its power to signify (Agamben 1998: 21). So, with the exposure 
of the barrier, signification becomes visible at the zero point of its content. A 
case in point is an empty signifier that signifies the presence of signification 
beyond any particular content. From Agamben’s point of view, however, it is 
not enough to leave the process of signification in force without significance. 
The zone of undecidability is the philosophical problem of our age – and not its 
solution as Derrida and political post-foundationalists tend to presuppose.  
To recapitulate, the deconstructive strategy of reading exposes the un-
decidability of the text or the breakdown of signification due to which the sign 
fails to realise itself as full positivity. The same void, however, sets and keeps 
signification in an endless movement that is able to produce ontic substitutes for 
pure being or, better, for language itself (Agamben 2005b: 102–103). Without 
offering any hope of escape, Derrida abandons human beings within an infinite 
play of signs or within an infinite self-signification of language that is never 
able to catch up with itself. At the point of its breakdown, signification 
continues to run empty and, in this way, it is present as an empty form. The 
zero-degree signification signifies only itself without, however, being able to 
bring itself into language (Agamben 2005b: 103). So, as Agamben argues, the 
barrier between a signified and signifier is widely open but absolutely 
impassable. In a similar way, Derrida nullifies the eschatological content of 
messianism as long as the messianic does not mean the arrival of the promise, 
the event of full meaning; by signifying a pure form of openness to a “radical 
otherness”, messianism is maintained in the zero-point of its content (see Laclau 
1996: 73–74). This is Derrida’s “messianic without messianism” that, according 
to Agamben, suspends “the messianic fulfilment”: “Deconstruction is a 
thwarted messianism, a suspension of the messianic” (Agamben 2005b: 103; 
my emphasis). For Agamben, however, the messianic fulfilment is not the same 
thing as an eschatological fulfilment, that is, the promised closure of the gap 
between a signified and a signified (Agamben 2005b: 62–63; 100–104). The 
messianic fulfilment does not produce any name for the name. What, on the 
contrary, takes place through the messianic fulfilment is a revocation of the 
zero-degree signification: messianism “fulfils and deactivates the very excess of 
signification over every signified, it extinguishes languages (I Cor. 13:8)” 
(Agamben 2005b: 137; my emphasis). The deactivation does not mean therefore 
that the very split or undecidability between signified and signifier would be 
closed by some new transcendental signified. 
To elaborate the theme of messianism, I turn to Agamben’s interpretation of 
Benjamin’s “Über den Begriff der Geschichte” where he makes an enigmatic 
statement in the eighth thesis: “[T]he tradition of the oppressed teaches us that 
the ‘state of exception’ [Ausnahmezustand] in which we live is the rule” 
(Benjamin 1977: 254–255). In order to understand the meaning of this sentence, 
we have to go back to Schmitt who, as we know, confines the state of exception 
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to the limit sphere of a juridico-political order. The exception, as long as it is 
limited temporally and spatially, is demarcated from the rule. The validity of a 
juridical order is guaranteed by the sovereign who has the power to declare the 
state of exception. For Schmitt, thus, the exception safeguards the working of 
the rule in normal conditions. Benjamin, however, objects to Schmitt’s vision 
by claiming that the state of exception has crossed spatiotemporal boundaries 
and become the prevailing normality (Agamben 2005a: 57–59). For that reason, 
it is not possible to distinguish the rule from the exception, the outside form the 
inside, violence from right. At the time when Benjamin was writing, Nazi 
Germany proved a ghastly example of this. A real state of exception confronts 
us with the zone of undecidability or the nexus between the exception and the 
norm. In the zone of undecidability, the juridico-political order is not 
annihilated, but rather maintained in the state of privation as the empty form. In 
a prolonged state of exception, a juridical order still enforces itself beyond its 
normal application. In order to struggle against the oppressive forces of fascism, 
Benjamin sets the task of bringing about “the real state of exception” that would 
revoke even the nullified law, the nothing (Benjamin 1977: 255; Agamben 
2005a: 86–88). This revocation halts the articulation that connects and diffe-
rentiates the exception from the rule, a signifier from a signified. Following 
Benjamin, for example, Agamben deems it necessary to render inoperative the 
empty form of relation that connects and differentiates life and law, outside and 
inside, bios and zoe. Agamben illustrates the case in point with the help of 
Kafka’s parable “Before the Law”:  
“The messianic task of the man from the country (an of the youth who stands be-
fore the door in the miniature) might then be precisely that of making the virtual 
state of exception real, of compelling the doorkeeper to close the door of the Law 
(the door of Jerusalem). For the Messiah will be able to enter only after the door 
is closed, which is to say, after the Law’s being in force without significance is at 
the end” (Agamben 1998: 56–57). 
Therefore, according to Agamben, the man from the country, contrary to how it 
may seem, manages to close the nullified law that is open but impassable. This 
messianic task resonates with our task of rendering inoperative the empty form 
of the Law or, analogically, a zero-degree signification endorsed by Derrida’s 
deconstruction. By deactivating the hollowed out Law, a juridical order is not 
simply eliminated. The deactivation is rather a fulfilment: “[T]he Messiah’s 
arrival signifies the fulfilment and the complete consumption of the Law” 
(Agamben 1998: 56; my emphasis). The revocation coincides with the fulfil-
ment of the Law. Agamben’s messianic gesture “revokes” and “retrieves” at the 
same time (see the second section of the fifth chapter). In my opinion, this dou-
ble movement becomes fully intelligible with the help of the “modal” cate-
gories – that is, potentiality and actuality – that I investigate in the final chapter 
of the introduction.  
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3.3. Marchart and Laclau’s Critical  
Assessments of Agamben’s Work 
The Heideggerian Left, as we know, is an umbrella label for diverse – not to say 
conflicting – perspectives. After laying a post-foundational groundwork, Mar-
chart’s Post-Foundational Political Thought offers a critical analysis of Lefort, 
Nancy, and Badiou’s political thinking. The German version of the same work, 
Die Politische Differenz, adds a section “Politische Differenz ohne Politik: 
Giorgio Agamben” [Political Difference without Politics: Giorgio Agamben] 
(Marchart 2011: 221–241). Along similar lines, Laclau engages with Homo 
Sacer in “Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy?” (Laclau 2014: 207–220). The 
present section extracts three major critical points from Marchart and Laclau’s 
analyses of Agamben with which my articles are intensely occupied.17 
In Agamben’s opinion, the subaltern position in which politics nowadays 
finds itself is explainable by the fact that politics “has been losing sight of its 
own ontological status, it has failed to confront the transformations that 
gradually have emptied out its categories and concepts” (Agamben 2000: ix). 
Contemporary thinking is confronted with the task of reconsidering traditional 
concepts, such as sovereignty, human rights, and democracy. Agamben aims at 
giving back to the fundamental concepts of politics their lost ontological 
standing. In Marchart’s point of view, Agamben’s re-ontologisation brings the 
never-ending play between the political and politics to a halt (Marchart 2010: 
238–239). This “standstill” brings with itself either of the following con-
sequences: “They all seek to put the play of the political difference to a halt, 
thereby either reducing the political to politics or hypostatizing politics into the 
political” (Marchart 2007: 161; my emphasis). The hypostatisation, in parti-
cular, takes place in the homo sacer project: “What in the case of Agamben is 
observable is the implicit reduction of the political difference to the ontological 
side of the political and the simultaneous emptying of the ontic side of politics 
from all meaning and content” (Marchart 2010: 238–239). Failing to take into 
account the contingent configuration of power relations, Agamben delimits the 
differential play to the ontological side. The strategic element of politics is 
replaced with “means without end”, i.e., with “pure means” (Agamben 2000). 
By downplaying concrete political circumstances, Agamben falls prey to a 
passive intellectualism that is busy building abstract genealogies and grand 
critiques of the juridico-political tradition (Marchart 2010: 222). For this reason, 
                                                     
17  Marchart and Laclau, of course, are not the only ones who have drawn attention to 
Agamben’s failure to think politics. See, for instance, Rasch, W. 2007. From Sovereign Ban 
to Banning Sovereignity. In Calarco, M. & DeCaroli, S. (Eds.) Giorgio Agamben: 
Sovereigity & Life. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Rasch, W. 2009. The Structure 
of the Political vs. the Politics of Hope. In Strathausen, C. (Ed.) A Leftist Ontology: Beyond 
Relativism and Identity Politics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press; and 
Geulen, E. 2009. The Function of Ambivalence in Agamben’s Reontologization of Politics. 
In Strathausen, C. (Ed.) A Leftist Ontology: Beyond Relativism and Identity Politics. 
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.  
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Marchart claims that Agamben completely misses the political difference as 
political difference (or the political dif-ference).  
In the homo sacer series, one can very easily find post-foundational terms 
like “contingency”, “undecidability”, “negativity”, and “decision”. In spite of 
this conceptual convergence, Agamben falls, according to Marchart and Laclau, 
back on the very old foundational paradigm of metaphysics. I think that the kind 
of post-foundational political ontology represented by Marchart and Laclau sees 
abstract essentialism, foundationalism, and naïve teleologism in Agamben’s 
understanding of the social bond. A juridico-political order, as we saw above, 
constitutes itself by positing and maintaining the limit relation with life. This 
relation, produced through the suspension of law, is “the relation of abandon-
ment” (Agamben 1998: 60). Agamben conceives the social tie as “the form of 
an untying or exception in which what is captured is at the same time excluded, 
and in which human life is politicized only through an abandonment to an 
unconditional power of death” (Agamben 1998: 90). The social bond is 
therefore originarily the non-relational relation with life. This limit relation 
manifests itself vividly in the exemplary figure of homo sacer that, as a sacred 
man, “may be killed and yet not sacrificed” (Agamben 1998: 8; original 
emphasis). From the perspective of the critical commentators, homo sacer is the 
extreme category that unjustly abstracts from singular and complex situations 
and, by doing so, subsumes under itself the very heterogeneous plurality of 
different phenomena from people imprisoned in a concentration camp to 
comatose persons (Laclau 2014: 214; Marchart 2010: 227–231). Due to the 
rigid opposition between bare life and sovereign power, it is not possible to 
analyse how inside/outside or exclusion/inclusion are articulated in concrete 
circumstances (Laclau 2014: 210; Marchart 2010: 232–237). This essentialist 
unification, Laclau thinks, ends up in a “naïve teleologism” that “draws a 
picture in which the becoming rule of the exception represents the unavoidable 
advance towards a totalitarian society” (Laclau 2014: 213). The concentration 
camp is the internal telos of history. Additionally, Agamben is not well 
disposed towards political post-foundationalism because it leaves us with an 
indeterminable situation where the moment of foundation is separated from the 
moment of fulfilment and where political grounding is made into “part and 
parcel of an infinite task” (Agamben 2005b: 104). And when one deactivates 
the play of difference, then one falls into an anti-foundationalism that, for 
Marchart, is just a peculiar type of foundationalism. All in all, Agamben’s 
ontologisation fails to notice the actual opportunities resulting from the 
breakdown of foundationalism 
Lastly, I think that one of the central topics of a post-foundational politics is 
the antagonistic relation. Marchart’s play between the political and politics 
reflects the endless re-negotiation of the social bond by conflicting articulatory 
practices. On Laclau’s account, however, social antagonism is downplayed 
when Agamben conceptualises it as the sovereign relation (Laclau 2014: 2010–
213). When “a supreme will within the community is not confronted by any-
thing” or, better, when the all-powerful sovereign is faced with the powerless 
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bare life, then there is no space left for social antagonisms (Laclau 2014: 212). 
That is to say, political conflicts can emerge only if power is not concentrated, 
but rather distributed unequally across the social field. In addition, Agamben’s 
critique of sovereignty suggests that he wants to conceive a socio-political 
world beyond the sovereign relation. For Laclau, this is the sign of a desire for 
harmonious social relations from where political power and social antagonisms 
are extracted. Laclau summarises: “To be beyond any ban and any sovereignty 
means, simply, to be beyond politics. The myth of a fully reconciled society is 
what governs the (non-)political discourse of Agamben” (Laclau 2014: 219–
220; my emphasis). Thus, within Agamben’s conceptual framework, Laclau 
thinks it is impossible to reflect on the antagonistic fracture that divides society 
from within and that triggers political efforts at re-grounding the social unity. 
All in all, there is no politics where all power is either completely concentrated 
or totally banned. 
So, in my opinion, the controversy between Agamben’s political thinking 
and Laclau/Marchart’s post-foundational political ontology revolves around 
three fundamental issues. Firstly, Marchart claims that Agamben fails to think 
the political difference as political difference, i.e., the never-ending play 
between the political and politics. This is the effect of an intellectualism that 
delimits the political difference on the side of the political. Secondly, from 
Laclau and Marchart’s perspective, Agamben’s ontologisation falls prey to an 
essentialist foundationalism that violently assimilates very different cases under 
one abstract and formalist paradigm. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, 
with the help of Agamben’s conceptual tools, Laclau thinks that it is impossible 
to grasp the antagonistic divide that structures the social bond. 
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4. SHORT OUTLINE OF THE THREE ARTICLES  
All problems raised at the end of the last subchapter are challenges that demand 
proper engagement. Can Agamben reflect on the political difference as political 
difference? Does Agamben succumb to intellectualism? Is Agamben really a 
foundationalist? How would Agamben approach post-foundationalism? Is it 
possible to reflect on social antagonisms in Agamben’s conceptual framework? 
Does Agamben abolish social antagonism in the name of an undivided and 
harmonious society? Is antagonism thinkable beyond the category of relation? 
Anyone who is familiar with Agamben’s writings notices that there is not one 
easy and clear answer to these questions. The homo sacer project has not tack-
led these problems directly. Agamben does not have any coherent account of 
the political difference between the political and politics. Nor has Agamben so 
far investigated the hegemonic conception of social antagonisms. 
In spite of lacking a firm ground, I maintain, it is possible to find laconic and 
cryptic remarks scattered throughout Agamben’s writings. Taking a point of 
departure from these hints, I seek to address the abovementioned problems. In 
what follows, I sum up the central thesis of all my articles: “Political Diffe-
rentiability”, “Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Messianic Fulfilment’ of Foundationalism 
in Politics”, and “Towards a Rethinking of Laclau and Mouffe’s Conception of 
‘Social Antagonisms’: Agamben’s Critique of Relation”.  
 
 
4.1. “Political Differentiability”  
The first article, entitled “Political Differentiability”, is motivated by Marchart’s 
claim that Agamben fails to think the political difference as political difference 
or, to use Heidegger’s neologism, Unter-Schied (dif-ference). By focusing too 
much on the ontological side of the political difference, Homo Sacer sutures the 
never-ending play between the political and politics. Abstract intellectualism 
completely disregards the ordinary activities of politicians. 
To unravel the relation between the political and politics, Marchart departs 
from Heidegger’s ontological difference but, in particular, from Heidegger’s 
article “Die onto-theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik” that reflects on the 
very difference between being and beings or, as it is usually conveyed, between 
the ontological and the ontic. The very political difference, as Marchart sug-
gests, shows itself in the figure of the never-ending play between the political 
and politics. What, for Marchart, the irresolvable chiasmus “indicates is 
precisely that no particular ontic politics can ever be grounded within the onto-
logical realm of the political, but will always have to be articulated within the 
space opened by the play of the political difference” (Marchart 2007: 159). 
Politics, as one ontic realm of society, rests on the political moment of insti-
tution; and inversely, the political discloses itself in the fissures of the social. 
The political differencing, for example, is the moment of political articulation. 
In the same vein, I believe, Agamben conceives the mutual conditioning of life 
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and law. A juridico-political order constitutes itself in opposition to a simple 
fact of living. A political existence is founded on the exclusion of natural life 
(Agamben 1998: 7). And Agamben’s train of thought can be inversed: through 
its suspension, a juridico-political order reveals the bare life by which it is 
animated. The sovereign decision differentiates life and law, outside and inside. 
To recapitulate, the ontological difference shows itself in the differential play 
between the political and politics and in the sovereign decision on the relation 
between life and law. 
Do Marchart’s endless play and Agamben’s sovereign decision manage to 
think the difference as difference? The answer, I believe, is negative. If one 
aims at considering the very difference itself between the political and politics, 
then “the question could be raised whether we borrow the qualifier ‘political’ 
from the side of ‘the political’ or whether we take it from the side of ‘politics’” 
(Agamben 2007: 173). On Marchart’s account, both sides – that is, the political 
and politics – are equally important. In order to keep the differencing in move-
ment, it is relevant that neither the political is hypostatised nor a ‘real’ politics is 
forgotten. From my perspective, however, it is not enough to give an equal 
weight to both sides of the political difference. The political difference as 
political difference is thought from the standpoint of its efficacy – that is to say, 
from the standpoint of that what the political differencing has differentiated 
(i.e., politics and the political). Correspondingly, life and law are given via the 
sovereign decision. In my opinion, Marchart’s play and Agamben’s sovereign 
decision therefore conceal the very difference itself.  
Is the political difference as such still thinkable? In contrast to Marchart who 
wants to keep the play operative without any end, Agamben would deem it 
necessary to deactivate the political differencing or, what amounts to the same 
thing, the sovereign decision. For only in this way is it possible to grasp the 
very political difference itself that withdraws itself after bringing to light the 
constellation of the political and politics. In my opinion, the very difference that 
holds together the political and politics is exposed when the differencing is 
brought to a halt or when there are no new historical constellations of the 
political and politics. As a result, I think, the differential play, or the sovereign 
decision, reveals itself as the pure power to differentiate – or as political 
differentiability. Furthermore, political differentiability is the shared dimension 
of the political and politics or, in other words, philosophy and politics. From my 
point of view, the pitfalls of intellectualism and wild political practicism can be 
avoided if the political difference is experienced in the dimension of political 
differentiability.  
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4.2. “Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Messianic Fulfilment’ of 
Foundationalism in Politics” 
Metaphysical grounding of all beings reaches the point of exhaustion with the 
arrival of nihilism. The consumption, however, does not simply mean the end of 
metaphysics. The “imperfect nihilism” stays within the nullified horizon of 
foundationalism insofar as it recognises the absence of an ultimate foundation 
but, on the other hand, argues for the inevitability of foundation. Marchart’s 
post-foundational thought exemplifies this prevalent way of thinking. As a 
“perfect nihilist”, however, Agamben wants to fulfil messianically the acts of 
grounding (e.g., political articulation and sovereign decision) that bring into 
existence contingent foundations. The “messianic fulfilment” extinguishes even 
the Nothing or, in our case, the nullified foundationalism. From my point of 
view, Agamben’s philosophy can be grasped satisfactorily neither in the 
foundational nor in the post-foundational terms. 
Marchart’s post-foundational thought, as we know, rests on the ontological 
presupposition that an ultimate foundation is necessarily absent. This absence, 
however, “does not purely and simply mean the absence of a ground, which 
would be just an absence, but is rather the presence of an absence. And this 
absence, being present, needs to be represented” (Laclau 2014: 118; original 
emphasis). This type of absence that occupies the intermediate place between 
mere absence and pure presence is named with the concept of privation. An 
ultimate foundation, if it exists in the state of privation, needs to be embodied 
and represented. The place of the ultimate foundation is filled in with a 
substitute – with a contingent foundation. Foundation is not thus just eliminated, 
but rather affirmed in its privation as a ground whose foundational character is 
negated (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 193). Post-foundationalism, as it is put 
forward by Marchart, is the empty form of foundationalism. This nullified 
foundationalism corresponds to the imperfect nihilism that lets “the Nothing 
subsist indefinitely in the form of a being in force without significance” 
(Agamben 1998: 53). 
Through the production of contingent foundations, the political acts of 
grounding bring about a partial – and not full – closure of the social field. 
Contrary to post-foundational political thought, I think Agamben defends a 
messianic nihilism or, to use Nietzsche’s terminology, a “perfect nihilism” that 
renders inoperative the empty form of foundationalism (Agamben 1998: 53). 
How is this objective achieved? What post-foundationalism has not noticed in 
its excessive fury of grounding is the messianic potential that accompanies the 
very moment of foundation. The messianic involves two interlinked aspects: the 
moment of “retrieval” and the moment of “revocation” (Agamben 2005: 103–
104; see also the next subchapter). In my opinion, the act of grounding is 
retrieved only when it manages to give itself back to itself – that is to say, when 
it succeeds in positing and maintaining a relation with itself. For this to take 
place, instead of bringing forth this or that contingent ground, the activity of 
giving grounds needs to translate into action all its own impotentiality. 
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According to Agamben, this actualisation of impotentiality, however, neither 
abolishes nor subordinates potentiality to some given actuality. Potentiality 
rather preserves itself in actuality as potentiality and becomes indistinguishable 
from it. As a practice, political articulation (like sovereign decision) exhibits its 
own potentiality. And finally, the initial function of a grounding act, insofar as 
it exhibits nothing more than its own potentiality, is revoked.  
Metaphysical foundationalism survives its collapse as political acts of 
grounding. The activity of constructing grounds for the social entails the 
messianic potential. In politics metaphysics finds its extreme realisation; and in 
politics, the exhausted metaphysics can be extinguished. Let us take, for 
example, the phenomenon of dance that, for Agamben, does not necessarily 
belong to the realm of aesthetics. A dance when it is performed in the situation 
of popular protest or gathering can take the form of gesture. A political dance, 
as a gesture, displays the corporal movements in their mediality (Agamben 
2000: 58). Gestures have a political significance because of their messianic 
potential. Dancing does not realise this or that potentiality. Nor does a dance 
aim at giving a ground for social relations and identities. Dancing rather 
displays nothing more than itself – that is, its pure potentiality to dance. And 
this retrieval, as we have seen, entails a revocation: an activity that exhibits 
itself in the dimension of mediality revokes its initial function. In my opinion, 
politics, if it is the pure realm of human gesturality, absolves us from political 
post-foundationalism or, in general, metaphysical grounding acts. 
 
 
4.3. “Towards a Rethinking of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
Conception of ‘Social Antagonisms’:  
Agamben’s Critique of Relation”  
I think it is absolutely essential to consider the concept of social antagonism if 
one wants to examine Laclau and Mouffe’s political thinking. Without taking 
into account the conception of the antagonistic relation, it is not possible to 
understand how the social field is generated as a hegemonic totality. From 
Marchart and Laclau’s perspective, Agamben fails to conceive the important 
role which social antagonism plays in the political institution of the social bond. 
I agree with Laclau that Homo Sacer calls into question the antagonistic 
relation, but from this, as I argue in this article, it does not follow that Agamben 
favours a reconciled society. 
Trying to answer the philosophical question “What is the antagonistic 
relation?”, Laclau and Mouffe first exclude two widespread responses 
according to which social antagonism is either the contradiction between 
conceptual objects or “the real opposition” (Realrepugnanz) between real 
objects (Laclau & Mouffe 1985: 122–123). The antagonistic relation is, simply 
put, “a non-relational relation” between two antagonistic poles which “are 
essentially heterogeneous with each other” and which call each other’s identity 
into question (Laclau 2014: 165). Although the antagonistic frontiers signal the 
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impossibility of communitarian fullness, the symbolic order is able to constitute 
itself as a positive reality only by positing and maintaining the relation with 
something heterogeneous that a discursive-hegemonic order fails to represent. 
This heterogeneous element, or an antagonising force, makes possible the 
positivity of the social. What, I think, is at stake for Laclau in the antagonistic 
relation is “the interplay of mutual subversion between the contingent and the 
necessary”, between outside and inside, negativity and positivity (Laclau 1990a: 
27). There is neither pure contingency nor pure necessity, neither pure 
universality nor pure particularity. Identity, for instance, is mediated through the 
limit relation with the non-relational – i.e., with a difference that subverts 
identity.  
 Homo Sacer, I believe, concentrates mainly on the concept of relation that is 
explicated as “the sovereign ban”, or sovereign relation, between life and law. 
The ban operates in a bio-political context. At first sight, it looks as if this leads 
far away from Laclau and Mouffe’s ideas. In spite of enormous differences, I 
believe, a common ground can still be found.  Specifically, Agamben’s ban is 
conceptualised as the limit relation: “The ban is the pure form of reference to 
something in general, which is to say, the simple positing of relation with the 
non-relational” (Agamben 1998: 29). To guarantee normal application of the 
law, a juridical order needs to assure its limit relation with life. Pace Hans 
Kelsen, law is not just a normative order (the realm of ought) purified from all 
socio-political facts (see Schmitt 1996: 23–40). The law, on the contrary, is 
subverted by life with which a juridico-political order posits and maintains a 
relation through the state of exception. Following Agamben, we may say that 
the non-relational – i.e., life – animates a juridical order. The outside penetrates 
the inside and subversively determines it. And like in the case of Laclau/ 
Mouffe, the non-relational relation expresses itself in a reciprocal subversion of 
binary categories such as outside and inside, synchrony and diachrony. The 
sovereign, having the power to decide upon undecidability, guarantees the 
normal functioning of a juridico-political order.     
What, ontologically speaking, is at stake in Agamben’s and in Laclau/ 
Mouffe’s work is the limit form of relation understood as the sovereign relation 
and the antagonistic relation, respectively. Here, in my opinion, the real diffe-
rences come forth. Whereas Laclau and Mouffe defend the limit relation, 
Agamben seeks to render the subversive interplay of dichotomies inoperative. 
From my perspective, Agamben’s endeavour has nothing to do with a pessi-
mistic outlook. Contrary to Laclau’s conviction, I am convinced that it is just 
not enough to replace the sovereign decision with political articulation or a 
discursive-hegemonic order with a juridico-political order. This is so because 
the internal logic, on which political articulation and sovereign decision depend, 
has run aground with the exposure of the limit relation. The antagonistic 
relation, if it reveals nothing more than itself in the emptied out form, surfaces 
as “pure antagonism” that, for Agamben, is “the relation of abandonment”. At 
the limits of objectivity, practice is abandoned to the never-ending task of 
deciding on the undecidable and of defining the non-relational relation. In the 
56 
appearance of pure antagonism, practice experiences the entanglement within 
the limit relation, within the empty form that has destined political articulation 
and sovereign decision to bring into existence a new historical constellation of 
dichotomies. In this situation, I think it is not enough to hold on to the anta-
gonistic relation and to re-define the Left-Right divide. 
In conceiving the social bond beyond the sovereign ban, Agamben is seen as 
longing for a reconciled society (Laclau 2007: 22). For that criticism to be valid, 
antagonism should be understood in Laclau and Mouffe’s terms of the non-
relational relation. In my opinion, however, Agamben is not against social 
antagonisms per se, but rather against the limit relation. The messianic strategy 
does not necessarily found a harmonious society. On the contrary, political 
thought must take up the task of rethinking social antagonisms from the ground 
up. For this purpose, Agamben’s concept of the “form-of-life” may offer a point 
of departure. The form-of-life rest neither on the separation of zoe from bios nor 
on the evaluation of zoe under the category of bios. In my opinion, the form-of-
life is an antagonistic power that never exhausts itself in an actual order. Living 
at the limits of language and the symbolic order of society, it manifests as pure 
potentiality that demonstrates the non-coincidence of life with itself. 
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5. INTERCONNECTION OF THE MAIN THESES 
The previous subchapter summarised the central theses of the dissertation. Till 
now, however, the connection between the articles has remained unclear. What 
is the main idea? What is the main concept of the research? What unites the 
political difference, post-foundationalism, and social antagonisms? An attentive 
reader can without any difficulty discern one clear theme that recurs in the lines 
of argumentation of the three articles. The central subject matter that defines 
Agamben’s homo sacer project and Laclau/Marchart’s post-foundational 
political ontology is the passage or the limit zone of undecidability between life 
and law, zoe and bios, phone and logos, langue and parole, exclusion and 
inclusion, outside and inside, means and ends, exception and rule, negativity 
and positivity, the political and the social, a constituting power and a constituted 
power, a signifier and a signified, semiotics and semantics, particularity and 
universality, potentiality and actuality, being and beings. What, from my 
perspective, is at stake in all these seemingly different cases is the very passage 
where dichotomic opposites are brought into a subversive interplay. This type 
of interplay first engenders binary oppositional concepts. In Agamben’s homo 
sacer project as in Laclau/Marchart’s post-foundational political ontology, the 
passage is the undecidable zone in which dichotomic opposites are connected 
and differentiated. Interiority, for example, emerges as interiority through the 
subversive relation with an exteriority. Thus, in my opinion, there is neither for 
Agamben nor for Laclau/Marchart any pure negativity or pure positivity, pure 
particularity or pure universality, pure exclusion or pure inclusion.  
The articulation of these opposites, however, runs aground at the end of 
metaphysics where the passage or the zone of undecidability shows itself as an 
impassable or ineffable thing – or even better yet, as that what has engendered all 
historical constellations of dichotomous opposites. In order to understand the 
traditional concepts of politics (for instance, constituting power and constituted 
power), a thoughtful involvement with metaphysics is thus indispensible. For that 
reason, I think, political ontology cannot simply avoid posing the question of the 
“modal” categories. Namely, if one succeeds in fundamentally transforming 
Aristotle’s traditional conception of the potentiality-actuality passage, then one 
has transformed the metaphysical and political tradition as a whole. In my three 
articles, I argue that Agamben has accomplished precisely this objective. 
The present subchapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I 
formulate Agamben’s thinking and Laclau/Marchart’s post-foundational politi-
cal ontology as two responses to the collapse of metaphysics. Moreover, I argue 
that the limits of an order where the subversive interplay of oppositional 
binaries centres on the potentiality-actuality passage reveals the exhaustion of 
the metaphysical tradition most vividly. The second section outlines Agamben’s 
reinterpretation of potentiality that leads to the “retrieval” and “revocation” of 
the potentiality-actuality passage and of the subversive interplay of opposites in 
general. The final section shows how the core ideas of post-foundational 
political ontology can be reconsidered from Agamben’s perspective. 
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5.1. The End of Metaphysics, or the Limits of an Order 
Throughout my three articles, I have sought to avoid conflating and fusing the 
terminologies of Agamben and post-Marxist political ontology. I have wanted 
to proceed by identifying as clearly as possible the subject matter standing at 
the centre of both approaches respectively. Having reached this shared 
presupposition, I believe, it is first of all possible to comprehend the nature of 
the break that Agamben makes with Laclau and Marchart’s post-foundational 
conception of politics. In my opinion, both contesting approaches start from the 
same situation – that is to say, from the end of metaphysics as a result of which 
the undecidable passage between signifier and signified, life and law, parti-
cularity and universality, the political and politics comes to light as the unsay-
able “it” or as Heidegger’s Ereignis. What needs to be thought as the subject 
matter or as the common point of departure is the “it” or, to be exact, the very 
ineffable passage itself from potentiality to actuality. In what follows, I put 
forward and defend the thesis that the culmination and exhaustion of the 
metaphysical tradition exposes itself at the limits of Agamben’s juridico-
political order and Laclau’s social order. This exposure, to repeat, is the 
exposure of the very undecidable passage from potentiality to actuality. 
In order to grasp what is at stake in the syntagma “the end of metaphysics”, 
Agamben studies and compares Heidegger’s Ereignis and Hegel’s absolute in 
several of his several writings (e.g., Agamben 1991; Agamben 1998: 61; 
Agamben 1999: 116–137; Agamben 2000: 109–112). Here, however, I do not 
intend to go into the similarities and differences discerned by Agamben in any 
detail since it would demand a long analysis. So, for the lack of the space, I 
confine myself to discussing Heidegger. According to Agamben’s interpre-
tation, Ereignis (literally, “event”, but usually translated into English as “appro-
priation”) is not just another “new formation of Being”, another form in being 
has “offered” itself in historically unique figures; for instance, being has 
revealed the beingness of all beings as arche, as subject, as substance, as god, as 
will, and as absolute (Heidegger 1969: 36, 66; Heidegger 2006: 72–73). After 
letting beings come to light and be there, being conceals itself in the present 
beings; or, as Heidegger says, being “withdraws” itself. The presencing of that 
what is present and what is given as an objective being falls into oblivion. 
What, however, appears in the arrival of Ereignis is no longer a novel epoch of 
being, a novel constellation of all beings in their unconcealment. Rather, on 
Agamben’s account, Ereignis breaks down the onto-theo-logical chain and ends 
the metaphysical tradition. In the figure of Ereignis, thinking comes face to face 
with the “it” or, in German, with the impersonal pronoun “es” that has histo-
rically sent “the various forms of epochal Being”, the unconcealment of all 
beings (quoted from Agamben 1999: 130). Heidegger, for instance, uses 
expressions such as “Es gibt Sein” (literally, “it gives being”) and “Es gibt Zeit” 
(literally, “it gives time”). From my perspective, Agamben understands Ereignis 
as “the pure self-destining”, which has withdrawn or concealed itself in what it 
has sent and destined (Agamben 1999: 131). The history of metaphysics is the 
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history of epochs of being where being has disclosed beings and, at the same 
time, concealed itself in that what it brought to light. To confront Ereignis 
means to come to terms with the fact that there is not any unveiling of a new 
historical constellation of being. Metaphysics, as the history of being, ends with 
Ereignis. At the end of metaphysics, pure self-destining reveals only itself and 
nothing beside itself: “Tradition, which covered over what was destined in 
figures, now shows itself for what it is: an untransmissible transmission that 
transmits nothing but itself” (Agamben 1999: 133). Being has all along trans-
mitted nothing more than its own self-concealment. Ereignis, insofar as it does 
not bring forth any new destiny or any new name for being, shows our pure 
abandonment to pure self-destining, to the self-concealment of being. The “it”, 
or Ereignis, appears as the negative – i.e., unsayable – limit beyond which 
contemporary thought has not ventured to go. What exactly is for Agamben this 
“pure self-destining without destiny”?    
With Ereignis, the tradition of philosophy reaches its extreme end. The end 
brings to light the limits of metaphysics that, as the third chapter showed, are 
the limits of language. Throughout its history, the internal structure of 
metaphysics has had an essential relation to language. To recall Agamben’s 
point, metaphysics ontologically presupposes the event of language as that what 
transcends the said in a speech act (see the first section of the third chapter). In 
this sense, the onto-theo-logical figures for being are, for Agamben, the 
metaphysical names for language: “[W]e are the first human beings who have 
become completely conscious of language. For the first time, what preceding 
generations called God, Being, unconscious appear to us as what they are: 
names for language” (Agamben 1999: 45; my emphasis). However, the fact that 
we have become completely conscious of language does not mean that we have 
found a new name for language. In the same way as Ereignis cannot be a new 
epochal unveiling of being, it cannot bring about some a new epochal un-
concealment of language. Following Agamben, we should say that Ereignis 
shows that there is not any name left for language: “Contemporary thought has 
approached an extreme limit beyond which a new epochal-religious unveiling of 
the word no longer seems possible” (Agamben 1999: 45; my emphasis). The 
limit which thinking has been approaching discloses that there is no name for 
language or, in logical terms, that there is no metalanguage (Agamben 1999: 
43–47; Agamben 1999: 211–214). Language, if it is the internal structure of 
Ereignis, reveals our linguistic being, our inescapable dwelling in the medium 
of language. But for that reason, Agamben thinks it is impossible to signify our 
essential embeddedness within the movement of signification. In other words, 
we are abandoned to and by language as pure self-destining. In Agamben’s 
point of view, Ereignis signifies our abandonment to and by the pure self-
destining of language. How is the abandonment experienced? 
The breakdown of metaphysics is announced by the uncanny arrival of 
nihilism. Heidegger’s essay “The End of Metaphysics and the Task of 
Thinking” suggests defining the end not as a mere cessation, but rather as a 
“completion” (Vollendung) (Heidegger 2007: 70–71). In place of termination, 
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Heidegger sees metaphysics achieving a final completion through the realisation 
of its “extreme possibilities” in the form of nihilism. Starting eminently with the 
work of Nietzsche, nihilism appears as the “truth”, or “essence”, of the Occi-
dental tradition having its beginning in Plato. In the same vein, the extreme 
revelation of language as pure self-destining is, for Agamben, the coming of 
nihilism that 
”interprets the extreme revelation of language in the sense that there is nothing to 
reveal, that the truth of language is that it unveils the Nothing of all things. The 
absence of a metalanguage thus appears as the negative form of the pre-
supposition, and the Nothing as the final veil, the final name of language” 
(Agamben 1999: 46; my emphasis).  
So, on Agamben’s account, the extreme revelation of language, with which 
metaphysics ends, is experienced as unveiling the nothingness of all beings. If 
there is no metalanguage, no new epochal name for the name, then being as 
language is taken as an ontological form of presupposition that is implicitly 
transmitted but all the time not said in every speech act. The Nothing is, in other 
words, the unsayable presupposition of all presuppositions. Paradoxically, 
however, this turns the Nothing into a final name for language (Agamben 1999: 
46). The nihilistic completion of metaphysics has, in my view, a double face: 
the face of culmination and exhaustion.18 Nihilism reveals the breakdown of 
metaphysics, that is, our thrownness into an infinite self-destining of language 
without destiny. Nihilism exhausts all possible figures for language. Yet, at the 
same time, by making the Nothing into a negative form of presupposition, 
nihilism pushes the metaphysical tradition to the extreme: the beingness of 
beings is unveiled as the Nothing. Thus, having reached the state of completion, 
metaphysics culminates and, by doing so, exhausts itself in nihilism. The “it”, or 
Ereignis, reveals itself as the Nothing, as an unsayable presupposition. 
So far, we have been reading the end of metaphysics as the culmination and 
exhaustion of the onto-theo-logical chain or, as Agamben would say, of 
language in nihilism. The extreme revelation of language reveals the self-con-
cealment of language as the pure self-destining to which we are abandoned 
without any possibility of escape. This claim needs to be unpacked and 
exemplified further. For this purpose, I think it is helpful to turn to Derrida’s 
deconstructive strategy of reading that demonstrates the impossibility of a 
fundamental structure (i.e., the sign) to be present as a sutured totality, as one 
object among other beings (Derrida 1973; Agamben 1993c; Agamben 2005b: 
102–103). When the movement of signification, insofar as it is signifies, is 
ungraspable, then language represents itself as a hollowed out form, as a pure 
form without any corresponding substance. In Agamben’s opinion, 
                                                     
18  Similarly, for Heidegger, metaphysics culminates in the actualisation of “its extreme 
possibilities” in the development of modern science; but metaphysics also exhausts itself in 
the nihilistic approach of sciences that do not ask after their “ontological” presuppositions 
(Heidegger 2007: 70–73). 
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deconstruction conceives language at the state of its breakdown. Although the 
meaningful self-reference of language is impossible, Derrida still continues to 
uphold the function of self-signification (Agamben 2005b: 103). Pure self-
destining is the infinite self-signification without any fulfilment: “A signifi-
cation that only signifies itself can never seize hold of itself, it can never catch 
up with a void in representation, nor does it ever allow anything to be an in-
significant; rather, it is displaced and deferred in one and the same gesture” 
(Agamben 2005b: 103). Here, I believe, we encounter again the double 
structure of nihilism: signification is exhausted and yet kept running on empty. 
Because of the void in signification, because of the lack of the name for 
language, signification is in a state of excess or “overabundance” insofar as it 
operates by producing “supplements” for the structural lack, that is, supple-
ments that never manage to come to terms with the impossibility. Supplements 
render the name for language present in its absence (Derrida 2007: 365–366).  
Laying out Agamben’s position, I have argued that the breakdown of the 
onto-theo-logical chain of “transcendental” names for being or for language 
does not mean the simple cessation and termination of metaphysics as a relic of 
some past folly; respectively, the uncanny interruption of signification does not 
imply a meaningless silence, a complete stoppage of signification. Nihilism, 
contrary to what might be expected, is not a mere absence of meaning. In the 
domination of nihilism, the human being rather finds itself abandoned by and to 
metaphysics or, to be exact, to language (Derrida 2007: 354–355; Agamben 
1999: 45–46). The nature of this human condition can be explicated further. 
Namely, a zero-degree signification manifests itself in the breakdown of the 
signified-signifier isomorphism, or the natural harmony of the sign (e.g., Laclau 
1996: 36–40). What, according to Agamben, shows itself as a result is the very 
passage or the very relation which connects the opposite poles of the sign 
(Agamben 1993c: 152–157). The barrier signals a negative presence of meaning 
or, put differently, of language. Furthermore, the barrier, or passage, is the place 
of “undecidability” where human practice articulates the passages through a 
signifier and a signified, beings and being, semiotics and semantics, phone and 
logos, langue and parole. This articulatory practice sets signification into 
movement by connecting and differentiating logos and phone, beings and being. 
So, in my opinion, Agamben understands pure self-destining (or the “it” or, in 
German, the “es”) as an articulatory practice that determines the very relation 
between signifier and signified, etc. To reformulate once more, the end of 
metaphysics reveals the undecidable passages where human practice first finds 
itself abandoned to articulating the dichotomous opposites. Ereignis, as the 
extreme revelation of language as self-destining without a final fulfilment, is the 
undecidable passage where articulatory practice brings binary concepts into a 
subversive interplay.  
Derrida’s concept of undecidability (along with the corresponding meto-
nymies such as “freedom”, “contingency”, and “decision”) is present in 
Laclau/Mouffe’s approach and, subsequently, in Marchart’s political ontology 
(e.g., Laclau 1985: xi, 105–116; Marchart 2007: 2–3). Again, like in Agamben, 
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the term signals the end of metaphysics that is described by Laclau with the 
following words: 
“The metaphysical discourse of the West is coming to an end, and philosophy in 
its twilight has performed, through the great names of the century, a last service 
for us: the deconstruction of its own terrain and the creation of the conditions for 
its own impossibility. Once undecidability has reached the ground itself […] the 
realm of philosophy comes to an end and the realm of politics begins” (Laclau 
1996: 123; my emphasis).      
Here, metaphysics is the discourse of all discourses that, in its twilight, 
deconstructs its guiding aspiration of unveiling the ultimate principles of the 
world. Deconstruction, according to Laclau, performs us a last service by 
showing the impossibility of a general and universal ontology, the impossibility 
of a self-grounding and self-evident foundation. Contrary to what the Occi-
dental tradition has thought, there is no immediate access either to pure being 
or, similarly, to social reality. The access is rather always mediated by particular 
discourses and contexts and points of view. Again, like in the case of Agamben, 
language, to which and by which we are abandoned, is not representable as a 
present being, as a full objectivity. From Laclau and Mouffe’s point of view, all 
beings as beings (including social being) are constituted in a non-sutured 
discursive field (Laclau 1990a: 97–114). What is visible at the end of meta-
physics is the fact that it is impossible to grasp society as a sutured objectivity 
grounded on an ultimate foundation. Yet, the impossibility does not mean a 
mere absence of society. For Laclau, I think, Ereignis manifests itself as the 
empty form of an order, as the empty form of relation between a signifier and a 
signified. An order that has exhausted all its historical figures reveals itself as 
“absent communitarian fullness”. Later, however, Marchart draws the con-
sequences of Laclau’s theoretical premises in full: metaphysics does not just 
cease to exist with the emergence of politics; politics rather preserves the 
impossible discourse of metaphysics by rendering it present in its absence 
(Marchart 2007: 163–169; see also the third section of the second chapter). 
Metaphysics, although it has exhausted its figures as an ultimate science with 
pure being as foundation, is still upheld and experienced as the empty form of a 
general ontology. The impossibility, which deconstruction is at pains to point 
out in reading the fundamental texts of the Occident, signifies nothing more 
than the “it” or the negative presence of metaphysics (Derrida 2007: 354). So, 
contrary to Laclau’s opinion, the age of politics does not simply do away with 
first philosophy.   
Metaphysics, to recapitulate, ends with the extreme revelation of language 
that corresponds to the collapse of the onto-theo-logical names for being (or for 
language) or, what amounts to the same thing, to the breakdown of the signifier-
signified relation. Pure self-destining is language that, throughout the history of 
metaphysics, has concealed itself in the historical constellations of a signifier 
and a signified, beings and being, semiotics and semantics, phone and logos, 
langue and parole. Having exhausted its figures, the self-destining, as I have 
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argued, reveals the undecidable passage where being and beings, signifier and 
signified, are connected and differentiated. Next, I argue that this subversive 
passage of dichotomous opposites is vividly visible in Agamben’s juridico-
political order, Laclau’s discursive-hegemonic order, and Marchart’s conception 
of metaphysics. The culmination and exhaustion of metaphysics manifests itself 
at the limits of a social and juridico-political order that is the place of an 
exemplary passage from potentiality to actuality. In what follows, I show in 
what way the potentiality-actuality passages come to light at the limits of a 
juridico-political order and a discursive-hegemonic order. I discuss Agamben 
and Laclau/Marchart’s approaches in separate subsections.   
 
 
5.1.1. Agamben’s Juridico-Political Order  
The end of metaphysics, as we have seen, reveals the “it” or the undecidable 
passage of dichotomous binaries. For Agamben, I believe, the potentiality-
actuality relation is the fundamental one among the metaphysical oppositions. 
In what follows, I want to show where the potentiality-actuality passage takes 
place in a juridico-political order.  
In Homo Sacer, the metaphysical categories are explicitly linked with 
juridico-political concepts (see, for example, Agamben 1998: 39–48, 60–62, 
182). The structural analogy between the metaphysical categories and the 
juridico-political notions of the Occident comes brilliantly forth in the following 
quotation:  
“[P]otentiality and actuality are simply two faces of the sovereign self-grounding 
of Being. Sovereignty is always double because Being, as potentiality, suspends 
itself, maintaining itself in a relation of ban (or abandonment) with itself in order 
to realize itself as absolute actuality (which thus presupposes nothing other than 
its own potentiality)” (Agamben 1998: 47; my emphasis). 
Here, as we can read, potentiality and actuality are not just any “modal” 
categories analysable purely from the point of view of logic. In my opinion, 
Agamben rather understands potentiality and actuality as two primary modes of 
being. Not only actuality, but also potentiality has an independent mode of 
being (see next section of the current chapter). But how does the being of 
potentiality show itself? For Agamben, being, as long as it is potentiality, has to 
be able to suspend itself and to exist in the mode of privation. In order to 
disclose itself, potentiality needs to be capable of its own impotentiality. Being, 
as potentiality, presents itself in the state of suspension. Ereignis, which signi-
fies the breakdown of the onto-theo-logical chain, demonstrates the potentiality 
of being to maintain itself in the state of impotentiality. From my perspective, 
Ereignis, as the extreme revelation of language, is simply the nullified figure of 
being, the negative presence of being (language). In other words, Ereignis 
marks the extreme limit where being exists in the state of its suspension.  
Impotentiality makes visible the passage from potentiality to actuality. But, as 
64 
we can read from the above quotation, being can sovereignly decide to translate 
its potentiality into actuality. Moreover, Agamben combines the self-grounding 
of being with that of the sovereign. The end of metaphysics expresses itself 
vividly at the limits of an order where the sovereign (the fundamental concept 
of the juridico-political tradition) and being (the fundamental concept of 
metaphysics) pass over into each other (e.g., Agamben 1998: 182). At the end of 
metaphysics, the potentiality-actuality passage comes to light exemplarily at the 
limits of a juridico-political order. What thus needs to be thought is an order 
that enforces itself in the nullified state, in the state of suspension. The limits of 
an order, in my opinion, bring forth the potentiality-actuality passage that 
exemplarily coincides with the exhaustion and culmination of metaphysics in 
Ereignis. In what follows, I will substantiate this claim. 
Agamben is interested in the limits of the social bond or of a juridico-
political order (e.g., Agamben 1998: 15; Agamben 2005b: 104–106). These 
limits, as we know, appear in the state of exception where the normal 
functioning of an order is suspended. This suspension does not bring about a 
disorderly chaos. In the state of exception, an order continues to enforce itself in 
an emptied out form: “The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, 
in withdrawing from it. The state of exception is thus not the chaos that pre-
cedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension” (Agamben 
1998: 18; original emphasis). What enforces itself in the state of exception is 
the empty form of the Law. As such, a juridico-political order is able to mani-
fest itself in a nullified form. From Agamben’s point of view, a juridico-
political order is present in its absence. The case in point for Agamben is 
Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” that tells a story of a man from the country 
seeking access to the Law. This man, however, is unable to pass through the 
door of the Law despite it being wide open. Agamben comments on the story 
thus: “Kafka’s legend presents the pure form in which law affirms itself with 
the greatest force precisely at the point in which it no longer prescribes 
anything […]” (Agamben 1998: 49; my emphasis). In the state of exception, the 
Law enforces itself in the hollowed out form. 
Potentiality does not demonstrate its independent being in the actual 
functioning of an order, in the actuality of some meaningful proposition, or in 
the full actuality of being. On the contrary, the being of potentiality expresses 
itself at the extreme limits where a juridico-political order demonstrates nothing 
less than its own potentiality to suspend itself and to maintain itself in the state 
of impotentiality. Using again Kafka’s parable again, Agamben explains: “The 
man from the country is delivered over to the potentiality of law because law 
demands nothing of him and commands nothing other than its own openness” 
(Agamben 1998: 50; my emphasis). To use a juridical vocabulary, it is correct 
to say that the being of potentiality manifests itself in the state of exception 
where a juridico-political order shows its constitutive potentiality “to maintain 
itself in its own privation, to apply in no longer applying” (Agamben 1998: 28). 
Employing its own impotentiality, an order can maintain itself in the state of 
privation, in the emptied out form that interrupts its historical unveilings. For 
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Agamben, I think, the nullified order is analogous to the “it” or Ereignis which, 
as we know, marks the end of metaphysics.  
An order, existing in the state of suspension, reveals the passage from 
potentiality to actuality. This passage, as we know, is the zone of undecidability 
that, according to Agamben, is occupied by the sovereign power (Agamben 
1998: 26–27; Agamben 2000: 113). In the last instance, it is up to the sovereign 
to decide when and where to suspend an order and when and where to translate 
its power into actuality. That is to say, the sovereign secures the passage from 
the empty form of an order to a concrete order. What, in my opinion, is at stake 
in the passage is the very relation itself between a constituting power and a 
constituted power (see Agamben 1998: 43–44). This means that there is neither 
fully fixed order nor purely potential order. True, with the help of impoten-
tiality, the sovereign can exist in the state of suspension: “[S]overeign power 
can also, as such, maintain itself infinitely, without ever passing over into 
actuality” (Agamben 1998: 47). Yet, there is always a troublemaker who can 
provoke the sovereign to translate its power into actuality. The sovereign, inso-
far as it secures the potentiality-actuality passage, secures the subversive 
interplay of binary concepts. What is at stake in the culmination and exhaustion 
of the metaphysical and political tradition is the undecidable zone where the 
sovereign decides upon the very potentiality-actuality passage. This passage is 
the “it” or self-destining that, throughout the metaphysical and juridico-political 
tradition, has remained concealed. However, the culmination and exhaustion of 
metaphysics in Ereignis brings this undecidable passage forth as the ineffable 
limit.  
  
5.1.2. Laclau’s Discoursive-Hegemonic Order 
Anyone who has read Hegemony and Socialist Strategy knows that neither 
potentiality nor actuality is of primary importance in Laclau and Mouffe’s ter-
minology. Nor does the concept of potentiality appear explicitly in Marchart’s 
work. Nevertheless, I maintain, the potentiality-actuality relation underlies their 
post-Marxist approach. In what follows, I seek to demonstrate this claim with 
Laclau’s discursive-hegemonic order and Marchart’s political post-foundatio-
nalism. 
According to Laclau, it is not possible to denote a society with an empirical 
referent. Society, like pure being, is not an ontic being that can be encountered 
somewhere as a fully present positivity. To put the same thing differently, there 
is no any ultimate foundation on the basis of which to conceive society as a 
fully transparent and present object (Laclau 1990a: 89–92). The social field, as 
a field of differences, is not an enclosed objectivity: 
“Against this essentialist vision we tend nowadays to accept the infinitude of the 
social, that is, the fact that any structural system is limited, that it is always 
surrounded by an ‘excess of meaning’ which it is unable to master and that, 
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consequently, ‘society’ as a unitary and intelligible object which grounds its own 
partial processes is an impossible object” (Laclau 1990a: 90; original emphasis). 
So, according to Laclau, society is impossible as long as it lacks a rigidly 
determined identity or literal meaning defined by some objectivity (e.g., econo-
mic law). If, furthermore, society is a signifying structure like many others, then 
the discursive field of the social is ineffable as a transparent totality. Yet, on 
Laclau’s account, it is possible to conceive society at the limits of social objecti-
vity where the impossible object attains a negative form of presence. As such, a 
social order is able to appear, for Laclau, at the point of its breakdown: “’Order’ 
as such has no content, because it only exists in the various forms in which it is 
actually realized, but in a situation of radical disorder ‘order’ is present as that 
which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence” 
(Laclau 1996: 44; my emphasis). As such, a social order represents itself as a 
result of the breakdown of a social bond. In the same way as Agamben’s 
juridico-political order enforces itself at its limits as the empty form, Laclau’s 
communitarian fullness is present in its absence at the limits of social positivity.  
The nullified order, I believe, manifests nothing more than itself at the level 
of the being of potentiality. Following Agamben, I would claim that an order is 
able to point to itself only because of its constitutive potentiality to maintain 
itself in the state of privation. By virtue of impotentiality, the being of an order 
is grasped in the state of its suspension. An order displays itself as lacking any 
fixed content; that is to say, society, or communitarian fullness, is present in its 
absence, in its privation. Or, in other words, social dislocations produce empty 
signifiers that can be attached to any signified. Empty signifiers, produced by 
the social, represent absent communitarian fullness that can be filled in with 
many possible contents: 
“This can only mean that the general form of fullness is exactly equivalent to the 
general form of possibility. That is to say that the fullness of the social does not 
manifest itself in any concrete social order but in the possibility of representing 
its radical indeterminacy, in other words its nature as a mere possibility” (Laclau 
1990a: 79; my emphasis). 
So, for Laclau, a dislocated order is undecidable with regard to its content. The 
empty form, or being, of an order is equivalent to the plurality of possibilities of 
how social relations can be (re-)organised. The emptiness and fullness are two 
sides of the same coin (see Laclau 2005: 170). Take, for instance, the concept of 
mana that, lacking a determinate meaning, is able to acquire a wide range of 
actual meanings depending on the context (Laclau 1996: 36; Agamben 2005b: 
101–102; Derrida 2007: 366–367). The empty signifier, representing a nullified 
order or society, is the zone of undecidability where the signified-signifier 
passage is decided upon or, better, where it is decided which discursive-
hegemonic substitute shall fill in the empty form of an order. In what follows, I 
substantiate this claim with Laclau’s concept of “dislocation”. 
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Laclau discusses the concept of dislocation in the essay “New Reflections on 
the Revolution of our Time” (Laclau 1990a: 41–45). The moments of dis-
location are, shortly put, interruptive events that disclose a structural im-
possibility due to which a structure fails to constitute itself as a sutured totality, 
as a fully transparent object. A signifying structure, like society, is constitu-
tively unable to coincide with itself as a full objectivity. The dislocation lays 
bare the internal limits around which a hegemonic order constitutes itself as a 
signifying structure. The sites of social antagonism are the exemplary spaces of 
dislocation. Laclau identifies three dimensions of dislocation. The first moment 
is temporality that is opposed to the spatiality, or symbolic repetition, of a 
structural rule (Laclau 1990a: 41–42). A symbolic representation hegemonises 
time. Temporality, heterogeneous with respect to symbolic repetition, is “a pure 
effect of dislocation” (Laclau 1990a: 42). The second dimension is freedom 
that, for Laclau, is located between two extremes: a full self-determination of 
the subject (e.g., existentialism) and a total absorption of the subject’s identity 
by the objectivity of a structure (Laclau 1990a: 43–45). There is a space for 
freedom only because a social structure is never able to fully determine the 
identity of a subject.  
In addition to temporality and freedom, possibility is the third and final 
dimension of dislocation. Illuminating this claim, Laclau first turns to Aristotle 
who, in Metaphysics, examines possibility in relation to movement (kinesis). 
What, for Laclau, is conceivable in motion is “the actuality of the possible as 
possible” (Laclau 1990a: 42). To borrow Laclau’s example, let us imagine an 
entity whose colour changes from white to black. Through this change, the 
entity actualises its potential. During the process of movement when the white 
entity turns black or during the process of blackening, the possible is actual as 
possible. In any case, this kind of movement presupposes a predetermined telos: 
“The Aristotelian possibility, however, is a single possibility because the pro-
cess of change is conceived as development and thus appears dominated by the 
telos of the transition from potentiality to actuality” (Laclau 1990a: 42; original 
emphasis). 
A dislocated structure, in contrast, does not reveal a single possibility, but 
rather a plurality of possibilities: 
 “This means that there must be other possibilities, since the idea of a single pos-
sibility denies what is involved in the very concept of possibility. As we have 
seen, because structural dislocation is constitutive, the dislocated structure can-
not provide the principle of its transformations. The dislocated structure thus 
opens possibilities of multiple and indeterminate rearticulations for those freed 
from its coercive force and who are consequently outside of it” (Laclau 1990a: 
42–43).  
Conceptually, for Laclau, a radical possibility involves the presence of alter-
native possibilities. The event of dislocation opens a plurality of possibilities 
regarding how social identities and relations can be rearticulated into a 
signifying totality, into a discursive-hegemonic order. The possibilities repre-
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sent thus the alternative conceptions of an order. A dislocated structure does not 
predetermine in what way social elements are rearticulated into a new order. 
The passage from possibility to actuality is not fixed by a pregiven telos. What, 
in Laclau’s opinion, is realised and what is repressed is not predetermined by 
some positivity (for example, economic or moral laws). In this sense, political 
articulation or, better, the political acts of institution take place in a zone of 
undecidability. The undecidability on which political articulation decides is 
therefore a zone of possibilities. A dislocated structure opens thus the un-
decidable zone of the possible where political articulation decides upon the 
passage between potentiality and actuality, between being and beings, an order 
and a particular ordering, between the political and the social. Even though 
political articulation is not structurally determined, it is not completely 
undetermined either – that is, the undecidable is not absolute: “[A] widening of 
the field of the possible […] takes place in a determined situation: that is, one in 
which there is always a relative structuration” (Laclau 1990a: 43). The 
possibilities, opened through dislocation, are therefore not logical possibilities, 
but rather a conceivable or real alternative to a prevailing order.  
A possible order that is actualised through political articulation excludes all 
real alternative possibilities, all competing representations of the social as a 
totality. A discursive-hegemonic order, in spite of its imaginary aspirations, is 
unable to realise communitarian fullness (Laclau 1990a: 44). There is a 
constitutive gap that separates the representative and the represented, commu-
nitarian fullness and a discursive-hegemonic order or, to use Heidegger’s 
terminology, being and beings. The instituting acts remain ontologically in-
complete – that is to say, political articulations are unable to bring into exis-
tence the idea of communitarian fullness. Despite the realisation of a concrete 
order, political articulations fail to realise a sutured totality, a reconciled so-
ciety. An actual order, no matter what its form, is able to erase and exhaust the 
possible. The excess, in the form of the possible, haunts the positivity of the 
social and, in the final instance, imposes itself on it (Laclau 1990a: 43). This 
possible appears through a “reactivation” of social “sedimentations” that, at first 
sight, appear to be natural and necessary. What, according to Laclau, the 
reactivation brings forth is contingency, or undecidability, of a social formation 
that is covered under the sedimentations of the social (Laclau 1990a: 33–35). 
The zone of undecidability is the site where the passage through being and 
beings, the empty form of an order and an ontic order is articulated politically. 
In the condition where an order maintains itself in the state of suspension, 
political articulation determines sovereignly what type of an ontic order is 
actualised. From my perspective, the end of metaphysics brings to light this 
undecidable passage. To sum up: the limit where an order is present in the state 
of suspension is the passage where potentiality (absent communitarian fullness, 
a nullified order) can pass over into actuality (a concrete form of order). This 
transition takes place through articulatory practice that organises the non-fixed 
fragments of the social into a signifying totality. 
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Similarly to Laclau, Marchart does not directly examine the problem of 
potentiality. Yet, like in Laclau’s thinking, the concept is nevertheless implicitly 
presupposed. Consider, for instance, the following statement: “[T]he political 
(located, as it were, on the ‘ontological’ side of Being-as-ground) will never be 
able to fully live up to its function as Ground – and yet it has to be actualized in 
the form of an always concrete politics that necessarily fails to deliver what it 
has promised” (Marchart 2007: 8). The moment of the political is always in 
excess of the moment of its actualisation. The acts of grounding never reach a 
final fulfilment: the possible exceeds the actual. That is to say, there is only the 
passage of articulation (or political grounding act) between the moment of the 
political and the moment of its actualisation. Marchart develops this type of 
post-foundational political ontology in response to the crisis of the metaphysical 
tradition that experiences the absence of an ultimate foundation. This absence, 
however, does not end up in an anti-foundationalism that does away with the 
concept of foundation altogether. Laclau summarises Marchart’s idea suc-
cinctly: 
“‘Anti-foundationalism’ would be the pure and simple absence of a ground, 
which could only be expressed through a proliferation of ontic identities. ‘Post-
foundationalism’ means something different: the ground does not disappear, but 
is penetrated by a dimension of absence or contingency that renders impossible 
any reduction of the ontological to the ontic” (Laclau 2014: 119). 
The absence of an ultimate foundation discloses the ontological dimension that 
maintains foundation present in its absence. I think that the same idea can be 
reformulated with the concept of potentiality. To attest to the phenomenon of 
foundation means to attest to the being of potentiality due to which foundation 
can maintain itself in the state of privation. Being-as-foundation shows itself as 
the empty from that requires an ontic representation. Contingent foundations 
represent the ultimate foundation in its absence. There is only a passage through 
the ontic and ontological as long as no foundation fully assumes the status of an 
ultimate foundation. Political practice (e.g., political articulation and the acts of 
political grounding) does not close, but rather conveys the passage. 
In essence, the previous line of argumentation redescribes the status of 
metaphysics. Having reached its end, metaphysics is not simply absent, but 
rather present as the “it”, Ereignis, the ineffable barrier between a signifier and 
signified. The fundamental science, concerned with the ultimate foundation of 
the world, becomes present in its absence. This empty form of metaphysics can 
be filled in by a plurality of ontic supplements or regional disciplines. What, 
according to Marchart, determines the exact from of metaphysics or what an 
ontic supplement fills in the structural lack of pure being is a political decision: 
“[A]scension of a regional ontology to the always precarious status of a general 
ontology can be only based, at the end of the day, on a contingent decision. And 
our decision to grant political thought (rather than aesthetics, or ethics, or set 
theory) the role of a prima philosophia is, of course, not so much a ‘philo-
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sophical’ decision based, for instance, on so-called rational grounds, as it is an 
intrinsically political decision: an intervention from the ontic side of politics into 
the depoliticized field of philosophy” (Marchart 2007: 171; original emphasis). 
In the same way as absent communitarian fullness is realised through a hege-
monic substitute, the content of metaphysics is determined by political decision. 
For Marchart, a decision to elevate political ontology to the status of a first 
philosophy is a political decision. That is to say, political decision actualises the 
impossible discipline of metaphysics by subverting pure being with an ontic 
content. Marchart’s political decision, I believe, occupies the undecidable pas-
sage where it fixes for the time being the subversive interplay between 
universality and particularity, the political and politics.      
 
 
5.2. Agamben’s Conception  
of the Potentiality-Actuality Passage 
Agamben formulates in the introduction to Infancy and History the main 
problem of his work: “[W]hat is the meaning of ‘there is language’; what is the 
meaning of ‘I speak’?” (Agamben 1993b: 5). These questions are a little later 
specified as “What is the meaning of ‘I can’?”. If one understands the meaning 
of “I can”, it is much easier to grasp the idea behind Agamben’s concepts such 
as messianism, language, sovereignty, and law. In my opinion, however, this 
question can be made even more specific – namely, “I can” might be condensed 
into the question of the very passage where a learned capability, or a poten-
tiality to do or be, is set into action. What is therefore at stake in “I speak” or “I 
can” is the translation of potentiality into actuality. In what follows, I will to 
show how Agamben explicates and interprets this very passage by rethinking 
Aristotle’s concept of potentiality. 
What is at issue in Agamben’s studies is a learned capability, a capacity, or a 
potentiality to do or be (dynamis) that exists in a complicated relationship with 
actuality (energeia). These “modal” categories, as it is well-known, are 
discussed by Aristotle in the Book Theta of Metaphysics (Aristotle 2006). 
Before setting forth his own position, Aristotle introduces the views of the 
Megarians: “There are some – such as the Megarians – who say that something 
is capable only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it is not capable” 
(Aristotle 2006: 1046b, 29–31). What is thus potential can exist if and only if it 
is exercised. The ability to play the kithara, for example, manifests itself in the 
actual performance. If one can play a kithara, then this learned ability exists 
only in the act of playing. And if no playing takes place, then there is no 
potentiality. Potentiality does not have a separate existence besides its being 
realised in act. All rational capacities, or crafts, are subordinated to the presence 
of acting. From the Megarian perspective, potentiality does not thus have an 
independent being. 
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To counter the Megarians’ interpretation, we need to examine the problem 
more closely. What, from Agamben’s point of view, is above all at stake in the 
complex relation between the “modal” categories is the very ineffable passage 
or movement from potentiality to actuality, from a capability into an act. In 
Aristotle’s ethical theory of virtues, this transition takes place through the 
“habit” (hexis) that, generally speaking, puts into action a knowledge, a techni-
que or a faculty (Agamben 2013a: 92–94). A “virtue” (arete) is the acquired 
habit to exercise a potential in accordance with the good. The habit defines the 
passage from the knowledge of the good to its realisation in act. Paradoxically, 
however, hexis is also the habit of privation (steresis). To have a potential to do 
or be implies to have a power not to be or do (Agamben 1998: 45). The ability 
to play the kithara does not always have to be put into action. The attained skill 
does not have to be exercised. And furthermore, when the acquired ability, 
knowledge, or skill is not exercised, it is not thereby abolished and made 
inexistent. Every type of potentiality entails a constitutive “impotentiality” 
(adynamia); in other words, impotentiality is the “essence” of potentiality. 
Aristotle states this point bluntly: “Every potentiality is impotentiality of the 
same and with respect to the same (tou autou kai kata to auto pasa dynamis 
adynamiai) (Metaphysics, 1046a, 32)”19 (Agamben 1998: 45). By virtue of its 
own impotentiality, a potentiality or capability is never dissolved and exhausted 
in the actuality of an act. What, in the end, constitutes the humanity of a human 
being is not this or that capacity or knowledge or skill, but rather the capacity to 
maintain oneself in relation to one’s own privation, to one’s own impotentiality.   
What, today, has fallen into oblivion is precisely impotentiality or, rather, the 
potentiality not to do and be. Take, for instance, the question of emancipation. 
The Marxist perspective associates the alienation of the working class with the 
capitalist mode of production due to which the full realisation of human capa-
cities is significantly constrained. Hindering the free development of human 
faculties, capitalism produces an impoverished mass – that is, the proletariat – 
who, in order to stay alive, have to sell their labour power to the capitalist. In 
contrast to this Marxist approach, the late capitalism promotes, according to 
Agamben, the feeling “Nothing is impossible”:  
“Separated from his impotentiality, deprived of the experience of what he can 
not do, today’s man believes himself capable of everything, and so he repeats his 
jovial “no problem,” and his irresponsible “I can do it,” precisely when he should 
instead realize that he has been consigned in unheard of measure to forces and 
processes over which he has lost all control” (Agamben 2011: 44).  
The market-oriented powers have changed the underlying characteristics of 
socio-political domination. In our time, as Agamben argues, human beings are 
not so much separated from what they can do or be, but rather from what they 
                                                     
19  Compare with an alternative translation: “And incapacity and being incapable are the 
privation that is opposite to the capacity of this sort, so that every capacity and incapacity are 
for the same thing and in the same respect“ (Aristotle 2006: 1046a: 29–31). 
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cannot do or be. Human beings are not so much separated from their powers as 
deprived from the experience of privation. Today’s man “has become blind not 
to his capacities but to his incapacities, not to what he can do but to what it 
cannot, or can not, do” (Agamben 2011: 44). In this changed socio-economic 
situation, resistance becomes a far more complicated and challenging affair: 
“Those who are separated from what they can do, can, however, still resist; they 
can still not do. Those who are separated from their own impotentiality lose, on 
the other hand, first of all the capacity to resist” (Agamben 2011: 45). To 
maintain the capacity to resist in the current world, it is thus necessary to start 
reappropriating impotentiality that constitutes every type of human capacity. 
What the capitalist world of spectacle wants to hide away from us at all cost 
is the very passage between potentiality and actuality, a capacity and its 
exercise, power and act. Through impotentiality, this very passage comes to 
light as an ineffable thing. In the previous stages of our research, we have 
already encountered this same passage as the extreme limit of Laclau’s 
discursive-hegemonic order and of Agamben’s juridico-political order. An order 
is an order only on the condition that it can exist beyond its normal application 
as the nullified form. In more general terms: the passage was already present in 
the breakdown of the onto-theo-logical chain in Heidegger’s figure of Ereignis 
or, alternatively, in the extreme revelation of language that illustrates the sove-
reign capacity of being to maintain itself in the state of suspension (Agamben 
1998: 21). In the last instance, I think, the potentiality-actuality relation is an 
exemplary passage as long as it overlaps and gathers around itself all other 
possible oppositions. When, for instance, we face a juridico-political order in 
the state of impotentiality (or, in the state of exception), we have to deal with 
nothing less than the undecidable passage between life and law, outside and 
inside, exclusion and inclusion, being and beings. In the same vein: when we 
are face to face with a discursive-hegemonic order in the state of its own 
suspension, then we have to confront the undecidable passage between parti-
cularity and universality, outside and inside, signifier and signified, the political 
and the social, negativity and positivity, contingency and necessity. Thus, to 
recapitulate, Aristotle’s “modal“ categories come before all others. So, from my 
perspective, the relation between actuality and potentiality has a paradigmatic 
importance for the delineation and “overcoming” of the metaphysical and 
political tradition in their entirety.   
To possess a learned capacity or knowledge means to put it in action. The 
skill of painting, for instance, becomes visible in an actual painting. At first 
sight, it seems as if an actualisation of potentiality requires a setting aside of 
impotentiality. By presenting a musical piece, for example, a player annuls 
his/her own ability not to exercise his/her acquired capacity. This is at least one 
prevailing way to conceive the movement from potentiality to actuality, from 
power to act. Despite its deceptive obviousness, one could nevertheless pose 
seemingly innocent questions: Is it possible to conceive the actuality of 
impotentiality? Is it possible to realise impotentiality? Trying to answer these 
problems, Agamben cites a problematic sentence from Aristotle’s Metaphysics: 
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“A thing is said to be potential if, when the act of which it is said to be potential 
is realized, there will be nothing im-potential (that is, there will be nothing able 
not to be) (Metaphysics, 1047a, 24–26)” (Agamben 1998: 45). This translation, 
as well as Agamben’s interpretation, is at odds with the traditional under-
standing.20 In contrast to the prevailing interpretations, Agamben suggests that 
an act does not necessarily have to destroy its own impotentiality: “To set im-
potentiality aside is not to destroy it but, on the contrary, to fulfil it, to turn 
potentiality back upon itself in order to give itself to itself” (Agamben 1998: 
46). Only by virtue of being able to realise all impotentiality, i.e., of being able 
to bring all impotentiality into an act, is potentiality able to seize hold of itself 
as potentiality. Through this kind of fulfilment, potentiality manages to refer to 
itself – that is to say, potentiality gives itself to itself as potentiality. Enabling 
its own impotentiality, an action can truly exhibit its own potentiality of acting 
and being. Glenn Gould is, for Agamben, an exemplary pianist who, in the 
intense act of playing, does not just exercise “his potential to play […], but 
rather his potential to not-play” (Agamben 1993a: 36). Adynamia is in this way 
fully actualised and brought into action. The inactivity, internal to any generic 
form of capacity, is enacted fully. For this reason, the impotentiality with which 
Gould performs a musical piece cannot just be identified with bare idleness. 
What, according to Agamben, an action needs to be enacted out is its own 
impotentiality, its own inactivity, or its own impotentiality not to be and do. 
Playing a piece of music, a professional musician realises a potential learned 
through hard training. But it is harder to conceive what it means for the same 
musician to actualise his or her own impotentiality to play, what it means to act 
out all the potentiality not to be or do. One thing is nevertheless certain: neither 
this nor that being is experienced when potentiality exposes itself as such 
through the realisation of all impotentiality. What, for example, we perceive 
after closing our eyes, after suspending our power to see something is not a 
mere absence or nothingness, but rather a pure receptivity, a pure potentiality to 
perceive (Agamben 1999: 181). In the perception of the darkness that appears 
after closing one’s eyes, a human being is confronted by its own impotentiality 
that displays the potentiality to perceive. In the same manner, when an action or 
practice enacts its own potentiality not to do or be, then an action does not 
simply negate, but rather fully realises impotentiality. By actualising its own 
impotentiality, the action is able to turn back upon itself and to exhibit itself in 
the medium of pure potentiality. To take a case in point, let us read the 
following quotation from Agamben’s book State of Exception: “To a word that 
does not bind, that neither commands nor prohibits anything, but says only 
                                                     
20  Stephen Makin translates the previous citation thus: “And this is what is possible – that 
for which, if the actuality of which it is said to have the capacity obtains, there will be 
nothing impossible” (Aristotle 2006: 1047a, 24–26). According to Makin, Aristotle states in 
these lines a modal test for possibility: “[…] if p is in fact the case then clearly nothing 
impossible follows from p’s actually being the case” (Makin 2006: 72). However, this modal 
test for possibility is not applicable to non-standard modalities such as capacities and crafts 
(Makin 2006: 74).   
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itself, would correspond an action as pure means, which shows only itself, with-
out any relation to an end” (Agamben 2005a: 88). This type of political action is 
not exhausted in some precalculated end. Absolved from its natural end, an 
action shows only itself in the dimension of pure potentiality. This self-expo-
sure means thus nothing other than the exhibition of an action in the dimension 
of pure potentiality. Instead of realising some sort of function or objective, an 
action manages to display itself in the dimension of its own potentiality.  
In opposition to the ordinary realisation of a capability or craft, the fulfil-
ment of impotentiality brings into existence neither an end product nor an 
ethical good as an end in itself. By using up all impotentiality, an action is able 
to demonstrate its own inexhaustible power to do or be. In contrast to poiesis 
and praxis, potentiality is favoured by Agamben neither as a means to an end 
nor as an end in itself (e.g., Agamben 2000: 57–58). Through the full realisation 
of impotentiality, an act turns potentiality back upon itself; and by doing so, an 
act reveals itself in the dimension of potentiality. The fulfilled impotentiality is 
therefore pure potentiality, i.e., the self-exposure of potentiality: “[P]ure poten-
tiality, that is, the actuality of an act, is pure potentiality, that is, the potentiality 
of a potentiality” (Agamben 1999: 216).21 In any case, potentiality is not 
negated, but rather preserved and sustained in act. But, for Agamben, the 
potentiality of a potentiality does not signify simply the zone of undecidability 
between pure potentiality and pure actuality; rather, the zone of undecidability 
is brought to light as such. What, in my opinion, acquires for the first time a 
form of actual presence in pure potentiality is the very passage itself where 
power is put into action. Through the fulfilment of its own impotentiality, an act 
is able to appropriate the “it”, the ineffable barrier within the sign, or, simply 
put, the Nothing. The liminal passage where an order shows itself in the 
emptied out form is assumed without post-foundational concessions, without 
any discursive-hegemonic supplements for absent communitarian fullness, 
without ontic substitutes for pure being. The thing that was presupposed by a 
juridico-political order or a discursive-hegemonic order is assumed fully. Now, 
for the first time, I think it becomes possible for Agamben possible to dwell on 
the very passage where we have always been. But when the passage is made 
present as pure potentiality, then the potentiality-actuality relation and, along 
the same lines, the subversive interplay of dichotomous opposites is put to a 
halt. 
In the arsenal of Agamben’s terminology, there is a term – i.e., “inopera-
tivity” – that, in my opinion, is well suited to clarify the deactivation and 
fulfilment of the very undecidable passage between potentiality and actuality.22 
Contrary to that what the term may suggest, inoperativity denotes neither a plain 
                                                     
21  In chapter eight of the book „Theta“, Aristotle argues for the priority of actuality with 
respect to potentiality (Aristotle 2006: 1049b-1051a; see also Makin 2006: 181–220).  
22  On inoperativity, for instance, see Agamben, G. 2011. Nudities. Trans. by D. Kishik & S. 
Pedatella. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press; Agamben, G. 2007. Profanations. Trans. 
by J. Fort. New York: Zone Books. 
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cancellation nor a substitution of one act with another. To comprehend the 
meaning of the concept, I take my cue from a short but informative remark in 
Homo Sacer: “The only coherent way to understand inoperativeness is to think 
of it as a generic mode of potentiality that is not exhausted (like individual 
action or collective action understood as the sum of individual actions) in a 
transitus de potentia ad actum” (Agamben 1998: 62). Therefore, the task is to 
think inoperativity as a radical form of potentiality that is not exhausted, but 
rather preserved in actuality. This generic mode of an inexhaustible potentiality 
manifests itself in the realisation of impotentiality, owning to which it is 
possible to dwell on the undecidable passage without looking for excuses in 
contingent foundations, ontic substitutes for pure being and a nullified order. 
The passage that is revealed at the end of metaphysics is “retrieved” (ripren-
dere) (Agamben 2005b: 23–25, 103–104). With the help of impotentiality, it is 
possible to dwell on the passage between power and act. But as a result, the 
inexhaustible potentiality renders the very undecidable passage between poten-
tiality and actuality, power and its exercise, inoperative; a transitus de potentia 
ad actum is deactivated and “revoked” (revocare). Agamben’s approach 
absolves us from the “it” (Ereignis) or from the articulation of dichotomous 
opposites that have kept the metaphysical and juridico-political tradition 
operative. Hence, in my opinion, the inoperativeness consists of a double 
movement: the retrieval and the revocation. In what follows, I exemplify 
illustrate this by using examples from Agamben’s own writings. 
 In The Time That Remains, Agamben examines the exemplary text of mes-
sianism, the Apostle Paul’s Letter to Romans. The second chapter of the book 
explores in detail the messianic vocation defined by Paul with the syntagma of 
“as not” (hos me) (Agamben 2005b: 23–25). The messianic experience does not 
simply eliminate all vocations once and for all; nor does the formula of “as not” 
refer to a simple inactivity, indifference, or sheer idleness. The Apostle Paul 
displays instead a peculiar relation to the initial vocation: “According to the 
principle of messianic klesis, one determinate factical condition is set in relation 
to itself – the weeping is pushed toward the weeping, the rejoicing toward the 
rejoicing” (Agamben 2005b: 24). Dwelling in the messianic time means that 
every type of activity, or vocation, is brought in a relation to itself. Although the 
initial form of every act seems to be left intact, the messianic “as not” 
nevertheless transforms the function of the vocation, which is to say, revokes 
the act from within. One is weeping as not weeping; one is rejoicing as not 
rejoicing. An action assumes itself, in the state of inoperativity. What the 
messianic vocation enacts is nothing more than the emptied out vocation. This 
renders visible the vocation itself in its pure mediality or, in other words, in its 
pure potentiality. The messianic vocation assumes the zone of undecidability 
between potentiality and actuality, between the exercise and its suspension. Put 
differently: the messianic vocation assumes and deactivates the potentiality-
actuality passage. A life, lived under the sign of the messianic calling, is the life 
of a fully assumed inoperativity. Messianism is, in other words, perfect nihilism 
that does away even with the nothing itself. 
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Another example of inoperativity is the resurrected body that Agamben 
examines in the essay “The Glorious Body” (Agamben 2011: 91–13). In what 
age exactly is the earthly body resurrected? Are diverse humors (e.g., urine and 
sweat) extraneous to the glorious body? Do fingernails remain growing? Does 
the resurrected body maintain sexual and digestive organs? These types of 
theological questions culminate in the problem of sexual reproduction and 
nutrition (Agamben 2011: 97). The glorious body, as long as it is identical with 
the body on the earth, maintains all the vital organs associated with sexual 
reproduction and nutrition. Yet, according to Agamben, there is a small change: 
the physiological operation of every single organ is suspended. All natural 
operations (e.g., procreation) are neutralised. The glorious body displays all the 
functions in the state of suspension: “The organ or instrument that was 
separated from its operation and remains, so to speak, in the state of suspension, 
acquires, precisely for this reason, an ostensive function; it exhibits the virtue 
corresponding to the suspended operation” (Agamben 2011: 98). The glorious 
body demonstrates itself in the dimension of pure mediality. The church 
responds to this by seeking to subject the inoperative body to liturgy. Like 
commodity, law, and language, the nullified form is thus separated into another 
sphere. Agamben, however, advocates another approach. From Agamben’s 
point of view, it is possible to fully assume the potentiality or privation that, in 
the earthly body, was fixed to the performance of some natural function:    
“A new use for the body is thus possible only if it wrests the inoperative function 
from its separation, only if it succeeds in bringing together within a single place 
and in single gesture both exercise and inoperativity, economic body and 
glorious body, function and its suspension” (Agamben 2011: 102). 
The potentiality that is liberated from performing some natural operation is 
enacted out fully. The coincidence of function and its suspension, as I have 
argued above, can occur only when action realises all its own impotentiality. 
For Agamben, thus, the glorious body shows a way towards a new use of the 
common and towards a new paradigm of human action that deactivates the 
subversive interplay between exclusion and inclusion, outside and inside, means 
and ends, negativity and positivity, the political and politics, a constituting 
power and a constituted power, a signifier and a signified, particularity and 
universality – or, simply put, potentiality and actuality. 
When, to repeat, pure potentiality becomes absolutely indistinguishable from 
pure actuality, then the passage from potentiality to actuality is put to a halt. 
Now, for the first time, one can truly dwell on the very same undecidable terrain 
where political articulation had instituted a discursive-hegemonic order and 
where sovereign decision had assured the normal application of a juridico-
political order. Heidegger’s Ereignis, as we saw above, unveiled the negative 
limit of the metaphysical tradition – that is to say, the “it” or the unsayable 
passage between being and beings. For Agamben, in my opinion, Ereignis lays 
bare the unsayable as the limit form of relation between beings and being. But 
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in order to say the ineffable thing, that is to say, “difference as difference”, it is 
necessary to attempt to “think the ontological difference no longer as a relation, 
and Being and being beyond every form of connection” (Agamben 1998: 61; 
my emphasis). To seize hold of difference as difference means, according to 
Agamben, nothing more than to retrieve and revoke the very relation. As I have 
argued, the only way to achieve this double movement is to reconsider the 
“modal” concepts. Namely, the inoperativeness of the potentiality-actuality 
passage goes beyond the ontological difference, beyond the question of being: 
“[O]ne must think the existence of potentiality without any relation to Being in 
the form of actuality – not even in the extreme form of the ban and the poten-
tiality not to be, and of actuality as the fulfilment and manifestation of poten-
tiality – and think the existence of potentiality even without any relation to being 
in the form of the gift of the self and of letting be” (Agamben 1998: 47; my 
emphasis).  
As we saw above, potentiality and actuality are conceived as two related modes 
of being. In line with this, Aristotle considered the being of potentiality in 
relation to actuality as “the gift” while Heidegger reflected on the being of 
potentiality as the letting be. For Agamben, however, both approaches are 
inadequate as long as potentiality is conceived in the mode of being. By 
reconsidering the potentiality-actuality passage, Agamben goes beyond the very 
ontological difference between being and beings. That is to say, Agamben’s 
reinterpretation of “modal” categories brings to light the very relation between 
being and beings. This retrieval, however, revokes the play between being and 
beings. That is in my opinion why Agamben deems it necessary to think 
potentiality not in relation to being. Potentiality no longer takes the form of 
being. From my perspective, the inoperativeness of the potentiality-actuality 
relation coincides with the inoperativeness of the ontological difference. While 
Heidegger manages to expose the negative limits of metaphysics, Agamben 
extinguishes the metaphysical tradition fully without making the zone of 
undecidability into a negative condition or foundation for practice and action.23 
If Agamben achieves this objective, then he manages to fulfil Heidegger’s 
proposal to think difference as difference, i.e., the dif-ference. 
 
 
5.3. Post-Foundational Political  
Ontology Reconsidered 
In the previous two sections, I have laid out the common ground of Agamben’s 
philosophy and post-foundational political thought. Furthermore I have shown 
how Agamben deactivates the potentiality-actuality passage or, what amounts to 
the same thing, the subversive interplay of dichotomous opposites. On the basis 
                                                     
23  On Agamben’s critique of Heidegger, for instance, see Agamben, G. 2004. The Open: 
Man and Animal. Trans. by K. Attell. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.   
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of this foundation, the three articles of my dissertation rethink the political 
difference, post-foundationalism, and social antagonism that, in their structure, 
are different names for the undecidable passage between binary oppositional 
concepts. In what follows, I summarise how Agamben’s interpretation of 
potentiality transforms Laclau and Marchart’s political thinking. 
Agamben’s philosophy as well as post-foundational political ontology 
operates in the terrain that emerges from the culmination and exhaustion of 
metaphysics in nihilism of which the operativity of a nullified order is an 
exemplary case. Starting from this common ground, I believe, it is possible to 
understand what distinguishes Laclau and Marchart’s post-foundational political 
ontology from Agamben’s philosophy. Whereas Laclau and Marchart deem it 
necessary to fill in the empty form of an order with ontic and hegemonic 
substitutes, Agamben seeks to render a zero-degree order inoperative or, better, 
to deactivate the passage from potentiality to actuality. To fulfil this objective, 
Agamben rethinks the metaphysical underpinnings of potentiality. Agamben 
expresses the contemporary task in these words: “This appears to be precisely 
the task of coming philosophy: to redefine the entire domain of categories and 
modality so as to consider no longer the presupposition of Being and 
potentiality, but their exposition” (Agamben 1999: 76; original emphasises). As 
we have seen above, potentiality can be given back to itself as potentiality only 
with the help of its own constitutive impotentiality. In my three articles, I have 
used Agamben’s reinterpretation of potentiality to rethink the main concepts of 
post-foundational political ontology such as the political difference between the 
political and politics, the political acts of grounding, and the antagonistic 
relation. All this, taken together, means nothing other than reconsidering politi-
cal ontology from the ground up. In the left-Heideggerian political thinking, 
Agamben and post-Marxism offer two different strategies of how to cope with 
the completion and exhaustion of the Western tradition in nihilism.  
 “Political Differentiability”, the first article of the dissertation, examines 
one of the fundamental concepts of contemporary political ontology: the 
political difference between the political and politics. Marchart thinks the politi-
cal difference in line with Identity and Difference where Heidegger proposes to 
reflect on “difference as difference”, i.e., on the very difference between being 
and beings. Analogously, Marchart wants to offer neither a pure philosophy of 
the political, nor a pure approach to politics. As an alternative, Marchart seeks 
to think the political difference as political difference that appears for post-
foundational political ontology as a never-ending play, or as an unbridgeable 
split, between the political and politics. Following Agamben, I believe, this 
differential play only manages to display the unsayability or negativity of the 
“it” that has sent the historical constellations of the political difference. In my 
opinion, Marchart’s political differencing is nothing more than the pure self-
destining that brings to light the differentiated – that is, the historical con-
stellations of the political and politics. This way of conceiving the political 
difference lays bare the empty form of relation between the political and 
politics. In its restless operation, the differential play is open but impassable.  
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In opposition to Marchart, I substantiate the contrary claim: as such, the 
political difference can become visible only if the mutual grounding of the 
political and politics is rendered inoperative. To grasp the political difference 
does not mean the experience, for this reason, of a new epochal constellation of 
the ontic and the ontological, politics and the political. From my point of view, 
for Marchart, the political difference is present after it has crossed the passage 
to actuality. Emphasising the effects, the political difference remains as such an 
ineffable thing. In any case, one should move away from concentrating on the 
effects of political differencing. Only by displacing the problem on the plain of 
potentiality, it is possible to fulfil the Heideggerian task of thinking the political 
difference as political difference. In my view, the political differencing displays 
itself only through the realisation of its own impotentiality. Putting into action 
all its own impotentiality, the political difference can show its pure power to 
differentiate. The power to differentiate, revealed by the actualisation of im-
potentiality, is nothing more than pure potentiality – or, as I would put it, 
political differentiability. Political difference turns back upon itself as pure 
potentiality. Yet, if this event takes place, then political differentiability de-
activates the never-ending play between dichotomous opposites. To think the 
political difference as political difference means to dwell on the passage where 
the political and politics are not linked anymore through their moment of 
articulation. The experience of pure potentiality extinguishes the play between 
the political and politics. What is more, this deactivation does not delimit the 
political difference either on the philosophical side of the political or on the side 
of political practicism. Political differentiability is the common dimension of 
thinking and political acting. 
The second article of the dissertation, “Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Messianic 
Fulfilment’ of Foundationalism in Politics”, examines Marchart’s post-founda-
tional political thought that, as a response to the breakdown of metaphysics, 
turns grounding into a never-ending task without a final fulfilment. The absence 
of an ultimate foundation is made into an ontological condition of contingent 
foundations; as long as there is no self-grounding foundation, all possible 
foundations have to be necessarily contingent. Marchart’s thinking performs a 
double movement: on the one hand, the philosophy of the political difference 
recognises the impossibility of first philosophy or of pure being-as-foundation; 
yet, on the other hand, Marchart substitutes political ontology in place of the 
founding science of all sciences. Agamben, in my opinion, summarises the core 
idea behind the post-foundational approach with the following words: “[T]he 
absence of destiny and ground is thus transformed into an in-finite destiny and 
ground” (Agamben 1999: 134; my emphasis). This infinite destiny is nothing 
more than the groundlessness of Laclau and Mouffe’s articulatory practice that 
abandons human beings to the endless (re-)grounding of a social totality, to the 
hegemonic determinations of the very relation between a signifier and a 
signified, or to the determinations of the passage over potentiality into actuality. 
Living in the end of metaphysics, human practice remains abandoned to the 
never-ending process of articulatory practice. The abyss of potentiality, as it 
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presents itself in the impossibility of an ultimate foundation, is open but im-
passable.  
Counter to Marchart and Laclau’s upholding of the nullified self-grounding 
of the social, Agamben aims at deactivating the undecidable passage of political 
founding that passes through a hollowed out order and the plurality of its ontic 
substitutes or, in other words, through potentiality and actuality. Situated on this 
undecidable passage, political articulation and sovereign decision bring into 
existence a discursive-hegemonic and juridico-political order respectively. Yet, 
there is another hidden option endorsed by Agamben. Namely, political 
groundings, which produce contingent supplements for the structural lack of an 
ultimate foundation, may be rendered inoperative through “the messianic 
fulfilment” that entails two moments – that is to say, the moment of retrieval 
and the moment of revocation (Agamben 2005b: 103–104). To explicate this 
messianic moment concealed in every moment of foundation, the concept of 
potentiality becomes again indispensable here. Let us think of political 
articulation that, as an ungrounded ground, constructs a contingent foundation 
for the complexity of social relations and identities. As the moment of 
foundation, however, political articulation does not necessarily have to institute 
another ontic substitute representing an ultimate foundation in its absence; or, to 
put the same thing differently: political articulation does not have to bring the 
ontological and the ontic into a subversive interplay. Against this path chosen 
by Marchart and Laclau, the political act of institution may actualise its own 
impotentiality, its own potentiality not to be or do. By doing this, political 
articulation as well as sovereign decision turns back upon itself, and it exhibits 
itself as pure potentiality. With impotentiality, an act enacts nothing more than 
its own potentiality to act. So, then, without the realisation of impotentiality, the 
retrieval would be impossible. But it is crucial to add that the function or 
purpose of an action, if it is conceived in the dimension of pure potentiality, is 
revoked. The messianic fulfilment lets therefore grounding pass. The messianic 
fulfilment of grounding acts that articulate the boundary between dichotomous 
opposites is made inoperative. As a consequence, Agamben says: “The un-
groundedness of man is now proper, that is, absolved from all negativity and all 
having been […]” (Agamben 1999: 134). Therefore, the task of politics does 
not necessarily reside in laying foundations for the infinite field of the social as 
Marchart and Laclau believe, but rather in the deactivation of metaphysical 
grounding (Marchart 2011: 969–970; Laclau 2014: 115–225). 
The third and final article of the present dissertation, “Towards a Rethinking 
of Laclau and Mouffe’s Conception of ‘Social Antagonisms’: Agamben’s Criti-
que of Relation”, investigates how Agamben’s reinterpretation of potentiality 
affects Laclau and Mouffe’s understanding of social antagonism. What, from 
my perspective, is at stake in Agamben’s sovereign decision and Laclau/ 
Mouffe’s political articulation is one and the same thing: that is, the passage (or 
alternatively, the limit form of relation and the non-relational relation) between 
dichotomous opposites such as life and law, negativity and positivity, outside 
and inside, heterogeneity and homogeneity, the political and the social. Making 
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a decision on the undecidable passage, political articulation and sovereign 
decision institute an order. Whereas Laclau and Marchart attempt to keep the 
subversive interplay of dichotomies operative, Agamben does not want to fill in 
the empty form of an order with ontic substitutes, but rather to render the 
undecidable passage inoperative. For this reason, Agamben calls into question 
the non-relational relation of which social antagonism is the principal example. 
Yet, although the homo sacer project challenges the limit form of relation, 
Agamben does not, in my opinion, advocate a reconciled society. This strategy 
goes directly against Laclau and Mouffe’s presupposition that social antagonism 
has to be necessarily conceived as the limit form of relation with something 
non-relational or non-presentable. Like in other cases above, Agamben’s 
understanding of the potentiality-actuality passage offers a point of reference 
for rethinking the nature of social antagonism. 
Instead of putting in place new constellations of dichotomous opposites, 
Agamben seeks to render the rearticulation of the antagonistic relation and the 
re-grounding of the sovereign relation inoperative. The inoperativeness trans-
forms political articulation and sovereign decision into a “form-of-life” that 
“always retains the character of a possibility; that is, it always puts at stake 
living itself” (Agamben 2000: 4). This form-of-life does not exhaust itself in 
this or that possibility, in this or that order, or in this or that political existence. 
Rather, it exposes an inextinguishable potentiality due to which any social 
formation is unable to coincide with itself. In this sense, the form-of-life 
expresses the convergence of pure potentiality and pure actuality. The social 
field cannot coincide with itself as long as an activity is never exhausted in 
some particular actuality. To move on, as we know, pure potentiality revokes 
the potentiality-actuality passages or, if you prefer, the never-ending play of 
binaries (for example, the life-law and zoe-bios intersection). That implies that 
other oppositions, such as being and beings, or the political and politics, are 
deactivated as well. Contrary to how it may look, I think, Agamben’s strategy 
of deactivation does not eliminate social antagonism in principle. The 
deactivation of the antagonistic relation does not do away with antagonism as 
such. As I seek to substantiate in my article, the contrary may be the case: the 
form-of-life is an antagonistic power that calls into question the hegemonic self-
signification of the social. This pure power is a radical heterogeneity that does 
not let itself be incorporated or articulated into the equivalential chain as one of 
its moments (see Laclau 2005: 129–156). To sum up, the form-of-life is anta-
gonistic. Thinking, as long as it is inseparable from politics, exemplifies this 
antagonistic force perfectly. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The present dissertation, Giorgio Agamben and Post-Foundational Political 
Ontology, concentrates on Giorgio Agamben’s political philosophy. The disser-
tation consists of the three articles and the introduction. The main objective of 
my articles is not to rationally reconstruct Agamben’s political philosophy in its 
entirety. Nor do I want to write Agamben’s intellectual biography. Instead of 
that, I examine Agamben’s political philosophy in the light of Oliver Marchart 
and Ernesto Laclau’s post-foundational criticism of Agamben that associates 
Agamben’s homo sacer project with the pessimistic reaction to the exhaustion 
of metaphysical and political categories. The dissertation is a response to this 
criticism. 
Central to the arguments of the dissertation is the potentiality-actuality pas-
sage without which it would be hard, if not impossible, to understand Agam-
ben’s discussion on the topics such as messianism, sovereignty, law, and 
language. Through numerous archaeologies and philosophical analyses, Agam-
ben demonstrates the importance of potentiality for the ontological structures of 
metaphysics and politics. He demonstrates that the self-grounding of a juridical 
order rests on negativity or, to be exact, on the potentiality of the law to suspend 
its normal functioning and to exist in the state of privation (i.e., in the state of 
exception). As Agamben emphasises, potentiality (dynamis) is constitutively 
impotentiality (adynamia), that is, potentiality (or capability) is constitutively 
potentiality not to be or do. To be capable of something means simultaneously 
to capable of not realising this particular potential. A capability does not thus 
exist only in act. By virtue of impotentiality, potentiality can turn back upon 
itself and seize hold of itself as pure potentiality. If one succeeds in bringing 
into act all its own impotentiality, then one can appropriate and dwell on the 
potentiality-actuality passage. But, in Agamben’s opinion, the same pure poten-
tiality deactivates the potentiality-actuality passage or, in general terms, the 
subversive interplay between the contingent and the necessary, the negative and 
the positive, the universal and the particular (see Laclau 1990a: 27).  
In my dissertation, I demonstrate that Agamben’s account of potentiality 
transforms the basic tenets of political ontology. Without the concept of poten-
tiality, as my three articles show, it is impossible to grasp the political diffe-
rence between the political and politics, post-foundationalism, and social 
antagonism.  
The dissertation focuses on three critical issues that Marchart and Laclau 
raise regarding Agamben’s philosophy. First, according to Marchart, Agam-
ben’s reflections and archaeologies remain trapped into intellectualism. In his 
view, Agamben collapses “the political difference” between the political (the 
ontological) and politics (the ontic) on the side of the political. Second, from 
Marchart’s and Laclau’s perspective, the breakdown of metaphysical grounding 
discloses the constitutive openness of the social bond; that is why a hegemonic 
politics can reorganise social relations and identities on the basis of some 
emancipatory project. In Marchart’s view, however, Agamben’s ontologising 
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philosophy destroys this openness. Last, from Laclau’s point of view, it is not 
possible to think the antagonistic relation with the help of Agamben’s sovereign 
relation between the all-powerful sovereign and powerless bare life. Additio-
nally, Agamben’s critique of sovereignty negates political power and social 
antagonisms. 
My three articles investigate Marchart and Laclau’s critical claims from 
Agamben’s perspective. 
The first article, entitled “Political Differentiability”, investigates the politi-
cal difference between the political and politics that Marchart’s Post-Founda-
tional Political Thought constructs after the example of the ontological diffe-
rence between being and beings. Following Heidegger’s lead, Marchart claims 
that the task of contemporary political ontology is to reflect on “the political 
difference as political difference”, that is, on the very political difference itself 
between the political and politics. The political difference appears, for 
Marchart, as the never-ending play between the political and politics. From my 
point of view, however, the political differencing puts too much emphasis on 
the effects, on the differentiated – that is, on the political and politics. To grasp 
the political difference as political difference, it is not enough to lay equal stress 
on the ontic and the ontological. In contrast to Marchart, I think it is possible to 
experience the political difference itself when the mutual conditioning of the 
political and politics is made “inoperative”. This deactivation, however, does 
not end in the collapse of the political difference. Through the deactivation, the 
political difference rather comes first into view as political differentiability, as 
pure potentiality, that does not bring about a new constellation of the political 
and politics. As long as political differentiability is the common dimension of 
thinking and acting, Agamben does not fall prey to intellectualism. 
The second research article (“Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Messianic Fulfilment’ of 
Foundationalism in Politics”) examines post-foundational political thought that 
experiences the breakdown of metaphysics or, what amounts to the same thing, 
the absence of an ultimate foundation. In post-foundational political thought, 
represented by Marchart, foundation is not merely and simply absent, but rather 
present in the state of privation as the empty form. This deprived form of 
presence is observable in contingent foundations that signal the absence of an 
ultimate foundation, i.e., the breakdown of transcendent grounding of all beings. 
But contingent foundations, as long as they do not negate the metaphysical 
concept of foundation altogether, embody an ultimate foundation in its absence. 
Contingent foundations, produced by the political acts of grounding, seek to 
absolve us from the abyss that nihilism has uncovered. Marchart’s political 
ontology, moreover, is not just an ontology of politics, but rather the ontology 
of all beings. Political ontology that, in the age of nihilism, takes over the 
impossible role of a first philosophy represents metaphysics in its absence. In 
contrast to post-foundational political ontology, Agamben aims at rendering the 
political acts of grounding inoperative. From my point of view, this does not 
end up in anti-foundationalism insofar as the deactivation takes place through 
the “messianic fulfilment” that consists of two interrelated aspects: the moment 
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of “retrieval” and the moment of “revocation”. The political act of grounding 
retrieves itself when it turns back upon itself and conveys nothing more than 
itself in its pure mediality. The retrieval takes place when an act brings into 
action all its impotentiality and, by doing so, displays itself in the dimension of 
pure potentiality. But an activity, which transmits only itself and nothing beside 
itself, revokes its original end. A gesture, for instance, shows an action or move-
ment itself in its pure mediality. Politics is, for Agamben, the exemplary sight 
of “gesturality” where the empty form of foundationalism can be fulfilled 
messianically.    
The third and final article, “Towards a Rethinking of Laclau and Mouffe’s 
Conception of ‘Social Antagonisms’: Agamben’s Critique of Relation”, exa-
mines one of Laclau’s arguments against the philosophy of Agamben: first, the 
sovereign relation between the sovereign power and bare life does not suit for 
thinking the antagonistic relation; second, the idea behind Agamben’s critique 
of sovereignty is to eliminate entirely social antagonism. To counter these 
claims, I start by showing the connection between Laclau and Mouffe’s discur-
sive conception of hegemony and Agamben’s archaeology of sovereignty. 
What, I maintain, is at stake in both cases is the “limit form of relation” (i.e., the 
“non-relational relation”) that connects the dichotomous opposites such as 
outside and inside, negativity and positivity, life and law into a subversive 
interplay. An order, insofar as it is penetrated by the dichotomous tensions, 
cannot coincidence with itself. The hegemonic relation and the sovereign 
relation are constitutively open for displacements by Laclau and Mouffe’s 
political articulation and Agamben’s sovereign decision. While, for Laclau, the 
antagonistic relation can always be rearticulated, Agamben wants to render the 
discursive reconstruction of the antagonistic relation inoperative, but not 
because of the pessimistic aversion towards social antagonism, but rather 
because of the exhaustion of the antagonistic relation of which the collapse of 
the Left-Right divide is a primary example. The Left-Right distinction, having 
lost its original content, operates in the emptied out form. Homo Sacer, I agree 
with Laclau, challenges the antagonistic relation but from this it does not auto-
matically follow that Agamben aims at establishing a reconciled society, 
communitarian fullness. From Agamben’s perspective, antagonism does not 
have to take the limit form of relation. What, in my opinion, is at stake in 
political ontology is to think social antagonism as the power of life which ruling 
“apparatuses” and hegemonic discourses, in spite of their intentions, fail to 
appropriate. This antagonistic power is perhaps the “form-of-life” that breaks 
the limits relation between the dichotomous opposites such as outside and 
inside, negativity and positivity, life and law.  
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Giorgio Agamben ja Post-Fundatsionalistlik Poliitiline Ontoloogia 
 
Käesolev väitekiri Giorgio Agamben and Post-Foundational Political Ontology 
keskendub Giorgio Agambeni poliitilisele filosoofiale. Väitekiri koosneb kol-
mest artiklist ja sissejuhatusest. Minu artiklite põhieesmärgiks ei ole rekonst-
rueerida Agambeni filosoofiat tervikuna. Samuti ei soovi ma kirjutada Agam-
beni intellektuaalset biograafiat. Väitekirjas uurin ma Agambeni poliitilist filo-
soofiat Oliver Marcharti ja Ernesto Laclau post-fundatsionalistliku kriitika 
valguses, mis seostab Agambeni homo sacer’i-projekti pessimistliku reaktsioo-
niga metafüüsiliste ja poliitiliste põhikategooriate ammendumisele. Väitekiri on 
vastus sellele kriitikale. 
Käesoleva väitekirja kõigi argumentide keskseks teemaks on potentsiaalsuse- 
aktuaalsuse üleminekutsoon. Ilma selleta on raske, kui mitte võimatu mõista 
Agambeni arutlusi säärastel teemadel nagu messianism, suveräänsus, seadus ja 
keel. Oma arvukate uurimustega tõendab Agamben potentsiaalsuse olulisust 
metafüüsika ja poliitika ontoloogilises ülesehituses. Ta näitab, et juriidiline kord 
rajaneb negatiivsusel ehk täpsemalt öeldes korra võimel peatada oma normaalne 
kehtimine ja olla kohal enda puududes. Aristotelesele toetudes rõhutab Agam-
ben pidevalt, et potentsiaalsus (dynamis) on konstitutiivselt mitte-potentsiaalsus 
(adynamis); potentsiaalsus kui võime ehk oskus on konstitutiivselt ka potent-
siaalsus mitte olla või mitte toimida. Olla millekski võimeline tähendab ühtaegu 
olla võimeline seda konkreetset võimet ka mitte realiseerima. Võime ei eksis-
teeri seega mitte ainult teos. Veel enamgi – adynamis’e läbi võib potentsiaalsus 
suhestuda endaga, hõlmates ennast kui puhast potentsiaalsust. Kui kellelgi 
peaks õnnestuma niiviisi realiseerida kogu oma mittepotentisaalsuse, siis ta saab 
omandada ja asuda potentsiaalsuse-aktuaalsuse üleminekutsoonis. Ent seesugu-
ne puhas potentsiaalsus deaktiveerib Agambeni arvates potentsiaalsuse-aktuaal-
suse ülemineku või, teisisõnu, sattumuslikkuse ja paratamatuse, positiivsuse ja 
negatiivsuse, universaalsuse ja partikulaaruse vastastikuse tingituse (Laclau 
1990a: 27).  
Väitekirjas on püütud näidata, et agambenlik arusaam potentsiaalsusest 
kujundab ümber poliitilise ontologia põhijooned. Ilma potentsiaalsuseta, nagu 
tõestavad kolm artiklit, ei ole võimalik mõista poliitilist diferentsi, post-fundat-
sionalismi ja sotsiaalseid antagonisme. 
Väitekiri keskendub kolmele otsustavale probleemile, mis Marcharti ja Lac-
lau arvates vaevavad Agambeni filosoofiat. Esiteks jäävat Agambeni mõtisk-
lused ja „arheoloogiad” Marcharti arvates intellektualismi küüsi. „Homo sacer“ 
tühistavat poliitilisuse (ontoloogilise) ja poliitika (ontilise) diferentsi poliiti-
lisuse kasuks. Teiseks toovat metafüüsika kokkuvarisemine Laclau ja Marcharti 
vaatenurgast vaadatuna ilmsiks sotsiaalse seose konstitutiivse avatuse ehk 
sattumuslikkuse, mille tõttu hegemoniaalne poliitika võib sotsiaalseid suhteid ja 
identiteete alati ümber defineerida. Marchart on seisukohal, et Agambeni onto-
logiseeriv filosoofia hävitab selle avatuse. Kui kolmandaks ja viimaks lähtuda 
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Agambeni suveräänsest suhtest, milles on vastamisi kõikvõimas suverään ja 
täiesti võimuta „pelk elu“, siis ei ole Laclau arvates üldse võimalik kõnelda 
antagonistlikust suhtest. Lisaks, nagu nähtub suveräänsuse kriitikast, olevat 
Agamben vaenulik poliitilise võimu ja sotsiaalse antagonism kui selliste suhtes. 
Minu artikleis on neid Marcharti ja Laclau kriitilisi väiteid uuritud Agam-
beni seisukohalt. 
Esimeses artiklis „Political Differentiability“ („Poliitiline diferentseerita-
vus“) käsitletakse poliitilist diferentsi, mille Marchart konstrueerib Martin 
Heideggeri olemise ja oleva „ontoloogilise diferentsi“ käsitusele toetudes oma 
teoses „Post-Foundatinal Political Thought“. Marchart väidab Heideggerile 
viidates, et tänapäeva poliitilise ontoloogia põhiülesanne on mõtelda „poliitilist 
diferentsi kui poliitilist diferentsi“, see tähendab poliitilisuse ja poliitika polii-
tilist diferentsi ennast. Marcharti arvates ilmneb poliitiline diferents poliitilisuse 
(ontoloogilise) ja poliitika (ontilise) lõputu mänguna nende vastastikuses 
tingituses. Kuid poliitiline diferents kui mäng rõhutab minu arvates diferentset 
ehk diferentseid külgi diferentsis – see tähendab poliitilisust ja poliitikat. 
Selleks, et kogeda poliitilist diferentsi kui poliitilist diferentsi ennast, ei piisa 
ainult ontilise ja ontoloogilise võrdväärsuse rõhutamisest. Agambenile tugine-
des tulekski arvata, et poliitilist diferentsi on võimalik kogeda ainult siis, kui 
peatada poliitilisuse ja poliitika mäng. See ei tühista poliitilist diferensi. Alles 
seejärel, kui poliitilisuse ja poliitika mäng deaktiveeritakse, saadakse minu 
arvates pilku poliitiline diferents ise. See ilmneb kui poliitiline diferentseeri-
tavus ehk eristatavus, kui puhas potentsiaalsus, mis ei tõsta esiplaanile poliitili-
suse ja poliitika uut konstellatsiooni. Veelgi enam – võib väita, et Agamben ei 
lange intellektualismi küüsi, kuna poliitiline eristatavus tähendab mõtlemise ja 
tegutsemise ühist dimensiooni.  
Teises artiklis – „Giorgio Agamben’s ’Messianic Fulfilment’ of Foundatio-
nalism in Politics“ („Giorgio Agambeni fundatsionalismi ’messiaanlik täide-
viimine’ poliitikas“) – keskendutakse post-fundatsionalistlikule poliitilisele 
mõtlemisele, mis kogeb metafüüsika ammendumist ja viimase põhja puudumist. 
Marcharti järgi ei ole post-fundatsionalistlikus mõtlemises põhi mitte pelgalt 
puudu, vaid see on puududes pigem kohal kui tühi vorm. Säärane puudu-olu 
kohal-olu on äratuntav „sattumuslikes põhjades“, mis viitavadki viimase põhja 
puudumisele ja metafüüsilise põhjamise ammendumisele. Sattumuslikud põhjad 
on oma fundatsionalistliku olemuse kaotanult õõnsad põhjad ehk mitte-põhjad. 
Sattumuslikud põhjad, mille on esile toonud poliitilised põhjamisteod, tahavad 
meid lunastada põhjatusest, mille on paljastanud nihilism. Veelgi enam – 
Marcharti poliitiline ontoloogia ei ole lihtsalt poliitika ontoloogia, vaid pigem 
kogu oleva ontoloogia. Poliitiline ontoloogia, mis nihilismi ajastul võtab üle 
võimatuna näiva esimese filosoofia koha, esindab metafüüsikat selle puudu-
olus. Erinevalt post-fundatsionalistlikust poliitilisest ontoloogiast seab Agam-
ben oma eesmärgiks seisata poliitilised põhjamis- ehk asutamisteod. Selle stra-
teegia tulemuseks ei ole anti-fundatsionalism, kuna seiskamine toimub „mes-
siaanliku täideviimise“ (ingl. messianic fulfilment) läbi. Sellel on kaks omavahel 
seotud momenti: „tagasisaamine“ (it. riprendere) ja „tühistamine“ (it. revocare). 
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Põhjamine ehk asutamine kui tegu saavutab enda tagasi siis, kui ta suhestub 
endaga ega vahenda mitte midagi muud peale enda oma puhtas „vahendus-
likkuses“ (engl. mediality). Tagasisaamine leiab aset siis, kui tegutsemine 
realiseerib kogu oma mittepotentsiaalsuse, näidates ennast sedasi oma puhtas 
potentsiaalsuses. Ent see tegutsemine, mis vahendab ainult ennast ega mitte 
midagi muud peale enda, „tühistab” oma algupärase sihi ja tähenduse. Poliitika 
on Agambeni jaoks puhta vahenduslikkuse eksemplaarne sfäär, milles võimal-
dub poliitilisi põhjamistegusid messiaanlikult täide viia. Näiteks vahendab žest 
tegu või liikumist ennast nende puhtas vahenduslikkuses. Poliitika on Agam-
beni seisukohalt sfäär, milles viiakse messiaanlikult täide fundatsionalismi 
puhas vorm. 
Kolmandas artiklis – „Towards a Rethinkig Laclau and Mouffe’s Conception 
of ’Social Antagonisms’: Agamben’s Critique of Relation“ („Laclau ja Mouffe’i 
’sotsiaalsete antagonismide’ kontseptsiooni ümbermõtestamise poole: Agam-
beni ’relatsiooni’ kriitika“) – uuritakse Laclau peamisi argumente Agambeni 
filosoofia vastu. Esiteks ei sobivat Agambeni suveräänsuse käsitus, mis vastan-
dab suveräänse võimu ja pelga elu, „antagonistiliku suhte“ mõtestamiseks. 
Teiseks ei jätvat Agambeni radikaalne suveräänuse-kriitika ka ruumi ühiskond-
likele antagonismidele. Et vastata nimetatud väidetele, alustan sellest, et näitan, 
kuidas Laclau/Mouffe’i diskursiivse hegemoonia kontseptsioon ja Agambeni 
suveräänsuse- arheoloogia omavahel seostuvad. Väidan, et mõlema lähenemise 
puhul on kaalul „piirsuhe“ ehk „mittesuhestuslik suhe“ (ingl. non-relational 
relation), mis liidab niisugused dihhotoomilised vastandid nagu sisemine ja 
välimine, negatiivne ja positiivne, elu ja seadus teineteist konstitueerivasse 
vastastikusse mängu. Kord, mida lõhestavad dihhotoomilised pinged, ei ole 
endaga mitte kunagi kooskõlas. Nii hegemoniaalne kui ka suveräänne suhe on 
konstitutiivselt avatud. Agambeni suveräänne otsus ja Laclau/Mouffe’i poliiti-
line artikulatsioon võivad piirsuhte alati uuesti määratleda. Kui Laclau arvates 
on antagonistliku suhte kuju alati teisendatav, siis Agamben tahab hoopis 
seisata antagonistliku suhte diskursiivse konstrueerimise, ent seda mitte pessi-
mistlikust vastumeelsusest sotsiaalsete antagonismide suhtes, vaid pigem 
sellepärast, et antagonism kui suhe on ennast ammendanud. Selle peamiseks 
näiteks on parempoolsuse ja vasakpoolsuse kollaps. Vasakpoolsuse ja parem-
poolsuse vastandus, mis on kaotanud oma sisu, eksisteerib kui puhas vorm. Ma 
olen nõus Laclauga, et „Homo Sacer“ vaidlustab antagonistliku suhte, kuid 
sellest ei tulene automaatselt, et Agamben tahab rajada harmoonilist ühiskonda, 
kus puuduksid kõik lõhed. Agambeni seisukohast vaadatuna ei pea sotsiaalne 
antagonism ilmtingimata võtma piirsuhte kuju. Poliitiline ontoloogia peab minu 
arvates proovima mõtelda antagonistlikku suhet kui võimu, mida valitsevad 
„dispositiivid“ ja hegemoniaalsed diskursused ei suuda isegi oma parima 
tahtmise korral mitte kuidagi endale allutada. 
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SUMMARY IN FINNISH24 
Giorgio Agamben ja Perustan Jälkeinen Poliittinen Ontologia 
Tämä väitöskirja (Giorgio Agamben and Post-Foundational Political Ontology) 
käsittelee Giorgio Agambenin poliittista filosofiaa. Väitöskirja koostuu kol-
mesta artikkelista ja johdannosta. Artikkeleiden pyrkimyksenä ei ole rationaa-
lisesti rekonstruoida Agambenin poliittista filosofiaa kokonaisuudessaan. Kyse 
ei myöskään ole Agambenin intellektuaalisesta biografiasta. Sen sijaan väitös-
kirjassa tarkastellaan Oliver Marchartin ja Ernesto Laclaun Agambeniin kohdis-
tuvaa kritiikkiä, jossa Agambenin homo sacer – projekti nähdään pessimistisenä 
reaktiona metafysiikan ja poliittisten kategorioiden nihilistiseen ehtymiseen. 
Väitöskirja on vastaus tähän kritiikkiin. 
Väitöskirjan keskeinen käsite on kulkureitti potentialisuudesta akatuaali-
suuteen. Ilman sitä on lähes mahdotonta ymmärtää Agambenin ajattelun muita 
aiheita – sellaisia kuten messianismi, suvereenisuus, laki ja kieli. Lukuisissa 
”arkeologioissaan” ja filosofisissa analyyseissaan Agamben osoittaa, että ajatus 
potentiaalisuudesta on keskeinen metafysiikan ja politiikan ontologisille raken-
teille. Hän osoittaa, että juridisen järjestyksen perusta lepää negatiivisuudessa ja 
tarkemmin sanoen lain kyvyssä kumota normaali toimintansa ja olla olemassa 
tässä kumoamisessa (poikkeustila). Kuten Agamben korostaa, kyky tai poten-
tiaalisuus (dynamis) on olennaisesti samalla impotentiaalisuutta (adynamia): 
potentiaalisuus on konstitutiivisesti potentiaalisuutta ei olla tai ei tehdä. Pystyä 
johonkin merkitsee samalla kykyä olla toteuttamatta tätä määrättyä potentiaali-
suutta. Kyky ei ole olemassa ainoastaan teossa. Impotentiaalisuuden ansiosta 
potentiaalisuus voi pitää kiinni itsestään potentiaalisuutena, joka ei kuluta 
itseään loppuun aktuaalisuudessa. Jos impotentiaalisuus kyetään tuomaan koko-
naisuudessaan tekoon, kyetään omaksumaan kulkureitti potentialisuudesta 
akatuaalisuuteen ja asuttamaan sitä. Agambenin mukaan tämä sama puhdas 
potentiaalisuus kuitenkin myös deaktivoi kulkureitin potentiaalisuudesta aktuaali-
suuteen tai yleisemmin ilmaistuna, subversiivisen pelin kontingentin ja välttä-
mättömän, negatiivisen ja positiivisen sekä yleisen ja erityisen välillä. 
Väitöskirjassani esitän, että Agambenin potentiaalisuuden käsite muuttaa 
käsitystämme poliittisesta ontologiasta. Ilman potentiaalisuuden käsitettä on 
mahdotonta ymmärtää poliittista eroa poliittisen (the political) ja politiikan 
(politics) välillä, ”post-foundationalismia” ja sosiaalista antagonismia.  
Väitöskirja keskittyy kolmeen Marchartin ja Laclaun esiin nostamaan 
Agambenia koskevaan kriittiseen kysymykseen. Marchartin mukaan, ensin-
näkin, Agambenin ajattelu ja hänen ”arkeologiansa” jäävät intellektualismin 
loukkuun. Hänen mukaansa Agamben palauttaa ”poliittisen eron” poliittisen 
(ontologinen) ja politiikan (onttinen) välillä poliittisen puolelle. Marchartin ja 
Laclaun näkökulmasta, toiseksi, metafyysisen perustan tuhoutuminen paljastaa 
sosiaalisen siteen konstitutiivisen avoimuuden hegemoniselle politiikalle, joka 
                                                     
24  I am gratful to Mika Ojakangas for this translation. 
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mahdollistaa sosiaalisten suhteiden organisoimisen uudelleen jonkin emansipa-
torisen projektin pohjalta. Marchartin mukaan Agambenin ontologisoiva filo-
sofia kuitenkin hävittää tämän avoimuuden. Kolmanneksi, Laclaun mukaan on 
mahdotonta ajatella antagonistista suhdetta Agambenin suvereenin käsitteen 
avulla – käsitteen, joka jakautuu kaikkivoipaan suvereeniin ja voimattomaan 
paljaaseen elämään. Tämän lisäksi Agambenin suvereenin kritiikki kieltää 
poliittisen vallan ja sosiaaliset vastakkainasettelut.  
Väitöskirjan kolme artikkelia tarkastelevat Marchartin ja Laclaun kriittisiä 
väitteitä Agambenin näkökulmasta.  
Ensimmäisen artikkeli “Political Differentiability” tarkastelee Marchartin 
teoksessaan Post-Foundational Political Thought hahmottamaa ja ontologiseen 
olemisen ja olevan väliseen eroon nojaavaa poliittista eroa poliittisen ja 
politiikan välillä. Heideggeria mukaillen Marchart väittää, että nykyisen poliit-
tisen ontologian tehtävänä on miettiä poliittista eroa poliittisena erona – toisin 
sanoen eroa poliittisen ja politiikan välillä itsessään poliittisena. Marchartin 
mukaan tämä ero näyttäytyy loputtomana poliittisen ja politiikan välisenä 
pelinä. Väitöskirjassani kuitenkin esitän, että Marchartin poliittinen ero korostaa 
liikaa sitä, mitä se erottaa eli poliittista ja politiikkaa. Jotta poliittinen ero ym-
märretään poliittisena, ei riitä, että korostetaan yhtä paljon ontologista ja onttista 
puolta. Nähdäkseni vasta sitten, kun toisiaan ehdollistavat poliittinen ja poli-
tiikka on tehty toimettomaksi, on mahdollista kokea poliittinen ero sellaisenaan. 
Tämä toimettomaksi tekeminen ei kuitenkaan pääty poliittisen eron häviä-
miseen. Pikemminkin toimettomaksi tekemisen avulla poliittinen ero tulee 
ensimmäistä kertaa esille poliittisena erottelukykynä (differentiability), puh-
taana potentiaalisuutena, joka ei tuota uutta poliittisen ja politiikan erottavaa 
rakennetta. Sikäli kuin poliittinen erottelukyky on yhteistä ajattelulle ja toimin-
nalle, Agamben ei sorru intellektualismiin. 
Toinen artikkeli “Giorgio Agamben’s ‘Messianic Fulfilment’ of Foundatio-
nalism in Politics” tarkastelee ”post-foundationalistista” poliittista ajattelua, 
jolle keskeistä on metafysiikan loppu tai – mikä tarkoittaa samaa – lopullisen 
perustojen poissaolo. Marchartin edustamassa ”post-foundationalistisessa” 
poliittisessa ajattelussa perusta ei ole ainoastaan ja yksikertaisesti poissa, vaan 
pikemminkin läsnä puutteena ja tyhjänä muotona. Tämä heikko läsnäolon 
muoto näyttäytyy kontingenteissa perustoissa, jotka viestittävät lopullisen 
perustan poissaloa, toisin sanoen olevan transsendenttisen perustamisen tuhou-
tumista. Kontingentit perustat, sikäli kuin ne eivät kumoa perustan metafyysistä 
käsitettä kokonaisuudestaan, ruumiillistavat lopullista perustaa sen poissaolossa. 
Kontingentit perustat, joita tuotetaan perustamisen poliittisilla teoilla, pyrkivät 
pelastamaan meidät siitä kuilusta, jonka nihilismin aikakausi on paljastanut. 
Marchartin poliittinen ontologia ei kuitenkaan ole vain politiikan ontologiaa 
vaan kaikkien olevien ontologiaa. Poliittinen ontologia, joka nihilismin aika-
kaudella ottaa ensimmäisen filosofian mahdottoman roolin, edustaa meta-
fysiikkaa sen poissaolossa. Toisin kuin ”post-foundationalistinen” poliittinen 
ontologia, Agamben pyrkii tekemään ”foundationalismin” ja samalla perustoja 
luovat poliittiset teot toimimattomiksi. Tämä ei johda ”anti-foundationalismiin”, 
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sillä toimimattomaksi tekeminen tapahtuu messiaanisessa täyttymyksessä, joka 
muodostuu kahdesta toisiinsa suhteessa olevasta ulottuvuudesta: vetäytymisen 
ja kumoamisen momenteista. Perustamisen teko vetäytyy itseensä, kun se 
kääntyy itseensä ja näyttää itsensä ja pelkästään itsensä sen omassa välitet-
tävyydessään. Vetäytyminen tapahtuu, kun teko tuo aktuaalisuuteen kaiken 
impotentiaalisuutensa ja niin tehdessään kokee puhtaan potentiaalisuutensa. 
Aktiivisuus, joka näyttää itsensä puhtaan potentiaalisuuden ulottuvuudessa, 
kumoaa sen alkuperäisen tehtävän. Esimerkiksi ele (gesture) paljastaa teon sen 
omassa välitettävyydessään ja näin tehdessään se kumoaa teon alkuperäisen 
merkityksen. Agambenille politiikka on eleellisyyden (gesturality) alue, jossa 
”foundationalismin” tyhjä muoto täytetään messiaanisesti.  
Kolmas artikkeli “Towards a Rethinking Laclau and Mouffe Conception of 
‘Social Antagonisms’: Agamben’s Critique of Relation” tarkastelee Laclaun 
Agambenin filosofiaan kohdistamia kriittisiä argumentteja. Laclaun mukaan, 
ensinnäkin, suvereenin vallan ja paljaan elämän välinen suvereeni suhde ei 
pysty ajattelemaan antagonistista suhdetta; toiseksi, Agambenin suvereeni-
suuden kritiikin tarkoituksena on tuhota sosiaalinen antagonismi kokonai-
suudessaan. Vastauksessani tähän kritiikkiin osoitan, että Laclaun ja Mouffen 
hegemonian diskursiivisen käsitteen ja Agambenin suvereenisuuden arkeo-
logian välillä on yhteys. Molemmissa tapauksissa on kyse suhteen rajamuodosta 
(i.e. ei-suhteellisesta suhteesta), jossa sellaiset dikotomiset vastakohdat kuten 
ulkopuoli ja sisäpuoli, negatiivisuus ja positiivisuus, elämä ja laki yhdistyvät 
subversiivisessa vuorovaikutuksessa. Sikäli kuin järjestystä leimaa tällainen 
dikotominen jännite, se ei voi käydä yksiin itsensä kanssa. Agambenin suve-
reeni päätös ja Laclaun ja Mouffen poliittinen artikulaatio tekevät hegemo-
nisesta ja suvereenista suhteesta konstitutiivisesti avoimia muutoksille ja siir-
tymille. Laclaun mukaan antagonistinen suhde voidaan aina artikuloida uudel-
leen, kun taas Agamben haluaa tehdä antagonistisen suhteen diskursiivisen 
rekonstruktion kokonaan toimettomaksi – ei siksi, että hän tuntisi vastenmie-
lisyyttä sosiaalisia vastakkainasetteluja kohtaan vaan koska antagonistiset 
suhteet, joista vasemmisto-oikeisto -jako on hyvä esimerkki, ovat ehtyneet. 
Menetettyään alkuperäisen sisältönsä vasemmisto-oikeisto jako toimii tyhjenty-
neessä muodossaan. Olen samaa mieltä Laclaun kanssa, että Agambenin teos 
Homo Sacer haastaa antagonistisen suhteen, mutta tästä ei automaattisesti 
seuraa, että Agamben pyrkisi perustamaan sopusointuisen yhteiskunnan tai 
yhteisöllisen täyteyden. Agambenin näkökulmasta antagonismin ei tarvitse 
omaksua suhteen rajamuotoa. Poliittisessa ontologiassa panoksena on ajatella 
sosiaalisia vastakkainasetteluja elämän voimana, jotka hallitsevan ”koneistot” 
niiden pyrkimyksistä huolimatta eivät kykene alistamaan tai tekemään tyhjäksi. 
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